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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the ways in which soldiers use language to report and 
structure their experiences of conflict.  In particular, it examines autobiographical 
descriptions of acts of killing from wars across the 20th and 21st century.  Beginning with 
the application of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 2008) to a clause-level Critical 
Discourse Analysis of lexicogrammar (cf. Hart, 2013; 2014; 2018), it shows that diverse 
stylistic strategies construe force and causality in a number of ways.  In doing so, the 
study also reinforces the importance of narrative context and background knowledge in 
the interpretation of individual clauses.  Considering the applicability and limitations of 
Cognitive Grammar to discourse-level analysis (following Pincombe, 2014), the thesis 
presents a novel approach to the representation of the perception of intentionality in 
language.  It argues that inferred intentions can function as reference points (Langacker, 
2008; Harrison, 2017), marking continuity or deviation from mind-modelled (Stockwell, 
2009) norms associated with the perception of an agent across discourse.  In addition, 
the thesis calls into question the specificity with which analysts define and distinguish 
between social and linguistic agency, and conducts a reader-response study, finding that 
readers’ perceptions of agents’ intentionality differ from their assessments of 
responsibility.  Overall, the analysis demonstrates that Cognitive Grammar can 
effectively account for the ideological construal of killing in soldiers’ writings, and that 
the adaptation of the model to consider the perception of intentionality promises 
further novel developments in the critical and stylistic analysis of discourse from a 
cognitive perspective. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Overview 
 
 This thesis is the first linguistic study of soldiers’ war writings.  Focusing on first-
person descriptions of acts of killing, it explores how language is employed by soldiers to 
represent violent acts for civilian readers.  While the language of war in political and 
news discourse has been analysed extensively (cf. Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Lakoff, 1991; 
Butt et al., 2004; Seaton, 2005; Robinson et al., 2010; Seo, 2013), writings produced by 
soldiers themselves, in the form of diaries, letters, and memoirs, have been largely 
ignored as sources for linguistic research.  Thorne (2006), for example, examines the 
‘language of war’, from military naming conventions to propaganda to media coverage, 
but does not discuss the ways in which soldiers themselves construct discursive 
representations of their experiences.    Although some research exists which situates 
soldiers’ writings within historical and social contexts (Carden-Coyne, 2009; 
McLoughlin, 2009), Roper (2005) has observed that existing academic commentary on 
soldiers’ writings about their own experiences ‘has little to say […] about how such 
experiences were assimilated mentally or contained within writing’ (345).  While Benke 
and Wodak (2003) examine the discursive structure of veterans’ experiences in oral 
interviews, the written form of soldiers’ personal accounts have not yet been explored in 
terms of their stylistic features.  This thesis therefore contributes to the extensive critical 
literature on the ideological construction of war and violence both through the 
investigation of an understudied genre, and the evaluation and development of its 
analytical methods.
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 Soldiers’ accounts of their personal experiences of war are highly ideologically 
charged, and descriptions of acts of violence will always be prone to politicised 
representation and interpretation.  Consider the following quote from a letter, written 
home from the front lines in May 1916 by teacher turned officer, Capt. Theodore Wilson: 
All those picturesque phrases of war writers – such as “he flung the remnants 
of his Guard against the enemy,” “a magnificent charge won the day and the 
victorious troops, etc. etc.,” are dangerous because they show nothing of the 
individual horror, nothing of the fine personalities smashed suddenly into red 
beastliness, nothing of the sick fear that is tearing at the hearts of brave boys 
who ought to be laughing at home – a thing infinitely more terrible than 
physical agony.  It isn’t death we fear so much as the long-drawn expectation 
of it – the sight of other fine fellows ripped horribly out of existence by 
“reeking shard,” as a great War-journalist says who spoke (God forgive him) 
of “a fine killing” in some battle or other.’ (in Housman, 1930: 299-300)   
Wilson expresses his frustration at the failure of war journalists’ language to capture the 
experience of conflict at the level of personal experience.  In the examples he cites, 
individual soldiers never simply act upon their enemy.  Instead, they are presented as 
instruments controlled by officers, (‘he flung his guard’), rendered absent through 
nominalisations which draw attention to the action, as opposed to the actor (‘a fine 
killing’), or grouped together in a single mass, already evaluated ideologically (‘a 
magnificent charge’).  That Wilson expresses such frustration at the failure of these 
passages to communicate a personal experience of conflict highlights the value in 
understanding the ways in which language is able to represent and renegotiate the 
events it purports to describe.  In choosing which of these aspects to emphasise or 
minimise in their descriptions, writers describing the experience of war can drastically 
alter the reader’s perception of a conflict, as well as those who take part in the fighting. 
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Of course, the language employed by soldiers themselves also necessarily adopts 
ideological positions in the description of their actions, and the primary aim of this 
thesis is to examine these texts critically, asking how narrators present themselves as 
agents of the act of killing.  In doing so, the self-reflexive approach aims to evaluate 
existing and emerging trends in critical and stylistic analyses of actions and events in 
language, developing a sophisticated model of agency which breaks the concept into its 
constituent elements for thorough analysis.  Beginning with the close reading of 
individual clauses, the thesis gradually introduces the issues and methods relating to 
critical and stylistic analysis, eventually working towards the consideration of discourse 
structure and social context in linguistic meaning.  According to Hewitson (2010), wars 
‘are at once individual and collective, heroic and anonymous, voluntary and mechanical 
events’ (310), and the critical analysis performed throughout this research aims to 
capture the range of perceptual and ideological responses to killing in war.  While this 
work is performed in relation to acts of violence in war writing, the model of analysis 
offered is applicable beyond this genre. 
1.2: Texts and Contexts 
 
 The narratives examined in this thesis have been collected from a number of 
sources.  As this thesis is interested in the language of ordinary soldiers, published work 
by literary figures who were involved in wars of the twentieth century have not been 
included amongst the primary material. Instead, personal papers of soldiers from the 
First and Second World Wars from the archives of the Imperial War Museum are 
examined, alongside several published collections of autobiographical writing from 
‘everyday’ soldiers (Purdom, 1930; Housman, 1930), as well as several book-length 
memoirs by soldiers of more recent conflicts (Lukowiak, 1999; Martin and Sasser, 2010; 
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McCurley and Maurer, 2013).  In conducting research for The Great War and Modern 
Memory (2013), Paul Fussell also explored the archives of the Imperial War Museum, 
where he found that: 
There were little notebooks still stiff with the mud of the Somme or Ypres.  
There were field orders, platoon rosters, copies of letters from boy lieutenants 
to the parents of the dead, mangled identity disks, their string dark with the 
sweat of some hopeful boy killed violently a half-century before […] 
Confronted with such an abundance, I knew I would have to impose strict 
limits on my curiosity (368) 
Similarly, in examining the archives for this project, access to sources at the Imperial 
War Museum was requested based on archival notes which indicated that the authors 
described first-hand experiences of killing during conflict.  It is important to note, 
however, that not all soldiers feel that acts of killing are the focus of their military 
identities (cf. Taylor, 2013: 106).  Accordingly, in selecting archival material for analysis, 
only texts which directly discussed acts of killing were included in the final study.  
Although this thesis limits its corpus to texts which discuss such acts explicitly, they 
nonetheless represent a range of ideological positions regarding killing in war.  In total, 
25 narratives are examined, providing an initial indication of stylistic trends across the 
genre.  These texts are discussed individually in relation to a range of clause-level and 
discourse-level stylistic features, and general patterns emerge with regards to their 
construals of violence.  Given the size of the corpus, these features are presented as 
promising indicators for future research into the genre of war writing.  More concretely, 
these studies offer the development of a range of clausal and narrative level approaches 
to analysis, through which agency and responsibility can be discussed, and which can be 
applied to both literary and non-literary discourse studies in future research. 
 Critically analysing veterans’ construals of their military experiences is 
particularly challenging, owing to the unique social authority claimed of these 
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individuals over their experiences.  As Harari (2009) has observed, the process of 
presenting and discussing military experience in an academic context necessarily opens 
the text up to questioning; a process which is sometimes seen as challenging the soldiers’ 
experiences: 
some scholars take it upon themselves to bring the voices of the dead or 
marginalized flesh-witness into the academic conference hall, the university 
seminar room, or the TV studio, and tell people: "this is the real truth about 
war." 
     Yet even this gesture is highly problematic.  By bringing the flesh-witness 
into the conference hall the sympathetic scholar brings the witness into a 
hostile environment which immediately begins to question, twist, and 
destroy the flesh-witness narrative and its authority.  No matter what the 
personal opinions of the people at the conference hall or the TV studio, the 
rules and atmosphere of the place swiftly cancel the flesh-witness, leaving 
behind "nothing more than words," as Andre Maillet might have said. (223-4) 
In focusing on the stylistic choices soldiers make in representing violence, the aim of 
this research is not to claim that individuals are misrepresenting their experiences for 
ideological purposes.  Rather, it aims to model and examine the inherent subjectivity of 
both reporting experience and inferring meaning from text. Throughout this thesis, the 
social power of soldiers’ positions as veterans is considered in terms of the power 
dynamic between reader and author, and the accessibility of knowledge through 
language.  Indeed, as the discussion of this project unfolds, it becomes increasingly clear 
that an account of meaning which concerns itself with ‘nothing more than words’ 
misrepresents the process of understanding which makes up the act of reading about 
war and the act of killing.  My interest in these military memoirs is the challenge to 
social norms that their contents provide, and the tensions they place on the ability to 
effectively share in an experience transformed into language.  Although primarily 
concerned with framing its discussion in terms of the critical and stylistic issues 
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associated with the representation of war, the thesis also engages with existing academic 
literature from a military historical perspective.  As well as providing context to the 
research surrounding war writing, these sources also often provide evidence of the 
importance attributed to language by non-linguist researchers. 
1.3: Linguistic Framework 
 
 While the precise theoretical framework of the account of language, grammar, 
and discourse employed throughout this thesis will be outlined in greater detail 
throughout Chapter 2, it is worth stating its nature broadly from the outset.  This 
research is primarily conducted through the application of cognitivist approaches to 
language, as developed in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 2008; 2009) and Cognitive 
Poetics (Stockwell, 2009; Harrison et al., 2014; Harrison, 2017), as well as in Critical 
Discourse Analysis (O’Halloran, 2003; Hart and Lukeš, 2007; Hart, 2013; 2014; 2018; van 
Dijk, 2014; 2017).  This thesis contributes to this literature by demonstrating the value of 
Cognitive Grammar in the analysis of acts of violence, and the perception of agency 
across discourse.   
 In adopting cognitive and critical approaches to language, this thesis also 
attends to the challenges and limitations associated with these frameworks.  O’Halloran 
(2003), for example, observes that specialist readers interested in the text as an object of 
analysis do not always reflect the ways in which every-day readers engage with and 
interpret the same texts.  Hence, inference and the perception of intentionality and 
responsibility are discussed in close relation to practical, reader-oriented studies (3.5; 7.5) 
which situate the consequent close readings in relation to the interpretative practices of 
non-specialist readers.  Likewise, stylistics has a long and rich history of interest in the 
representation of experience in language.  From Simpson’s (2003) engagement with 
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ideation to Stockwell’s (2009) concept of mind-modelling, linguistic researchers who 
prioritise the discussion of language choices and their literary effects provide a valuable 
framework when transitioning from single-clause analyses to the discussion of their 
broader narrative contexts, as well as readers’ perceptions.  According to Wales (2014), 
stylistic analysis must be ‘scrupulously systematic and explicit and therefore transparent 
and retrievable, so that other people can understand how an interpretation has been 
reached’ (34).  Likewise, Hart (2018) describes how a ‘commitment to triangulation’ (400) 
in Critical Discourse Analysis supports the interpretations of the individual analyst 
through additional data and experimentation. 
 Across both critical and stylistic analysis, methodologies differ for textual 
analysis with regards to the prominence of text-external features.  For instance, van Dijk 
(2006; 2009; 2014) has proposed a cognitivist model of Critical Discourse Analysis which 
aims to triangulate the relationship between discourse, cognition, and society as 
inextricable from one another, and CDA more generally closely associates language with 
institutional practices (cf. Montgomery, 1995; Fairclough, 2001).  By contrast, Jeffries 
argues that while these approaches demonstrate the importance of socio-political 
context in analysis, they require ‘specific tools of analysis’ (2010: 6) in order to relate 
these observations of function more precisely to linguistic form, and ‘Critical Stylistics’ 
views the text as the primary interest of its commentary (cf. Ch. 2.2.2).  However, as 
cognitive approaches to language and discourse analysis necessarily treat language as a 
subset of everyday cognition, the background knowledge of the individual reader is 
viewed as key to interpreting and inferring meaning (Langacker, 2008: 463; van Dijk, 
2014).  Thus, while this thesis is primarily interested in the language of violence, 
language itself is viewed throughout as a socio-cognitive phenomenon, and 
understanding the social factors which affect perception is an essential dimension of its 
analysis and discussion.  In particular, the importance of readers’ personal background 
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knowledge regarding causality, intentionality, and responsibility for actions is developed 
over the course of the analysis, which is continually revised through a reflexive 
discussion at the end of each chapter. 
1.4: CDA and Social Change 
 
 While stylistic analysis is often conceived with the aim of producing literary 
commentary on a text, or working through a particular linguistic issue, Hart (2014) has 
noted that Critical Discourse Analysis ‘aims at achieving social change’ (2).  That is, it 
performs its critical analysis with the aim of uncovering the means by which language 
construes ideologically charged perspectives, or uses the recognition of inequalities in 
discourse to make commentary relating to broader institutional issues, such as sexism or 
racism.  Fairclough (2009) goes further, suggesting that CDA should ‘contribute to 
addressing the social ‘wrongs’ of the day […] by analysing their sources and causes, 
resistance to them and possibilities of overcoming them’ (163).  War writings concerned 
with acts of violence contain social ‘wrongs’, the language of which often construes the 
actors and victims involved in differing degrees of focus according to the ideological 
frame of the narration.  While the act of killing is clearly an example of a ‘social wrong’, 
its context within warfare can challenge the straightforward evaluation of its morality: in 
times of war, and self-defence, harming or killing another person may be considered by 
some actors and readers to be acceptable.   
 In the majority of cases, Critical Discourse Analysis takes as its subject language 
produced by or in support of ideological and political values which conflict with those of 
the researcher.  In doing so, it aims to uncover how the language of this opposition 
conceals its ideological purpose.  Analysing the language of Adolf Eichmann’s defence at 
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the Nuremburg Trials, Schwelien (1961) describes how an analysis of his speech can 
reveal ‘hidden’ truths: 
Eichmann does not suspect that exactly where he is - stubbornly or cannily-
shrewdly, lying or covering and cloaking - trying to turn the truth of the 
events and of his deeds into its opposite, he actually lets the whole truth 
surface.  Not that what he is saying is of importance for posterity, but how he 
says it, for as pure language mirrors truth in thought, in the jargon of 
violence, dark inhumanity is reflected relentlessly even where it is supposed 
to remain hidden. (Schwelien 1961: 6, trans. Segev, 2013: 52) 
In developing an understanding of the relationship between language and ideology, 
through the analysis of fascist and racist discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis often 
approaches language in terms of what it conceals.  Indeed, Butt et al. (2004) go so far as 
to describe language as the ‘first covert operation of war’.  However, many soldiers are 
upfront about their experiences in combat, and Bourke (1999) has extensively sourced 
testimony from soldiers who describe their role in conflict as enjoyable or pleasurable.  
In other words, a critical approach to the language of war writing which aims to uncover 
the concealed beliefs of the author or narrator fails to consider all the ways in which war 
is described, and how the actions of individuals involved in conflict are construed.  By 
choosing to primarily examine the writings of soldiers from periods in which their 
involvement in war has been largely celebrated, this thesis deliberately challenges the 
way in which critical linguistic research approaches the relationship between language 
and ideology, even when it remains focused on descriptions of violence. 
 In other words, one of the purposes of this research, and the reason for choosing 
such a morally complex focus within the texts examined, is to ensure that the critical 
comments produced in its reading are equally applicable to a range of ideological 
positions.  In describing the act of killing, narrators express pleasure, regret, fear, and 
exhilaration, and the analysis of the linguistic construal of experience must be able to 
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account for each of these responses equally.  To begin this project with an expectation 
that language will only operate covertly, then, would be a misrepresentation of the 
corpus.  As a result, while language can be used to conceal violence in order to exert or 
perpetuate a position of power or privilege, the present analysis aims to consider a 
variety of social and ideological positions, including those where acts of violence during 
wartime might be openly discussed, and even celebrated, by some authors and readers. 
 From the outset, then, war writing is viewed as existing within and producing a 
nexus of ideologically charged socio-political concepts.  While this research is interested 
in the representation of agency and ways in which language contributes to readers’ 
perceptions of actors as morally responsible for acts of violence, it remains open to the 
capacity for soldiers to present their experiences in a number of ideological directions.  
As a result, the stylistic effects of individuals’ construals in the representation of actors 
are considered on a case by case basis, and in relation to the evaluative stance outlined 
by the narrators themselves, as well as the affective evaluations of non-specialist readers.  
This, in turn, allows for a closer examination of the individual features which comprise 
the perception of agency, as readers are in turn asked to produce evaluations of causality, 
intentionality, responsibility, and praise/blameworthiness associated with given actions. 
1.5: Thesis Structure 
 
 The structure of this thesis can be broken into thirds, representing analytical and 
methodological developments in the research, each composed of two chapters.  The first 
third (Chapters 2 and 3) focuses on individual clauses, and the construal of force and 
causality in language.  Situating the linguistic framework of this study in relation to 
Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014) and its models of 
transitivity and ergativity (2.2), the first chapter of this thesis is concerned with setting 
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out the role of cognitive approaches to critical and stylistic close readings.  The 
cognitivist approach is introduced with an overview of cognitive linguistics and the 
Canonical Event Model and action chains as representative of the conceptualisation of 
force and motion in events in Cognitive Grammar (2.3.1).  Following this, the concepts of 
granularity (2.3.2) and perspective (2.3.3) are introduced as additional dimensions of 
construal, demonstrating the versatility of Cognitive Grammar’s approach to event 
construal.  Likewise, an introduction to Conceptual Metaphor Theory (2.3.4) examines 
an alternative means of analysing soldiers’ language choices, and Werth’s (1993; cf. 
Browse, in press 2018) notion of ‘Common Ground’ (2.3.5) sets out a preliminary 
terminology for the discussion of readers’ applications of background knowledge and 
context to the understanding of meaning, before the compatibility of functional and 
cognitivist approaches to grammar and discourse is outlined explicitly (2.4).  
Throughout this chapter, these terms are introduced with reference to primary war 
writing sources, in order to elicit an initial discussion of key stylistic features (2.5). 
 Having introduced the linguistic framework of the project, Chapter 3 examines 
the existing literature on critical approaches to the language of war and killing, 
examining the limitations of these studies as overly reliant on the interpretations of 
individual, specialist readers (3.2).  Coupled with discussion of readers’ abilities to infer 
causal connections unspecified within the source text (3.3), and objections of the 
narrator’s construal based on competing knowledge or beliefs (3.4), the chapter reports 
a reader-response study (3.5) in order to support the critical analysis of a highly 
segmented description of the acts involved in killing an enemy soldier.  The study shows 
(3.5.2) that while an explicit causal connection between the narrator and the act of 
injuring the enemy soldier is absent from the text, readers are readily able to infer it.  
Participants’ responses provide qualitative feedback on the effects of the author’s 
stylistic choices, which serve as the basis for an alternative analysis (3.5.3).  In addition, 
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they also demonstrate how the interpretation of meaning within individual clauses 
relies on broader narrative context and personal background knowledge (3.5.4). 
 Following on from these findings, the next third (Chapters 4 and 5) moves to 
configure the critical and cognitive analysis of action in relation to discourse.  Chapter 4 
examines the role of narrative in the construction and perception of identity.  In doing 
so, narratological research (4.2) is examined in relation to the approach to discourse in 
Cognitive Grammar (4.3.1) and Critical Discourse Analysis (4.3.2), introducing the 
present limitations in the application of Cognitive Grammar beyond clause-level 
analysis (Pincombe, 2014).  However, examining the perceived relationship between 
narrative and identity in research on war writing (4.4) highlights the ethical risks of an 
overextended view of narrative as necessarily constructing experience (Strawson, 2004; 
4.5).  In considering the possibility of non-narrative experiences, and trauma in 
particular (4.6), the chapter concludes by acknowledging the limitations of the 
relationship between narrative structure and selfhood. 
 While Chapter 4 includes illustrative examples throughout, Chapter 5 produces 
an extended analysis of the only two memoirs presently published by drone pilots.  The 
instability of identity is a prominent theme throughout these texts, from the question of 
their authorship (5.2) to the analysis of their language.  As drone pilots operate at a 
physical distance from the battlefield, this chapter shows that their construal of 
psychological (5.3.1) and physical (5.3.2) proximity to the acts of violence they commit is 
in constant negotiation with societal expectations regarding the experience of warfare.  
Likewise, the pilots’ agency over the act of killing is complicated by technological and 
bureaucratic systems (5.4), as well their own metaphors (5.5) and event models (5.6).  
Although this chapter provides new insights into the emerging language of drone 
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warfare (5.7), it also reaffirms the limitations of Cognitive Grammar in manageably 
analysing longer passages of discourse. 
 Examining this issue further, the final two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) set out a 
novel model of stylistic analysis which aims to more closely connect the clausal analysis 
afforded by Cognitive Grammar with the overall structure of the discourse in which it 
appears.  Beginning with a theoretical discussion of intentionality, as historically defined 
in language and literature (6.2), Chapter 6 argues that the perception of intentionality is 
integral to understanding differences in the potential meaning of clauses (6.3).  The 
chapter demonstrates (6.4) the effects of explicit and inferred intentions in individual 
clauses (6.4.1), complex sentences (6.4.2), and across discourse (6.4.3; 6.5).  With this 
conceptual work done, the chapter returns to the analysis of war writing in terms of 
actors’ intentions (6.6), and demonstrates how the perception of goals and beliefs 
contribute to the critical analysis of these texts (6.7).  The chapter ends (6.8) with a 
reiteration that this approach affords novel modes of analysis for critical and literary 
purposes, and that work remains to be done in its application to other genres of 
discourse. 
 In the final chapter, the perception of intentionality is discussed in relation to 
agency, and considered alongside responsibility and praise/blameworthiness as 
constituent features which affect its perception (7.2).  A further reader response study 
(7.4) shows that while intentionality and responsibility are often judged similarly, the 
two are assessed independently when readers are given an act of war time violence to 
evaluate explicitly (7.5.1).  The variety in readers’ responses indicates the importance of 
background and cultural knowledge to readers’ interpretative activities.  Following a 
review of the study (7.5.2) readers’ responses are once again used to inform a critical 
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analysis of the text (7.6), where the distinction between intentionality, responsibility, 
and praise/blameworthiness allows for greater depth in the discussion of the text’s style. 
 Finally, Chapter 8 provides a reflective summary of the analyses and methods 
produced throughout the thesis (8.1), and presents its key findings in three fields.  
Firstly (8.2), it examines common trends in the stylistic features observed across the 
examined war writings.  It discusses how granularity (8.2.1), action chains (8.2.2) and 
disnarration (8.2.3; cf. Prince, 1988) are employed by multiple authors to construe their 
experiences of violence.  While the first two sections in particular relate the value of 
adopting Cognitive Grammar as the linguistic framework for this analysis, each section 
also demonstrates how the features in question are employed to support a number of 
ideological positions regarding the morality of killing in war.  This chapter also reflects 
on the contribution of the research to Critical Discourse Analysis (8.3), with particular 
reference to its experimental reader-response methods (8.3.1), and its caution in the 
conflation of linguistic and social agency (8.3.2).  As a final series of findings, the chapter 
reaffirms the value of Cognitive Grammar in the analysis of force (8.4.1), as well as the 
potential for its model of intentionality in bridging the gap between clausal and 
discourse analysis (8.4.2).  Lastly, the chapter also provides recommendations for future 
directions in associated research, both in terms of the analysis of war writing (8.5.1), and 
the future development of Cognitive Grammar in discourse analysis (8.5.2). 
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Chapter 2: Events, Action, and 
Causation in Linguistics and 
Cognition 
2.1: Introduction 
 
This chapter begins the study of the language of violence in war writing by 
considering the subject in its most straightforward sense: the single clauses in which an 
activity relating to killing or wounding is described.  Croft (1998) describes the 
prototypical event in language as ‘a volitional agent acting on his or her own bring[ing] 
about a complete change of state to a patient, so that the patient cannot change any 
further in the relevant semantic dimension’ (89).  In its most direct construal, one 
individual killing another constitutes this kind of event, which is ‘the most completely 
individuated from the causal network’ (ibid).  In other words, an analysis of acts of 
violence performed by volitional agents can be isolated linguistically, and examined at 
the clausal level, in order to understand how event participants are represented with 
regard to this agentive relationship.  As will be shown by the practical examples 
throughout this chapter, however, the language employed in these texts is not always so 
straightforward, and terminology is introduced to explain how these alternative 
representations function.  The end of the chapter (2.5) reflects on these findings, as well 
as the benefits and limitations of isolated clause-level analysis, and establishes the basis 
for a broader reader response study in Chapter 3. 
In order to discuss the representation of events in language, the chapter begins 
with the discussion of several prominent approaches to linguistics employed in stylistics 
and Critical Discourse Analysis, while at the same time examining the ways in which 
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these linguistic frameworks have been used to form conclusions about the ideological 
functions of language.  Firstly (2.2), the concepts of ideation and transitivity from 
Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday, 1979; 2014) are introduced as linguistic tools, 
as well as formative resources for CDA from its origins (Fowler and Kress, 1979) to the 
present day.  Following discussion of the application and limitations of SFL, Cognitive 
Grammar is introduced (Langacker, 1987; 1999; 2008) as an alternative approach to 
clause-level stylistic analysis while maintaining an emphasis on the social and functional 
dimensions of language and meaning, alongside parallel cognitivist approaches (2.3).  
With reference to practical examples of descriptions of violence in military memoir 
throughout, the chapter examines the value of concepts such as force dynamics, 
granularity, and shared knowledge for practical textual criticism.  These features are 
presented as a stylistic ‘toolkit’ (Wales, 2014), designed to facilitate the discussion of the 
reader’s overall impression of a text.   
 In the analysis of actions and their causes, the discussion throughout this 
chapter necessarily employs the term ‘agency’, both as a linguistic and social concept (cf. 
van Leeuwen, 1997: 32), the two of which are often conflated or confused.  For linguistic 
purposes, ‘agency’ refers to the grammatical position of participant in an action 
designated as the (intentional) causer of the act, but the term has broader associations, 
relating to the ‘socioculturally meditated capacity to act’ (Ahearn, 2001: 112).  While 
language allows the speaker to configure almost any variation of subject and object to 
draw the reader’s attention towards or away from different possible visible sources of 
causation, their perception of events in the world provides parameters to these 
construals.  As John Keegan notes of the experience of individual soldiers in conflict, ‘it 
is a function of the impersonality of modern war that the soldier is coerced […] by vast, 
unlocalised forces, against which he may rail, but at which he cannot strike back and to 
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which he must ultimately submit’ (1976: 324), prompting Bourke (1999) to describe 
‘myths of agency’ (358) in soldiers’ descriptions of their roles and experiences in conflict.   
Writing about one’s experiences of conflict provides the authors of these texts 
with the opportunity to produce a representation of events according to a balance of 
personal agency and force they either perceive and report objectively, or deliberately 
construct for the reader.  What a soldier might be able to report about their experiences 
in conflict may not represent an understanding of all the factors that influenced a 
decision.  Indeed, the concept of ‘construal’ as employed in Cognitive Grammar 
introduced in this chapter (2.3.1) emphasises the inherent perspectivisation of language, 
which always requires the selection of a viewpoint from which to describe an observed 
or performed event.  In order to contextualise this approach, this chapter begins by 
outlining the ways in which functional models of transitivity (2.2.1) have traditionally 
been adapted to discuss the critical and stylistic effects of language choices in various 
forms of literary and non-fiction discourse (2.2.2).  After reflecting on the limitations of 
a functionalist approach, Cognitive Grammar is introduced, with key terms for the 
analysis of agency, causation, and force from the perspective of Cognitive Grammar 
being introduced through practical examples from primary texts (2.3.1; 2.3.2; 2.3.2).  In 
addition, further cognitive approaches to meaning in language, such as blending in 
metaphor (2.3.4) and Werth’s (1993) notion of Common Ground (2.3.5) are introduced.  
The chapter concludes with a reflection on the relationship between cognitivist and 
functionalist approaches to language (2.4), before outlining initial observations 
regarding the language of killing in war writing, and outlining the next stages of the 
research (2.5). 
 
 
18 
 
2.2: Functionalist Perspectives 
 
While the present research project focuses on the way in which events are 
structured and represented linguistically, ‘events’ do not exist in the world a priori, as 
the sensory information through which we experience the world is fluid, and always 
fluctuating.  Rather, the act of perception is the identification of culturally significant 
‘breakpoints’ in the fluency of action (Hard, Reccia, and Tversky, 2011), and the 
partonymic organisation of constituent events in order to make sense of ongoing 
activity at a number of levels simultaneously (Zacks and Tversky, 2001; Zacks and 
Swallow, 2007; Tversky, Zacks and Hard, 2008).  To talk of a linguistic event, then, is to 
describe an observation about the world which has passed through the perceptual 
processes by which actions and events are ordered, and represented in language in a 
form which aims to communicate the perceived level of activity.   
Historically, Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse analysis have employed 
Systemic Functional Linguistics (cf. Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014) as the framework 
through which language and grammar are discussed.  While SFL is a detailed and wide 
ranging framework, Halliday delineates three ‘metafunctions, which represent the basic 
functions of language.  The ‘textual’ metafunction refers to the grammatical structure of 
a text, the ‘interpersonal’ metafunction describes the pragmatic interactions between 
discourse participants, while the ‘ideational’ metafunction represents the fact that 
language selectively represents and conveys perspectivised descriptions of events and 
ideas.  It is the ideational metafunction which receives the majority of attention in the 
application of SFL to critical analysis, as this accounts for the way in which experiences 
which take place or are perceived in the world – both physically, in a sense externally to 
the individual, and in their own private mental life – are translated into linguistic 
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manifestations.  This section examines the methods developed to examine the ideational 
metafunction, and reviews its application across critical and stylistic analyses. 
2.2.1: Transitivity and the Ideational Metafunction   
 
While SFL is concerned with the development of a functional theory of language 
in a broad sense, it is the ideational metafunction of linguistic representation which is 
most pertinent to the present study.  In particular, SFL focuses on transitivity as the 
system through which language functions to represent the world.  As Halliday has put it, 
transitivity is ‘the set of options whereby the speaker encodes his [sic] experiences of the 
process of the external world, and of the internal world of his consciousness’ (1971: 359, 
my emphasis).  In placing emphasis on the speaker’s ‘experience of the process of the 
external world’, Halliday establishes transitivity as a model not only for the grammatical 
organisation of clauses, but one which can analyse clauses and their perspectives on the 
events they describe with regards to the subjectivity of the speaker, leading him to refer 
to transitivity as ‘the clause in its ideational aspect’ (ibid).  The act of speaking or writing 
about experiences in the world organises and separates them into discrete units, and 
hierarchies of causality foreground the relationships between certain participants in 
actions and their consequences, while omitting or downplaying others. 
Transitivity orders processes according to the kinds of activity being performed.  
At the most basic level, processes are divided into material, mental (doing and 
happening), behavioural (sensing), and relational (being and having) processes 
(Halliday, 2014: 224-300).  These labels are linguistic and descriptive: rather than 
delineating different events in the world, they refer instead to the perspective from 
which the event is framed in language.  For instance, an explosion could be reported in 
terms of a mental process of perception (‘I heard a loud bang’), orienting the reader to 
the event from the point of view of the first person narrator.  In its stylistic and critical 
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application, transitivity analysis operates through frequency, identifying patterns of 
positioning within lexicogrammatical categories (e.g. Simpson, 1993: 90-91; Hart, 2014: 
23-25).  When a participant within the discourse is shown to be absent from or highly 
present in an agentive function, they can be described as having lesser or greater agency 
and control over the actions and events which occur respectively.  Observing the 
frequency with which participants appear in different transitivity roles, performing or 
having different kinds of processes performed upon them, is often used to establish a 
‘transitivity profile’.  This profile is then taken to be indicative of the way in which a 
participant is generally perceived in terms of personal agency, as well as the ‘mind style’ 
(Leech and Short, 1981) of the narrator who provides the reader’s perspective. 
The discussion of transitivity is not exclusive to functionalist linguistics.  
Fillmore (1970) examines the distinction between ‘break’ and ‘hit’ verbs, showing that 
semantically similar verbs can have distinct argument realisations, leading to the 
development of Theta Theory in generative grammars (cf. Haiden, 2005).  For example, 
while ‘the window broke’ can be passivized, as the verb ‘broke’ selects for a DP object, 
‘*the fence hit’ is an ungrammatical construction, as ‘hit’ instead selects instead for a DP 
location.  With Theta Theory, the context of an utterance is not factored into its 
meaning.  Rather, interest lies exclusively in the parameters of syntactic possibility.  In 
terms of its applicability to stylistic analysis, theta criteria may be a useful means of 
expressing the consequences of certain word choices when expressing a given event, 
such as describing how an intransitive verb such as ‘ran’, which assigns only an agent, 
elicits distinct theta criteria to a transitive (e.g. ‘Adam chased me’, which requires both 
an agent and theme.  However, developing such an analysis to produce stylistic 
commentary leads to functionalism, because as well as describing the specific linguistic 
phenomena in question, a study of a word or phrase’s effect on the reader is necessarily 
concerned with the social, communicative purpose and impact of the language choices 
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made.  To extend an analysis of language beyond the observation of the capacity lexical 
semantics, and toward a meaningful commentary on the function of a given utterance, it 
is necessary to move beyond a generative study of context-free clauses, and instead 
consider the functionality of an utterance as an essential dimension of meaning. 
 The value of the transitive model for the present analysis is its classification of 
different kinds of process, which alters the functional category of the actor through 
further subdivision.  For example, in a passage of his memoir in which he recalls being 
involved in a firing squad for the execution of attempted deserters, Quinton (1929) 
describes the scene as follows: 
“At your target, take aim”. 
Twelve rifles came up to the aiming position.  
Fire! 
I just had time to see that helpless figure shudder & then hang very still, when 
“About turn!” 
We again stood facing the hedge.   
Quinton, (1929: 23, my emphases) 
In the events described in this extract (italicised), the transitive processes 
employed by the narrator shift the reader’s engagement both with the events themselves 
and the agents who perform them.  In the clauses in which the narrator is positioned as 
agent (‘I’ and ‘we’), the processes described are mental and relational respectively, and 
the narrator simply observes the behavioural motion of the dying individual, before 
standing motionless.  Prior to the act of killing itself, the description presents the rifles 
themselves in the category of actor in relation to the material process of ‘coming up’.  In 
other words, this construal presents the motion of the rifles from a perspective which 
avoids presenting Quinton himself as an agentive force associated with their movement.  
Finally, the moment in which the guns are fired and the act of killing itself takes place is 
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presented even less straightforwardly.  Throughout the extract the descriptive clauses 
are broken up by the direct speech of a disembodied speaker, in which imperatives 
imply the activity which takes place.  The context of the utterance makes the intended 
actors of each instruction clear.  However, the shift to free indirect discourse for ‘fire!’ 
produces an ambiguity: serving both to describe the utterance of the order, and also as 
an onomatopoeic description of the act itself.  While the reader is able to interpret the 
passage quoted above as a series of events in which the narrator was involved in an act 
of violence, the transitive structure of the descriptive clauses serve to diminish the 
agency associated with the narrator himself. 
 As well as transitivity, SFL includes an alternative model of clausal analysis 
known as ‘ergativity’, which can be employed concurrently with transitivity.  Halliday 
(2014; 332-355) argues that an analysis which focuses on a clause’s in/transitive structure 
(‘The man laughed’ vs. ‘The man laughed at the clown’) is primarily concerned with the 
extension of a clause’s meaning, whereby the transitive form provides additional 
information about the same basic activity as described in the intransitive construal.  
Ergativity, on the other hand, shifts attention to causation.  For instance, the sentences 
‘The bear startled’ and ‘The mouse startled the bear’ convey the same event, but with the 
introduction of a new actor who is shown to cause this process.  While transitivity is 
suited to instances in which additional clauses introduce new goals and objects upon 
and toward which processes occur, ergativity accounts for examples in which the 
addition of new clauses supplements the agentive position, providing further 
information about where a process originated, as opposed to where it was directed.   A 
consideration of both transitive and ergative structures will help to clarify precisely how 
the language of the text organises the representation of Actors, Goals, and the central 
Process to which they relate.  In the case of texts concerned with violent acts, the 
determination of responsibility for Processes can have significant ideological 
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consequences.  SFL’s capacity to discuss a passage in both ergative and transitive terms 
allows for the analysis to consider both the represented extent of an action, as well as 
the clarity of the text’s representation of Intitiator-Actors, who take the ergative position 
of causing the initial Process.  
2.2.2: SFL in Critical and Literary Analysis 
 
The Systemic Functional approach has been used extensively to discuss language 
in broader contexts, including critical and literary-linguistic analysis, and is integral to 
the evolution of both stylistics and critical-linguistic practices.  Halliday himself 
demonstrates how transitivity can be used to discuss literary style in his analysis of the 
William Golding novel The Inheritors, where he argues that patterns of transitivity 
express ‘the linguistic representation of experience’ (1971: 359).  In comparable 
contemporary analysis, both literature (Simpson and Canning, 2014; Darani, 2014) and 
non-fictional texts (e.g. Seo, 2013; Li, 2010) are approached in terms of internal patterns 
of transitivity.  In particular, there is a rich history of critical linguistic engagement with 
transitivity as an analytical tool, extending back to Fowler and Kress’s (1979) conception 
of Critical Linguistics, and continuing into present day Critical Discourse Studies.  For 
these theorists, SFL and transitivity analysis is seen as a means by which to ‘uncover’ the 
hidden power structures within the social dynamic of a given piece of discourse 
(Fairclough, 2001; Butt et al., 2004).  For example, if one character in a narrative is 
regularly presented as the agent of material actions, whilst another performs primarily 
mental acts, this can demonstrate that the first actor has been construed as having a 
greater ability to affect change in the world.  Oftentimes, this analysis is coupled with an 
interest in a particular sociological agenda.  For instance, Mills (1995) employs 
transitivity as part of a broader feminist critique of literature and everyday discourses 
such as advertising, in order to demonstrate a societal imbalance of agency across 
24 
 
gender lines.  In essence, transitivity analysis allows for the study of language and 
characterisation in agentive terms, where the nature of the act and the social status of 
the actor and subject are the focus of analysis.   
 In order to demonstrate how transitivity analysis can enable the critical 
interpretation of war writing, the following extract from the autobiography of Henry de 
Man (1920: 198-9) describes an act of violence performed by the author, to which the 
reader may have an emotional response.  For the ease of analysis, a number has been 
assigned before each clause within the extract: 
[1] I secured a direct hit on an enemy encampment, [2] saw bodies or parts of 
bodies go up in the air, and [3] heard the desperate yelling of the wounded or 
runaways. (1920: 198-9) 
The first clause [1] of this passage demonstrates a material action, in which the first 
person narrator (de Man) acts upon a direct grammatical object.  However, de Man’s 
semantic choices focus on a level of granularity which emphasises that the mortar strike 
was on an ‘encampment’.  When humans are introduced as grammatical objects within 
the narrative, [2] and [3], the governing process is mental, and de Man is thus positioned 
as a witness to their sounds and motions, while his involvement in causing these actions 
is implied through the narrative proximity to the earlier material act.  From a classic 
critical perspective, then, we might conclude that de Man’s account evades a certain 
level of direct involvement with the act of violence described within the passage. 
 A problem arises with this interpretation, however, when the sentence 
immediately following this extract is also considered.  As de Man goes on to write: 
I had to confess to myself that it was one of the happiest moments of my life. 
(199) 
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To read de Man’s language exclusively with an eye to accounting for a rendering absent 
of the self as agent to avoid blame would be reductive, as de Man openly relates the 
experience of happiness to witnessing what might typically be considered traumatic or 
troubling events.  That said, de Man’s use of the verb ‘confess’ suggests shame in his 
happiness, and it could be argued that the transitive structure of the preceding passage 
reflects this stance by avoiding a direct description.  Nonetheless, the idea of a combat 
veteran describing and evaluating their experience of war – even as a perpetrator of 
violence – in a positive light cannot be dismissed, as several war historians (Hynes, 1997; 
Bourke, 1999; Jones, 2006) have written at length regarding soldiers’ positive emotions 
in relation to performing and witnessing violence.  Indeed, critical discourse analysts 
have often been critiqued (Widdowson, 1998; Lev, 2003) for the role that the 
researcher’s personal ideology may play in the interpretation of the source material.  
Likewise, Halliday’s claim that the transitivity profile of select passages of The Inheritors 
produces a ‘world-view’ (1971: 348) which correlates with the experiences of the 
Neanderthal protagonist has been called into question by Fish (1979).  These criticisms 
will be explored further in the following chapter (3.2.1).  For now, it serves best to 
consider what the SFL approach can meaningfully contribute to linguistically focused 
critical and literary analysis: 
A Hallidayan transitivity analysis throws into relief the core semantic 
framework of a text, and is often useful on narrative texts; it answers certain 
fundamental questions we might have about a narrative: which characters are, 
in this narrative, prominently occupying which of a very limited set of 
participant roles (most basically the "doer" roles - such as Actor, Senser, or 
Sayer - and the "done-to" roles - such as Goal or Addressee); and which of the 
four basic processes mainly occur. (Toolan, 2009: 236) 
Of course, Halliday is not the only source for functionalist approaches to 
language used in critical and literary research.  Van Leeuwen (1997) produces a detailed 
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taxonomy of ‘social actors’, organising the various relations between actors and subjects 
in discourse into a stratification based on the implicit social order.  Importantly, van 
Leeuwen describes his approach as ‘sociosemantic’, as ‘sociological agency is not always 
realised by linguistic agency, by the grammatical role of “Agent”’ (1997: 32).  Unlike 
Halliday’s argument that all aspects of experience can be encoded in language, van 
Leeuwen’s social actor analysis takes into account not only the grammatical structure of 
the clause, but the broader sociological conventions associated with individual word 
choices in accounting for the ascription and perception of agency.  Accordingly, even 
when a participant in a process is not positioned as an actor, social actor analysis 
considers the semantic connotations of the language chosen to represent them, with 
categories such as ‘impersonalisation’ being ‘wellnigh impermeable to human agency’ 
(60).  Van Leeuwen’s own analysis focuses on the discourse of racism, but its application 
to the power dynamics of language and society has the capacity to extend to other 
modes and themes of discourse.  In discourse concerning military conflict, the way in 
which narrators choose to refer to themselves and their opponents can affect the 
reader’s perception of each party’s capacity for agency, and even their humanity.     
More recently, Jeffries (2010; 2014) has developed the term ‘Critical Stylistics’ in 
response to developments in Critical Discourse Analysis, which she argues is designed to 
‘bring the text back into discussions of discourse meaning’ (2014: 410).  Critical Stylistics 
therefore aims to produce ‘a method of finding the ideology in any text, whether or not 
you agree with it’ (ibid), viewing Critical Discourse Analysis as ideologically-driven and 
lacking ‘some of linguistics’ hard-won credibility by giving up on all attempts at 
objectivity’ (408).  However, as Jeffries’ discussion of action representation remains 
firmly rooted in Systemic Functional Linguistics, which she describes as ‘the most 
productive’ (2010: 49) approach for stylistically-oriented approaches Critical Discourse 
Analysis, it is unclear how Critical Stylistics differs methodologically from earlier 
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approaches to Critical Discouse Analysis in order to support its objective aims.  
Moreover, CDA has received other criticisms not addressed by Jeffries’ stylistically-
oriented adaptation.  Namely, that its analysis can be selective in its discussion of 
primary material (Widdowson, 1998), lacking in a systematic process of analysis (Stubbs, 
1997; cf. Breeze, 2013), or at risk of critiquing others for stylistic features it employs itself, 
such as passivisation and nominalisation (Billig, 2008).  Not only do these challenges 
persist in Critical Stylistics, but similar questions can also be asked of cognitive 
approaches to CDA, and the implications of these criticisms for this thesis will be 
addressed in Chapter 3.2. 
2.3: Cognitive Perspectives 
  
Distinct from the functional approach to grammar is Cognitive Linguistics.  
Based on a similar notion that language is part of a larger system of cognition and 
interaction with the world, the diverse approaches to Cognitive Linguistics generally 
hold that language is based on the perceptual processes which govern general cognition 
(cf. Lee, 2001).  As with functional linguistics, cognitively oriented perspectives on 
language have been adapted to provide critical commentary on a range of texts and 
media, although this approach is comparatively recent.  While Van Dijk (1998) examines 
ideology in language in relation to mental models and social cognition, O’Halloran 
(2003: 21) notes an absence of cognitively-oriented approaches to critical discourse 
studies five years later.  In the field of discourse analysis relating to war, Lakoff (1992) 
discusses metaphor in rhetoric around the Gulf War from a cognitive perspective, 
although the primary focus of this analysis is the role of metaphor in reports about war, 
as opposed to the experiences of those involved directly.  Since this time, however, the 
‘cognitive turn’ in stylistics has seen rapid expansion in the application of these 
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associated methods in the analysis of literary fiction (Culpepper and Semino, 2002; 
Stockwell, 2002 and 2009; Gavins and Steen, 2003; Zunshine, 2006; Gavins, 2007; 
Dancygier, 2011; Harrison et al., 2014; Harrison, 2017; Giovanelli and Harrison, in press, 
2018).  Although an ongoing project to synthesise cognitive research, Cognitive 
Linguistics, and literary analysis, cognitive poetics has already begun to demonstrate the 
broad range of applications for cognitive linguistic models in understanding the ways in 
which meaning is produced in the interpretation of literary discourse. 
In addition, following O’Halloran (2003), cognitive approaches to CDA have 
been advanced by Hart (2008; 2011a; 2011b; 2014; 2015; 2018, see also Hart and Lukeš, 
2007), who argues that Cognitive Grammar’s symbolic models of events can be used to 
critically analyse the construal of force and perspective, with particular reference to the 
representation of protests, riots, and immigration in media discourses.  Van Dijk (2014) 
also explores the relationship between discourse, cognition, and demonstrating the 
imbalanced relationship between social actors in newspaper reports of protests.  
Similarly to Cognitive Poetics, then, Critical Discourse Analysis has begun to adapt 
Cognitive Grammar and related cognitive linguistic models for the purpose of examining 
ideology and power dynamics within discourse.  There is still much work to be done, 
however, in extending the applicability of Cognitive Linguistics’ extensive range of 
descriptive models to critical commentary, and in assessing its value in relation to the 
analysis functional grammar models already afford.  The discussion below therefore 
examines key terms from Cognitive Grammar and associated approaches to language in 
relation to the primary texts of this thesis, in order to demonstrate the applicability and 
present limitations of a cognitively-oriented approach to language and discourse. 
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2.3.1: Event Models and Action Chains 
 
Cognitive Grammar seeks to explain the structure of grammar and meaning in 
terms of symbolic prototypes.  In the case of event construal, Langacker’s notion of the 
prototypical event is realised in the Canonical Event Model (Fig. 2.1).  As in SFL, the 
distinction is made between the grammatical subject and object, here termed the agent, 
or trajector (the participant who acts) and patient, or landmark (who/what is acted 
upon).  These are considered archetypal roles, along with ‘instrument’ (used by an agent 
to act on a patient), ‘experiencer’ (to describe the subject of mental processes), and ‘zero’ 
(‘conceptually minimal and nondistinct… participants who merely exist’ (2008: 356)).  
Building on these archetypal units, Langacker hypothesises a ‘canonical event model’ – 
the archetypal model for the representation of a process as being caused by an agent 
acting upon a patient, as shown in the diagram below.  Such a model also contains the 
immediate scope (IS), being the ‘onstage’ context relevant to the act and actors being 
construed; the maximal scope (MS), the greater context, such as its impact at a later 
date; and the position of a viewer (V) external to the process: 
 
Fig. 2.1: The Canonical Event Model, e.g. ‘John hit Sally’ 
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 As the figure above shows, Cognitive Grammar’s treatment of grammar as 
symbolic divorces its typological categories from specific grammatical features.  For 
instance, the grammatical subject and the CG agent will not always be parallel, as when 
a process is presented in the passive, the subject may well be the patient.  The 
conceptual roles modelled in Cognitive Grammar demonstrate causal associations 
between the actor and patient, while their construal within the lexicogrammar also 
affects focal prominence.  ‘John hit Sally’, for instance, has distinct morphosyntactic 
units which directly correspond to each section of the Canonical Event Model’s 
conceptualisation of the action in question.  A passivized construal of the same event 
(‘Sally was hit by John’) reverses the grammatical role of each participant while still 
describing the same event. For the cognitive model of grammar, the capacity for the 
construal to alter in terms of prominence, with attention now primarily on the patient 
as opposed to the agent, demonstrates the lexicogrammatical continuum through which 
meaning is constructed (Evans and Green, 2006: 478).  The way in which an author 
constructs a clause grammatically, then, significantly affects the ways in which the 
reader perceives the described events in terms of focal prominence.  Hence, as Croft 
(1998) observes, ‘the assignment of grammatical relations to participants is determined 
by the way the world is, that is, our real-world knowledge of specific circumstances.  But 
to a considerable degree, it is up to the speaker’s construal of the event’ (89).  Outlining 
the ways in which language performs these functions – what is shown to be the actor 
upon what, and in what ways they act – demonstrates the naturally close relationship 
between the stylistic analysis of linguistic choice and the Cognitive Grammar concept of 
construal. 
In other words, the Canonical Event Model represents a kind of gestalt cognitive 
schema (Schank and Abelson, 1977), serving as a prototype by which language users can 
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set expectations for the direction of force and motion in a typical English clause.  The 
Canonical Event Model represents the frame around which events are typically 
organised.  A construal may differ from this model in terms of perspective, transitivity, 
or the absence/presence of an agent or patient, but such a deviation is notable.   
Beyond the Canonical Event Model, Cognitive Grammar also categorises several 
further semantic roles: instrument, experiencer, mover, absolute, and theme.  However, 
Dowty (1991) argues that only notions of ‘proto-agent’ and ‘proto-patient’ are required, 
demarcating prototypical sources and sinks of energy, with more specific categories 
representing scalar positions of relative agentive or patient-like features.  This thesis is 
primarily concerned with agent and patient roles, as the kinds of physical actions 
involved in acts of killing require the conceptualisation of force, prototypically from a 
causer, and sunk into or passed through a patient. 
 Langacker goes on (2008: 373-378) to discuss strategies for event representation 
being either agentive (with grammatical focus on the cause of the act) or thematic 
(typically emphasising the experiencer or sensor, for example), and concludes that 
English is strongly agentive, prototypically organising processes linguistically in terms of 
causation and agency, with grammatical emphasis on the agent as the trajector.  
However, some construals segment events into smaller, distinct event models, where 
the causal connection between one agent and patient is less obvious than in other more 
direct descriptions.  Describing an experience of shooting an enemy soldier, for example, 
Turner (n.d.) writes that , ‘I fired carefully – the figure fell’ (49).  This construal keeps 
grammatically distinct two processes where a causal connection is otherwise 
straightforward.  When introducing the difference between an agent and a theme (an 
experiencer/instrument/patient), Langacker observes that:  
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‘A typical agentive process thus has the conceptual layering shown in diagram 
[below].  At its core is a conceptually autonomous thematic process, which 
can often be expressed independently (e.g. It broke).  This core supports the 
notion of agentivity, which – being conceptually dependent – is usually not 
expressed in isolation (*He caused).  Together they constitute a higher-level 
event conception that is itself autonomous (He broke it)’ (2008: 372).   
While the dependence of ‘caused’ makes its use in an intransitive construction 
ungrammatical, ‘fired’ can be used intransitively, meaning that the ‘higher-level event 
concept’ is broken down into its component processes, although the relationship 
between the two is implied through their proximity in the narrative order.  The diagram 
below shows both the typical agentive process, where the processes are directly linked, 
and how these components are separated but otherwise unchanged in their 
manifestation in the memoir.  In this model, as elsewhere in Langacker’s style, a double 
arrow denotes a transfer of energy from one participant to another – an acting upon – 
while a single arrow indicates an objectless process (in this case, the figure does not act 
on anything by falling). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2: Dissecting the agentive process in ‘I fired carefully – the figure fell’ 
 
The figure above marks two force states.  In the first, the bold arrow demonstrates a 
transfer of force from the first person narrator, while the smaller arrow shows that ‘the 
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figure’ is conceptualised as enacting a change of state through the fall to the ground, but 
that the force associated with this motion is not directed towards a particular patient or 
landmark.  Consequently, the first person narrator is labelled as an ‘agent’, while ‘the 
figure’ is described as a ‘mover’.  As this example shows, different construals can affect 
the ‘level’ at which events are construed, with consequences for the perception of 
causality and the transfer of force.  Termed ‘granularity’, or ‘specificity’, the role of this 
phenomenon in critical analysis is examined in further detail below (2.3.2). 
The asterisk in Fig 2.2 indicates a representation of agency which requires 
further explanation: Langacker claims, and the example above shows, that a thematic 
process such as ‘the figure fell’ can be construed ‘without reference to an agent or 
agentive causation’ (2008: 371).  However, an agentive process ‘incorporates a thematic 
process, without which it is conceptually incoherent’ (ibid), meaning clauses such as 
‘*he caused’ appear to be incomplete construals of events they attempt to describe.  Yet 
at first glance, ‘I fired’ appears not to have an associated thematic process.  Fig 2.2 
hypothesises an interpretation of the two clauses as causally connected to one another, 
in which case the figure who falls serves as the goal at which the act of firing is directed.  
Although it may not always be possible to know if a reader will infer such a connection 
between clauses, the ordering of the clauses without breaks between them and the flow 
of the action chain follows what Langacker describes as a ‘natural path’ (372) of ordering.  
With the first person narrator as both the first word and agent in the first of these 
processes, their agentive role and its implied effect on the fallen figure remains 
prominent in this construal, despite the initial separation of the two clauses. 
Langacker (1999: 46) also shows how language choices can be used to put 
emphasis on any aspect of an action chain with the following examples, where 
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emboldened annotations indicate the foregrounding of an agent [AG], patient [PAT], 
and instrument [INST] in the construal, alongside the subject (s) and object (o): 
(a) Sam sliced the salami with a sharp knife. 
[AG(s) – INST – PAT(o)] 
(b) The knife easily sliced the salami. 
[AG – INST(s) – PAT(o)] 
(c) The salami slices easily. 
[AG – INST – PAT(s)] 
Here, as with the earlier example of ‘I fired carefully’, it is possible to represent the 
action chain without reference to the instrument: 
(d) Sam sliced the salami 
[AG(s) – INST – PAT(o)] 
and that the absence of this component in the chain has a minimal effect on its 
construal in relation to the transfer of force, as the concepts of ‘slicing’ and ‘firing’ 
schematically require the use of a tool in order to be performed at all.  Thus, while the 
explicit textual foregrounding of the instrument is a choice made available in English, its 
absence or presence here has little impact on the reader’s model of the events described. 
Moreover, the landmark of ‘fired’ is prepositional, and when something is fired 
at, the construal of the individual clause only describes the intention to transfer force to 
the described landmark.  Without further context, therefore, it remains possible for the 
narrator to have missed his mark, and for the energy described in the act of firing to 
have been transferred to an alternative, unintended and conceptually absent landmark.  
Another example, ‘I fired into the grey mass’ (Quinton, 1929) shows how easily the 
explicit transfer of force in an otherwise canonical event model can be obscured, as the 
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agent, while positioned as a trajector directing force towards a landmark, never 
explicitly interacts with a single landmark as part of the overall mass count noun ‘mass’:   
 
Fig. 2.3: Multiple landmarks - ‘I fired into the grey mass of humanity’ 
 
Quinton goes on to describe ‘blaz[ing] away into that oncoming mass of humanity’, 
which operates similarly to the diagram above, as force is transferred by an agent 
towards a mass noun.  As stated previously, however, it differs from ‘fired’ in that the 
semantic content of ‘blazed away’ suggests a repeated action.  Hence, not only does the 
phrase produce multiple simulations of the force transfer process, but this repetition 
leads to an inference of intention, specifically regarding a desire to produce a given 
effect – in this instance, to wound.  
These examples can be contrasted with the direct transfer of force in 
descriptions such as ‘I had shot him’ (Hyder, 2009: 175).  No instrument mediates the 
agentive relationship here, as shooting is conceptualised as being done directly by an 
agent to the theme, and it may be of significance that such a description appears only 
after a metonymic description of acting upon a German helmet, ‘I put two shots through 
it’ (174), a ditransitive which explicitly extends the action chain once again.  Bourke 
(1999) describes how ‘the long-distant and indirect character of ‘area attacking weapons’ 
such as shrapnel, bombs, and gas meant that while people could regularly be seen dying, 
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it was rarer to actually see them being killed’ (xviii), a technological development with 
potential parallels in grammatical event representation.  That is, a level of disconnect 
exists between the performance and consequences of a violent act – causality is 
fundamentally, and sometimes irrecoverably, interrupted, consciously or otherwise. 
 Moving beyond individual clauses, Cognitive Grammar also conceptualises the 
transfer of force across a number of trajectors.  Visualised in terms of a ‘knock on’ effect, 
related transfers of force are associated conceptually through an ‘action chain’ 
(Langacker, 2008: 355).  Action chains have already been examined in Cognitive Poetics, 
as Stockwell (2009: 183-189) describes how modulating between the construal of longer 
and shorter chains of actions can affect the perception of narrative pacing, and the 
transition between agent, mover, and patient roles produces ‘texture’ with regards to the 
perceived agency of the characters described.  Likewise, Harrison (2017: 31-45) examines 
how the extended construal of a detailed action chain can ‘lose sight of the bigger 
picture’ (45), with the reader’s attention instead focused on small-scale activities (Cf. 
2.3.2 below).  In this thesis, understanding the perceived causes of actions is an essential 
element of the analysis (e.g. Ch. 3.5; 5.4; 7.5).  Moreover, action chains indicate the ways 
in which Cognitive Grammar is presently able to expand its analysis across larger units 
of discourse than individual clauses, and Chapter 4.3.1 will examine the applicability and 
limitations of this approach in greater detail. 
The experience of war is often understood as disjointed and chaotic, and Leed 
(1979) describes it as an ‘autonomous event comprehensible only to those who could no 
longer see themselves, even in combination, as authors of their own acts’ (38).  However, 
Bourke (1999) suggests that soldiers who describe killing employ ‘myths of agency’ – a 
desire to ‘assert their own individuality and sense of personal responsibility even within 
the disorder of combat’ (358).  Likewise, Todd (2014) has suggested that the linguistic 
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construal of agency serves a function in the therapeutic context, moving the narrator 
away from the ‘reduced social status of the object position’ (281) by working towards a 
tellable construal of events in which the narrator can position themselves agentively.  
However, positioning oneself as the agent of an act of killing – a position prototypically 
associated with volition and responsibility for the act which occurs – often places the 
narrator in a position of social taboo and moral uncertainty.  Cognitive Grammar’s 
model of events and the transfer of force can be used to observe precisely how the 
agency of the narrator manifests in passages which traverse the performance of violence, 
often taking instead an agentive position in relation to a mass of objects, or produce a 
causal chain.  As a result, the narrator is positioned as an agent, without recourse to a 
direct construal of the individual as the producer of violent force against another, 
specifiable, individual.  
2.3.2: Granularity and Prominence 
 
 As well giving the reader a spatial and temporal position in relation to a 
described event, the construal of narration also affects the detail with which events can 
be perceived at all.  The concept of ‘granularity’, or specificity (Langacker, 2008: 55) 
models the way in which alternative construals of an event in language may alter the 
reader’s perspective.  In cognitive scientific research, Vallacher and Wegner (1987) and 
Zacks and Tversky (2001), for example, have shown how individuals’ perceptions of 
events shift according to the ‘prepotent identity’ associated with the activity.  For 
instance, a series of small-scale activities (‘selecting a tea bag, boiling water, pouring the 
water into a mug, etc.’) are perceived – and can be construed linguistically – according 
to a higher order of activity (‘making a cup of tea’), evoking an image schema which 
infers the vast majority of these constituent events without explicit consideration.  
Likewise, if the overall goal of such activity is uncertain or unrelatable, a highly granular 
38 
 
description may be preferable.  As well as actions, granularity also affects the description 
of objects and persons.  In the passage discussed in 2.3.1, Turner’s description of ‘the 
figure’ represents a low granularity, as the reader is given almost no information about 
the individual. As the following discussion will show, descriptions of violence in war 
writing employ both extremes of granularity in their descriptions. 
While the discussion of language and events thus far has considered the 
structure of clausal construals of events, segmentation as explored in cognitive science 
also refers to the perceiver’s capacity to alternate between different ‘levels’ of 
understanding, according to the context of observation. Talmy (2016) refers to ‘macro-
event nesting’, which describes how certain event representations can contain ‘nested’ 
actions of a lower level.  For instance, the phrase ‘Could you reach me that box down off 
the shelf?’ entails other required movements towards the box, the gripping of fingers, 
and consequently passing the box to the initial speaker, in order to complete the request.  
While everyday actions may envoke scripts which allow discourse participants to 
interpret comparable ‘micro-level’ events of which the acts described are comprised, this 
will not always be the case.  For example, in a diary entry for July 2nd 1917, W.C.H. 
Johnson writes: 
In camp at Rumbo.  Saw German white officer killed at Linguala yesterday .  
Bush covered with empty cartridge cases.  Gold coast regiment did fine work. 
While the context of the entry suggests that Johnson is describing ‘work’ related to 
combat, it is impossible to infer precisely what is entailed by ‘fine work’. Consequently, 
this low granularity can also be used to conceal the specifics of a given process of action 
by abstracting to an extent whereby the events which comprise the description cannot 
be construed.   
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The relationship between levels of granularity and the rhetorical effects of 
language has been summarised by Quintillian.  Discussing reports of war, he observes 
that condensing a series of events and experiences into a single utterance does not 
necessarily exclude them from consideration, although the absence of detail may have 
stylistic and affective consequences: 
To say “the city was stormed” is to embrace everything implicit in such a 
distaster, but this brief communique, as it were, does not touch the emotions.  
If you expand everything which was implicit in the one word, there will come 
into view flames racing through houses and temples, the crash of falling roofs, 
the single sound made up of many cries, the blind flight of some, others 
clinging to their dear ones in their last embrace, shrieks of children and 
women, the old men whom an unkind fate has allowed to live to see this 
day… “Sack of a city” does, as I said, comprise all these things; but to state the 
whole is less than to state all the parts (trans. McLoughlin, 2014: 52-53) 
In other words, the higher order description of events entails the conceptualisation of 
constituent events through the schematisation of knowledge.  Although the images 
Quintillian describes are not offered explicitly in the initial example clause, they can be 
inferred by the reader through their existing knowledge of the process of storming a city.  
Langacker (1990) hypothesises a similar scenario: 
Typically, a conceived event comprises an intricate web of interactions 
involving numerous entities with the potential to be construed as 
participants, yet only a few of these interactions and participants are made 
explicit, and fewer still are rendered prominent […] Floyd’s little sister, 
Andrea, has been teasing him mercilessly all morning.  Angry and desirous of 
revenge, Floyd picks up a hammer, swings it, and shatters Andrea’s favourite 
drinking glass.  The shards fly in all directions; one of them hits Andrea on 
the arm, drawing blood.  Hearing the commotion, their mother comes in and 
asks what happened.  In response, Andrea utters these immortal words: Floyd 
broke the glass. (214) 
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Equally, Grunbaum (2007) suggests that a description may be distorted if the 
emphasis is placed on substantially lower order events than would strictly be 
meaningful in the context of the process being described: ‘if the narration takes the form 
of a detailed description of a body and its movement, then we are pushed towards an 
understanding of the narrated scene that falls apart in purposeless observational 
fragments’ (302-303).  For instance, an account of the process of walking to the shops 
which explicitly considered the movement of each tendon within the legs of the walker 
loses sight of the overarching act.  Scarry (1985) has considered this more explicitly in 
relation to accounts of violence, describing how the vocabulary of injury ‘may recede 
further and further from view by being tucked into successively smaller units… 
distanc[ing] the injury by a continual act of extension, as though it were the umbrella on 
an ever-extending shaft’ (77).  By focusing further on the minutiae of a given event, 
Scarry and Grunbaum argue that high granularity descriptions can mean that the 
reader’s impression of the overarching act is lost within a plethora of detail.  Likewise, as 
H. Porter Abbott has put it, ‘narrative can fail not for a lack of causality, but because 
there is too much of it’ (2010: 15), and the relationship between actors and their actions 
may be obscured in a high granularity description of events.  For an analysis interested 
in the critical function of a text’s language, high and low granularity in the description 
of an action or event can be viewed as a valuable starting point for understanding how 
and where the language of the passage draws the reader’s attention. 
While the concept of granularity is closely associated with the construal of 
events (Langacker, 2008: 55), the notion that lexicogrammatical structures afford 
prominence to particular aspects of the world under description can also be used to 
describe the ways in which language draws the reader’s attention towards and away 
from other concepts.  The idea of a ‘Figure’, which the reader actively attends to, is set 
against the backdrop of the ‘Ground’, the context taken for granted.  As dynamic 
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categories, Langacker uses the notions of Figure and Ground as the basis for describing 
information and perspectives as foregrounded or backgrounded (2008: 58).  The 
construal of events, then, is the selection of causes and agents to be configured within 
the Figure and Ground of the described activities, foregrounding or backgrounding 
particular agents and actions as required. 
2.3.3: Perspective and Deixis 
 
With the above discussion outlining the functions of prominence, specificity, 
and focus, it remains to consider the role of perspective as a dimension of construal in 
Cognitive Grammar (cf. Langacker, 2008: 53).  In the outline of the Canonical Event 
Model given in Fig. 2.1, the viewing arrangement was marked with a ‘v’, outside of the 
act itself, indicating a third person perspective.  These visualisations represent the 
position of the reader in relation to the acts and actors associated with the construal in 
question, and can vary according to the information provided.  Prepositions (‘above’, 
‘below’, ‘beside’, etc.) can provide more specific information about the spatial position of 
the viewing arrangement, while temporal markers (‘yesterday’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘in an hour’) 
ground the reader’s perspective in time.  Each of these prepositions encodes a relative 
position in space and/or time from which the scene is viewed, known as deixis. 
In stylistics, deixis is analysed in terms of the choice inherent in positioning the 
reader in a particular perspectival relationship with actors and events.  Short (1996) 
refers to the reader’s perspective ‘within’ the text as the ‘deictic centre’ – the physical 
and temporal anchor back to which prepositions indicating relative positions refer – and 
examines the implications of deictic choices in readers’ perceptions.  The term ‘deixis’ 
has been applied and extended in its meaning in Cognitive Poetics, as Stockwell (2002) 
describes deixis broadly as ‘taking a cognitive stance within the mentally-constructed 
world of the text’ (46), referring not only to physical and temporal stances, but also 
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socially-oriented perspectives.  Additionally, Deictic Shift Theory (Duchan, Bruder, and 
Hewitt, 1995) suggests that perspective can shift across conceptual domains within 
discourse, and the notion of ‘popping’ and ‘pushing’ between layers of narrative space 
has been integrated into Text World Theory and expanded further (cf. Gavins, 2007).  
Deixis allows for an understanding of the ways in which construals position the reader 
in relation to physical, temporal, and social positions within a discourse.  Just as an 
analysis of the granularity of a construal can demonstrate the ways in which language 
foregrounds or backgrounds particular features of a scene for the readers’ attention, so 
too can a model of the readers’ deictic position help to show how an author’s language 
choices affect the possibility of readers perceiving actors and events from particular 
relative positions. 
As the texts analysed for this thesis are all first-person autobiographical 
narratives, the reader’s physical position within the text is bound to the perspective of 
the first-person narrator.  With the notable exception of drone pilots, discussed further 
below (5.3), physical deixis is therefore limited to the narrator’s location.  However, 
Stockwell also argues that language encodes ‘relational deixis’, through ‘expressions that 
encode social viewpoint and relative situations of authors, narrators, characters, and 
readers’ (2002: 46), drawing parallels between the roles of physical and social proximity 
or distance.  How a narrator chooses to describe the relationship between two 
individuals (e.g. choosing between the descriptions ‘the two men’, ‘the two brothers’, 
and ‘the criminal and the policeman’) affects the reader’s orientation to the participants 
and events of the discourse.  As relational deictic markers determine the emotional 
proximity between the reader’s deictic centre and other participants, the language 
employed by soldiers to describe their enemy combatants has the potential to 
significantly affect a reader’s affective response to the acts and individuals described.   
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As well as indicating the narrator’s relationship to other characters, relational 
deixis can also provide evidence to support the interpretation and evaluation of 
narrative mind-styles.  For example, the negative shading when Turner describes firing 
at ‘the figure’, as opposed to some alternative and more specific construal of the 
individual, marks a relational distance from the narrator’s target, and foregrounds 
uncertainty.  As a result, the reader’s impression of whether or not the narrator truly 
shot at a person is complicated.  The analysis of drone pilots’ language in Chapter 5 
examines the role of perspective in construal in further detail (5.3), and explores how 
the distinction between spatial and relational deixis is not always rigid, as some of the 
pilots’ language choices encode both spatial and social relationships within the same 
utterance. 
2.3.4: Metaphor in Cognition 
 
While the discussion so far has focused on the construal of events in relation to 
the Canonical Event Model, soldiers’ descriptions of killing are not always so direct.  In 
The Body in Pain, Scarry (1985) observes the capacity for inventive metaphorical 
language with regards to the description of violence, producing a taxonomy of the 
means by which a direct violent relationship between actor and patient may be 
subverted linguistically (80-81).  Under the broad category of ‘redescription’, many of 
the examples Scarry provides involve metaphorical construals of violence.  Because 
metaphor often conceals the precise nature of the acts being described, the construals 
examined throughout this thesis are predominantly non-metaphorical.  Nonetheless, 
the relationship between metaphor and ideology is readily observable, and 
understanding how cognitive approaches to metaphor have been applied to critical 
analyses will allow for the discussion of such language when relevant.  As Grossman 
(1996) puts it: 
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Most soldiers do not "kill", instead the enemy was knocked over, wasted, 
greased, taken out, and mopped up.  The enemy is hosed, zapped, probed, 
and fired on.  The enemy's humanity is denied, and he becomes a strange 
beast called a Kraut, Jap, Reb, Yank, dink, slant, or slope (93).     
Given the ease with which metaphor can be deployed in everyday language, CDA has 
often been concerned with the role of metaphor in conferring ideology (e.g. Goatly, 2007; 
Hart, 2008; 2011b; Underhill, 2011; Musolff, 2012; Ana et al., 2017).  Considering these 
examples through the framework of conceptual metaphor theory further demonstrates 
the applicability of Cognitive Linguistics to the critical analysis of war writing, and 
provides further evidence of the kinds of discursive strategies and ideological stances 
adopted by these authors for consideration in relation to the analysis of other stylistic 
features. 
 One of the key terms associated with the cognitive approach to metaphor is 
‘conceptual blending’ (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002), which Turner (1998) has described 
as ‘a fundamental instrument of the everyday mind’ (93).  Closely related to Langacker’s 
notion of the conceptual substrate (2008: 463), conceptual blending represents the 
capacity for individuals to map competing components of knowledge to produce a 
synthetic blend of information.  The kinds of metaphor employed in these texts are 
typically ‘single scope networks’ (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 126-131) in which a 
‘framing input’ (e.g. hunting rabbits) is mapped to a ‘focus input’ (killing enemy 
soldiers), in order to compress and draw attention to particular aspects of the focus 
input.  Such networks are particularly powerful rhetorically, as Fauconnier and Turner 
note that ‘one feels that what is experienced in the blend was there all along and, 
therefore, that the insight captured is indeed some reliable discovery about the focus 
input’ (ibid: 129), while Lakoff and Johnson (1980) write that ‘the acceptance of the 
metaphor, which forces us to focus only on those aspects of our experience that it 
highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true’ (157).   The 
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importance of blending as a means of integrating and selecting from meanings 
associated with multiple inputs extends beyond metaphor (cf. Fauconnier, 1997: 149-185), 
and Turner (2008) has suggested that all narrative interpretation is the result of 
blending activity.  As with the affect of granularity on the perception of detail (2.3.2), the 
selection of metaphors and inputs affects the perspectivisation of an event.  When 
actions are described euphemistically, their content is blended and therefore partially 
erased, as the construal requires the reader to infer the constituent activities.  Thus, 
although metaphor is not the primary focus of the linguistic analysis in this thesis, 
understanding its role in the development of cognitive approaches to stylistics and 
linguistics in general provides additional context to the overarching framework which 
governs the model of language adopted in this research. 
Firstly, as Scarry notes, violence can be described as ‘the extension or 
continuation of something else that is in itself benign’ (1985: 77).  In narrating the 
retaking of an occupied trench, for example, Worsley (1930) relates that ‘Some half-
dozen weary and comatose Germans were quietly and expeditiously removed from the 
active list, and the Company Headquarters was regained in safety.’ (in Purdom, 1930: 109, 
my emphases).  As well as the passive construction of the actions which reduce the 
prominence of the actors in this example, the metaphors around which the action is 
constructed draw upon semantic cues which trivialise and erase the violent nature of the 
events.  In the first instance, the act of removing the names of German soliders from a 
list of active combatants stands in for the violent acts performed during the narrative.  
In the second clause, the attention is focused on an overarching goal of regaining 
Company Headquarters, an act which contains within it implicit acts of violence, but 
whose focus draws the reader toward a justification for the injuring which occurs.  Such 
discourse compares to contemporary military focus on peacekeeping, where operations 
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are presented publicly in terms of the moral value of their outcomes (Chouliaraki, 2014; 
cf. Ch 5.3). 
Other metaphors reframe violence in more mundane terms.  For instance, ‘They 
got a bit back last week I believe in that Neave Chapelle affair with interest’ (Chennell, 
1915: 25).  This example differs from the typical metaphors of cost highlighted by Scarry 
(1985: 75-77), which typically focus on the concept of violence as a necessary price paid 
by the actors or nation in exchange for some other concept (e.g. peace or safety).  The 
metaphor of interest instead focuses on the enemy combatants, and suggests a contract 
typically involving two parties who knowingly and consensually agree to a series of 
activities, outcomes, and payments.  In other words, as well as construing the enemy 
combatants as participants in a consensual act, the framing input of interest draws 
attention to the possibility that the enemy soldiers expected, consented to, and deserved 
to be acted upon violently.  Not only do mundane semantic fields allow for a description 
of the most unknowable aspects of war within a relatable frame of experience, then, but 
such frames can simultaneously serve to present an ideological position and justification 
for violence without further explication.  For example, when the enemy is ‘mown down 
like corn before the scythe’ (Turner, n.d: 46), not only does the metaphor invoke banal 
and familiar imagery, but perennial and necessary activity, as the process of being mown 
down is essential to the purpose of growing corn at all.  Moreover, Scarry has specifically 
acknowledged the semantic field of vegetation as a common theme in the redescription 
of violence, focusing instead on the fact that ‘vegetable tissue, though alive, is perceived 
to be immune to pain; thus the inflicting of damage can be done without permitting the 
entry of the reality of suffering into the description’ (66).  Not only can metaphor 
produce alternative construals of violence, then, but it can serve to obscure the fact that 
violence is being described at all. 
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Throughout her discussion of metaphor and redescription, Scarry is primarily 
concerned with the ways in which language may ‘back away from injuring’ (66).  As per 
earlier observations (2.2.2), it is important to consider that not all narrators of military 
experience aim to obfuscate their violent activities.  In descriptions which compare the 
performance of violence in war to hunting, for example, while enemy combatants are 
construed as non-human prey, the emphasis of the new semantic field remains violent, 
and often celebratory.  This is clearly the case for Hill (1915) who writes that, ‘It was 
developing into the finest game the world can give, a man hunt.  You would hear a cry 
“There go some, Come on, boys”, and off you would go after them shouting as you went.  
It was very much like going after rabbits’.  Mapping violence to the context of hunting 
could serve several functions at once, as it dehumanises those against whom violence is 
performed, redistributes the power dynamic of the context in which the act takes place, 
and reframes the events in relation to a semantic field of sport and pleasure.  Facing the 
notion of pleasure in relation to violence once again, we must ask to what extent the 
metaphor could be said to conceal violence from the reader.  While Hill clearly 
acknowledges that he performs violent acts, and construes himself as an agent exerting 
force upon his enemies, the metaphors he employs reframe the social dynamics of the 
scene, as enemy soldiers are described as sub-human vermin, the extermination of 
whom is both praiseworthy and enjoyable to perform.   
In the examples of metaphor found in the corpus of texts examined in this thesis, 
metaphors seem primarily to function as a way of mapping violence to the mundane.  By 
relating these acts to everyday processes such as filing paperwork, or paying a bill, the 
transgressive acts of violence is normalised through the conceptual blend with ordinary, 
uninteresting framing inputs.  Alternatively, mapping to activities such as hunting 
frames killing in relation to sport and enjoyment, as well as the dehumanisation of the 
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enemy, and an imbalance of risk between the writer (the hunter) and the enemy 
combatants (the hunted animals). 
Metaphor is not easily isolated from other elements of language and meaning.  
As Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 170-234) show, the language of actions and events is rich 
with symbolic imagery, and the spatial symbolism associated with Cognitive Grammar is 
closely related to the metaphorical operations of everyday language.  Furthermore, 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002) argue that the perception of cause and effect itself is 
fundamentally a process of conceptual blending (75-87), established through the 
integration of separate observations into a single linear explanation of otherwise 
segmented events.  Although the analysis of metaphor remains peripheral to this thesis, 
the cognitive models used to explain it contribute to the overall cognitivist impression 
of the ways in which readers understand the relationships between actions in discourse.  
This will be particularly important for Chapter 3, which examines the role of inference in 
interpretation, as well as the discussion of sustained impressions of actors over larger 
spans of discourse in Chapter 6. 
2.3.5: Common Ground and Shared Knowledge 
 
As well as clausal structure and metaphor affecting readers’ perspectives on 
actors and their actions, the social and cultural associations of words and phrases are 
influenced by previous experience and usage.  According to Bakhtin, ‘all words have the 
'taste' of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, 
a generation, an age group, the day and hour.  Each word tastes of the context in which 
it has lived its socially charged life’ (1981: 293).  Though this quotation implies that the 
'taste' of a word is somehow inherent to the word itself, the metaphor of tasting also 
aptly suggests an interaction between the word and its reader.  For cognitivist 
approaches to language, this 'taste' is elicited by the reader's prior knowledge and 
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previous usages with which a word or phrase is associated, as well as its context.  For 
instance, Werth (1993) describes the concept of ‘Common Ground’ in communication 
between two or more participants, which Browse (in press, 2018) has described as ‘a 
bank of propositions, built up through the discourse, which participants accept to be 
true’.  In order for a communicative act to succeed, both speaker and listener must agree 
on certain conditions which either describe aspects of the world or the relationship 
between things within it.  In Critical Discourse Analysis, ‘background knowledge’ 
(Fairclough, 2010: 31) refers more specifically to the ideological assumptions which 
precede discourse, while the definition employed in this thesis extends further to 
discourse participants’ general knowledge of the world, as well as their ideological 
beliefs.  Agreement between participants in relation to this knowledge is dynamic, and 
the process of communicating allows speaking participants to negotiate, establishing 
propositions and construals from which to develop their perspective.  For Cognitive 
Grammar, this notion relates to the ‘conceptual substrate’ which underpins discourse 
(Langacker, 2008: 463; cf. Ch. 6.2), and refers to the shared knowledge employed by 
discourse participants to make sense in the process of communication. 
The process of comparing a unit of language to previous instances also has social 
implications: depending on the person, different words or phrases will have different 
ideological meanings, affecting the way in which discourse participants can relate and 
share knowledge.  Van Dijk (2009) describes this process in terms of ‘event models’ 
which schematise knowledge involved in the production and interpretation of actions 
and events in discourse, and which have ‘a social basis, because they instantiate socially 
shared knowledge and possibly also group ideologies’ (79).  For van Dijk, there is an 
inherent and interdependent relationship not only between discourse and cognition, 
but also society and the social conventions which govern language and behaviour.  
Moreover, van Dijk suggests that language users ‘may have different interpretations of 
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events, and at the same time, different interpretations of the same discourse.  This 
implies that the influence of discourse on the minds of recipients may also be different’ 
(ibid).  While language users require an overlap in understanding in order to 
communicate, this conceptualisation of event models allows for the fact that 
participants can disagree with or resist aspects of the common ground established 
through discourse, with each drawing on existing knowledge or beliefs.  As Hart puts it, 
the choice of construal made by an author in positioning a reader’s perspective on an 
event is ‘likely to be responsible for reproducing ideologically vested representations of 
events in the minds of many ordinary readers’ (2011: 422).  While readers may resist a 
construal of events as presented within a text, the persuasive power of discourse lies in 
the capacity for readers to adopt a construal, or reinforce existing ideas. 
The mental work of the reader goes beyond accepting or rejecting the construals 
afforded by an author: the process of ‘mind reading’ (Zunshine, 2007), which Stockwell 
and Mahlberg (2015) term a more active process of ‘mind-modelling’, describes how 
readers develop a psychology of individual characters within a narrative, and has been of 
particular significance to recent research in Cognitive Poetics (e.g. Nuttall, 2015; Browse, 
2018; Harrison, 2018; Nuttall, 2018).  Instead of simply seeing characters in discourse as 
literary artifice, readers often interpret and respond to these fictions as though the 
characters have mental states which exist beyond their textual description.  Through the 
‘principle of minimal departure’ (Ryan, 1980), we assume that – unless explicitly 
specified – other agents identified as performing mental activities operate similarly to 
ourselves, and therefore that their reasons for acting can be compared to our own.  
Mind-modelling demonstrates the centrality of prototypical schemata to cognition, and 
its application in Cognitive Poetics reveals how authors can play upon readers’ 
assumption for literary effect. 
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Although primarily developed in relation to fictional characters, readers of 
autobiographic fiction must still mind-model the participants within the discourse, 
situating their actions and states within a prototypical model of mental activity. As this 
thesis moves on to discuss the inference of goals and intentions in Chapters 6 and 7, an 
understanding of readers as predisposed to infer certain kinds of mental activity within 
human agents will be essential in discussing the possible reasons – and the possibility of 
reasons – associated with different actors and actions. The process of mind-modelling 
represents a key concept in the understanding of cognition employed throughout this 
thesis: that readers can and will employ prototypical schemas and pre-existing 
knowledge in order to make sense of both events and participants in discourse. 
Taking into account the role of Common Ground and mind-modelling in the 
understanding of discourse, the cognitive approach to language advanced in this thesis 
sees communication as a transactional process in which the author offers a construal, 
and readers perform situated perceptual work in interpreting meaning.  In the context 
of military memoir, discourse is governed not only by the process of sharing knowledge 
with the reader, but also in maintaining an established social authority in which certain 
experiences and knowledge regarding conflict are unknowable to civilian reader.  
According to Harari (2010):  
In order to prove that they themselves understand the experience of war and 
have the authority to speak of it, soldiers need to describe the experience of 
war in shocking detail.  Yet they simultaneously remind the audience that 
these descriptions cannot transmit knowledge, because experience cannot be 
conveyed through words. (69).   
At the level of functional communication, Harari’s claim that descriptions of war cannot 
transmit knowledge is clearly wrong: in order for any meaningful discursive activity to 
occur, participants must be able to engage with the meanings construed within the 
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soldiers’ discourse in order for any interaction to occur.  For communication to function, 
language requires that both speaker/writer and listener/reader share some Common 
Ground in terms of knowledge and reference, but the conceit of civilian interaction with 
war writing requires explicit limits to the knowledge shared through discourse.  
Accordingly, Browse (in press, 2018) distinguishes between the Common Ground and 
the ‘Idealised Common Ground’, identified by readers resisting the knowledge or 
construals imparted by the author recognised as being ‘the-world-according-to-the-
speaker’ (ibid) which overlaps with, but is not identical to, the actual Common Ground 
of communication.  In acknowledging that there are experiences that cannot be shared 
effectively with an audience through language, Harari identifies a general Idealised 
Common Ground in military discourse where the majority of readers’ perspectives will 
be at odds with those presented in the text.  Although war writing is unusual in that it 
often explicitly aims to maintain this conceptual juxtaposition between the knowledge 
accessible to military authors and civilian readers (cf. Ch. 5.3), these texts nevertheless 
include methods by which experiences of conflict are shared through language. 
 Although the experience of killing will be alien to the majority of a war story’s 
readers, highly granular construals (2.3.2) can often produce common experiential 
grounds for its description.  Warsop (1965), for example, describes how he ‘squeezed the 
trigger at the first one then the other indistinct figures’ (15) during conflict.  Through 
the segmentation of activity, the act of firing a gun at another person is construed in 
terms of a more easily understood bodily action, while the taboo and ‘unknowable’ act 
of killing is not described directly.  Viewed in this light, an act such as ‘squeezing the 
trigger’ construes the events which occurred in terms more relatable to readers without 
comparable combat experience, while simultaneously maintaining a distance between 
the civilian reader and the act of killing itself to preserve the established social dynamic 
between those who have experienced combat and those who have not.  As Langacker 
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(2008) puts it, ‘we often direct attention to a perceptually salient entity as a point of 
reference to help find some other entity which would be hard to locate’ (83).  In this 
case, the text employs simple physical actions to allow the reader to understand the 
more complex and distant activity of killing, without compromising the privileged 
position of the author as the sole participant capable of fully understanding the 
experiences described.  As this study continues to consider these texts beyond the 
individual clause, this near-paradoxical process of conveying information about events, 
whilst simultaneously denying the reader an authoritative relationship with the 
knowledge conveyed, will be borne in mind as a defining feature of soldiers’ 
autobiographical war writings. 
2.4: Discussion – A Cognitive-Functional Approach 
 
At first glance, it may appear that the linguistic frameworks above are 
fundamentally incompatible with one another.  While this may be the case for 
generative grammar, which treats grammar in abstraction from its communicative 
function altogether, SFL and Cognitive Grammar – and indeed functional and cognitive 
approaches to language more broadly – overlap in some cases with regards to their focus.  
Simpson (2003), for instance, describes transitivity as being ‘how speakers encode in 
language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience of the 
world around them’ (82, my emphasis).  While Halliday himself does not refer to mental 
images associated with language, the role of the ‘world-view’ (1971: 348) in affecting 
transitivity choices throughout The Inheritors appears to serve a similar function.   
Harrison (2017) suggests that the role of Cognitive Grammar in stylistics is to support, 
rather than replace, existing linguistic frameworks (7), and the development of a 
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framework designed to discuss texts in terms of the mental operations inherent to 
interpretation demonstrate one of its clearest advantages in this respect. 
Indeed, Stockwell (2002) has argued that SFL remains ‘a usable grammar without 
contradicting cognitive principles’ and, while not explicitly concerned with the 
conceptual representation of language in the mind, is nonetheless ‘cognitively 
sympathetic’ (70).  Melrose (2005) goes further, examining how SFL may be used to 
reconcile linguistic and neurological accounts of language.  In the most recent iteration 
of his Introduction to Functional Grammar (2014), Halliday’s discussion of transitivity 
and ideation is directly comparable to the terminology of Cognitive Linguistics, 
explaining the transitivity system in relation to the psychology of children’s 
psychological development, and demonstrating the difference between material and 
mental processes in relation to their role in ‘construing’ inner and outer experiences 
(Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014: 214).  Gavins (2007) employs SFL’s model of transitivity 
analysis in the advancement of Text World Theory (e.g. 61-64; 70-71) to discuss the 
configuration of perspective in relation to the conceptual structure of discourse.  As 
such, the development of cognitivist approaches to language does not represent an 
abandonment of functionalist principles.  In Cognitive Grammar itself, Langacker has 
addressed the issue even more directly, writing that: 
It is not a matter of choosing between a cognitive and social-interactive 
[model of language] – for either to be viable, it has to incorporate the other.  
Social interaction depends upon cognition.  It is not carried out by empty 
heads, but by sentient creatures who apprehend the circumstances, assess the 
mental state of the other party, and act accordingly (2009: 153) 
With this in mind, rather than asking which model to adopt for the duration of 
this study, it becomes more productive to ask in what ways each model can contribute 
to the other analytically.  For instance, SFL’s system of categorising processes subdivides 
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the category of material actions into the ‘intentional’ and ‘superventional’ (Simpson, 
2003: 83) to distinguish between the kinds of actions performed purposefully and those 
which are not.  By contrast, Langacker’s canonical event model has no function for 
distinguishing between such processes, instead referring to the archetypal agent as ‘a 
person who volitionally carries out physical activity’ (1991: 210).  Chapters 6 and 7 return 
to this issue by making the case for the development of an account of intentionality in 
Cognitive Grammar.  While this represents one area in which CG might be expanded in 
terms of its modelling of processes in language, Cognitive Grammar’s emphasis on the 
transfer of force between Agent and Patient draws attention to the role of causality in 
language more intuitively than ergativity.    For now, it suffices to say that functional 
and cognitively oriented approaches to language and grammar can meaningfully 
interact.  Particularly, when the analysis is concerned with the development of critical 
commentary, the ability to move effectively between a discussion of cognitive processes 
and social contexts will become an invaluable means of strengthening one’s conclusions. 
2.5: Critical Consequences for Event Representation 
 
 The aim of this chapter has been to outline a series of linguistic tools and a 
cognitively-oriented framework for the purpose of advancing the present critical and 
stylistic analysis, with a particular emphasis on the construal of force, causality, and 
agency.  The process of doing so has also allowed for the comparison of functionalist 
and cognitivist approaches to language, as well as a discussion of the applications of 
both frameworks to previous literary and critical discourse research.  Demonstration of 
the effects of these features has also allowed for the introduction of primary texts, and 
an opportunity to produce some preliminary analyses of their most interesting linguistic 
features and their stylistic effects.   
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 Coates and Wade (2007) have suggested a number of discursive operations that 
can be performed in the process of describing violence linguistically: language can be 
used to ‘conceal violence, obscure and mitigate offenders' responsibility, conceal victims' 
resistance, and blame and pathologize victims’ (513).  Although both the functional and 
cognitive analyses above have demonstrated the ability to discuss agency in discourse, 
Cognitive Grammar was shown to afford greater critical detail with respect to concepts 
such as causality and the transfer of force.  Equally, however, language ‘can be used to 
expose violence, clarify offenders' responsibility, elucidate and honor victims' resistance, 
and contest the blaming and pathologizing of victims’ (ibid).  Although the relationship 
between responsibility and lexicogrammar will not be discussed fully until later 
(Chapter 7), Cognitive Grammar’s conceptual framework facilitates not only the 
discussion of agentive absence, but also presence.  Additionally, as several of the texts 
explored so far have shown, language can be used to embrace violence, as some soldiers 
have no difficulty in publicly claiming responsibility for such acts through construals of 
action which place the narrator at the causal head of an action chain (cf. Bourke, 1999).  
It is important, therefore, to ensure that the analysis of stylistic features is not tied too 
closely to a single ideological position, both in the narrator’s intentions and the reader’s 
impressions, and addressing this challenge will be the focus of Chapter 3. 
 This chapter has established a relationship between functional and cognitive 
approaches to grammar, expressing a methodological preference for the latter.  At the 
same time, theories of grammatical structure of actions and events have been set against 
a history of Critical Discourse Analysis and stylistics, and the methods and issues of 
these fields have been outlined and preliminarily addressed.  Moving into the next 
chapter, these discussion points will be brought into a more sustained critical reading of 
a single text, designed to address the challenges proposed for critical analysis.  In 
addition to refining the kind of analysis hypothesised throughout this chapter, 
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producing a close reading based on a number of participants’ responses will allow 
further reflection on evidence of readers’ responses to clauses in which causal 
connections are inferred, as opposed to expressed directly. 
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Chapter 3: Inference, Interpretation, 
and Ideology 
3.1: From Theory to Practice 
 
 While Chapter 2 employed practical examples of descriptions of violence in 
military memoir in order to introduce the stylistic features and analytical methods 
which frame this thesis, its primary focus was in establishing a Cognitive Linguistic 
framework through which to discuss these texts.  As a result, many of these examples 
were treated as singular clauses or small units of language divorced from the broader 
context of the narrative in which they were originally produced.  However, as elements 
of the cognitive approach such as the conceptual substrate show, the process of reading 
always employs context and previous usage in order to make sense of a given unit of 
language or described event.  This is most clearly the case in passages where the act of 
killing itself is segmented into a more granular description (cf. Ch. 2.3.1), and the reader 
is required to infer the activity which connects one action (pulling a trigger) with 
another (a man falling). In interpreting such descriptions, the reader relies on their 
schematised knowledge of activity to infer a causal relationship not described directly. 
Of course, one challenge to the critical discussion of these texts is a lack of 
external evidence to corroborate the author’s report of events.  Labov (2003) 
demonstrates the perceived value in relating the language choices of narrators to the 
notion of ‘what really happened’:  
In the great majority of cases, the only information available on the 
nature of the reported events is in the narrative itself: there is no 
independent evidence on what actually happened.  At first glance it 
might seem that the original events cannot be recovered, and that the 
narrative has to be considered as an entity in itself, disjoined from the 
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real world.  Nevertheless, there are good reasons why the effort should 
be made to reconstruct the original events from the narrative evidence.  
Inferences about the original events will lead us to greater insights on 
how the narrator transforms reality in reporting it to others.  Re-
tracing these transformations tells us more about the character of the 
narrators, the norms that govern the assignment of praise or blame, 
and in more serious cases, the narrator’s complicity in the events 
themselves (64, my emphases) 
This rhetoric of revealing ‘insights’ about the state of the world through language is 
often repeated in CDA, especially building from SFL, where the ideational metafunction 
of a linguistic choice is often weighed against other possible ways of describing the same 
event (e.g. Butt et al., 2004; Li, 2011), in order to demonstrate the ideological effects of 
the original construal.  Rather than ‘reconstructing’ previously unknown or uncertain 
facts about a given representation of a violent act, the aim of this chapter is to explore 
the linguistic inferences readers rely on in interpreting events, and how these cognitive 
processes affect the perception of ideologically-charged construals.  Determining 
whether or not these inferences more or less accurately represent events as they were is 
not the aim of the investigation.  Rather, I seek to show that an inferential model of 
causation in language more accurately represents the process by which causation is 
perceived, and responsibility for a given action is conferred, along with praise and/or 
blame. 
 Describing the history of war writing, Sarah McLoughlin has suggested that for 
many soldiers, the process of representing their experience of war in language ‘somehow 
controls it: imposing at least verbal order on the chaos makes it seem more 
comprehensible’ (2010: 19).  Interpreting this as a process of controlling and making 
sense of experience for the individual, McLoughlin’s claim is less a comment on the 
nature of the experience of war, and more an observation on the fundamentals of 
language.  In order to represent an experience linguistically, the structure of a clause 
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and the attribution of agents, and often themes, necessitates a causal and temporal 
order of participants and events.  This in turn applies to narratives, where it has been 
argued that the ordering of events into a tellable story does not simply rely on linearity, 
but also causality (Chatman, 1978: 45).  The consequences of organising multiple events 
into narrative structure for the representation of identity will be the subject of Chapter 4.  
For now, the analysis is focused on sentence-level perceptions of causality, moving 
towards their position in a narrative more broadly, and understanding how readers infer 
causal connections when the language of the text is implicit. 
 A key issue for Critical Discourse Analysis is determining how and when readers 
are able to produce inferences, and when the construal renders an actor or activity 
absent from interpretation.  While the work so far has established methods by which to 
describe the functional effects of language choices, the present chapter is also concerned 
with the way in which these ideological functions are determined.  In a further review of 
literature from stylistics and Critical Discourse Analysis dealing specifically with 
analyses of military writing (3.2.1), I examine how the reading practices employed by 
critically-minded language specialists differ from the way in which everyday readers 
engage with texts, and the consequences for the production of critical interpretation 
(3.2.2).  With a view to reconciling this difference in order to establish the discussion of 
stylistic function throughout this thesis in terms of everyday engagement with the 
language of these texts, I turn once more to Cognitive Linguistics in order to outline 
how readers are able to infer causal connections absent from the source material (3.3), 
as well as produce readings which resist the ideological frame presented by the narrator 
(3.4).  This having been done, I describe a short qualitative study performed in order to 
compare my own reading practices with non-specialist readers (3.5).  These findings are 
discussed in terms of clause level reconstrual of implied activity (3.5.2), and the 
application of wider contextual knowledge (3.5.3) to inform readers’ evaluative 
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judgements of events and participants.  The study produces findings which call into 
question readers’ engagement with acts of violence as the primary reportable event of 
the narrative (3.5.4).  The resulting discussion (3.6) paves the way for an expanded 
discussion of the interconnections between clausal and narrative analysis in future 
chapters.  
3.2: Critical Approaches to War Writing 
 
 While the genre of soldiers’ diaries and memoirs has been generally neglected in 
terms of critical linguistic analysis, some existing literature has investigated the 
discursive methods employed by combat veterans to represent their identities and 
experiences.  Benke and Wodak (2003) have analysed the language of Austrian 
Wehrmacht veterans, who were interviewed conversationally about their role in the 
Second World War.  After building a typology of linguistic features employed by 
participants following a functionalist approach to critical discourse analysis, the authors 
conclude that ‘material processes are lacking’ (133) from their interviewees’ accounts of 
their actions, and therefore that ‘there is not one consistent image of a perpetrator to be 
found’ (ibid) in the language the veterans use to describe themselves.  In other words, 
the soldiers interviewed for the study minimalised the grammatical positioning of 
themselves as agents in material processes which implied action towards another 
participant, and either sought to downplay the significance of their actions or to place 
responsibility for them elsewhere. 
 Benke and Wodak’s findings have been paralleled more recently, as Grassiani 
(2011) explores the discursive pracitices of Israeli soldiers in interviews about acts of 
violence performed in combat, and observes a ‘sense of ‘accepting passivity’ or lack of 
agency when they spoke about their presence and activities’ (95).  Again, analysing the 
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transcriptions of her interviews through an SFL framework she concludes that ‘distance 
is taken from the suffering that is witnessed and responsibility is evaded or replaced’ 
(ibid).  Similarly, Robinson (2011) provides a close reading of the memoir of Ken 
Lukowiak, a British soldier who fought in the Falklands, and who infamously killed an 
Argentinian soldier after the ceasefire had been declared.  From the stylistic choices 
Lukowiak makes, Robinson concludes that ‘firing the shot that killed the soldier is 
described without any consciousness of his own agency’ (583, emphasis mine).  Once 
again, the segmentation of the act of killing into smaller-scale events, and the 
subsequent distance between the actor (Lukowiak) and the final patient (‘the figure in 
grey’) is portrayed as evidence that the narrator is unaware of the moral consequences of 
his actions. 
3.2.1: Problems and Limitations  
 
 Taking these three studies together, there are several questions to be raised 
regarding their methods, and the ways in which their critical conclusions are reached.  
Firstly, there seems to be a tendency to conflate linguistic agency with practical agency.  
As Neilsen (1999) notes, agency is a ‘disputed and ambiguous term’, either taking a 
broad and vague social meaning, or ‘vanish[ing] into linguistic systems’ (45).  In other 
words, if an actor in a given clause is not described as performing an act at a particular 
level of granularity directly (in these instances, killing a person), then the extrapolated 
conclusion is that they are not consciously performing this kind of act at all.  For 
Grassiani, ‘agency’ seems to be co-referential, and a lack of linguistic agency is directly 
associated with a lack of practical agency.  Van Leeuwen (1997), however, has argued 
that ‘there is no neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories, and if [CDA] ties 
itself in too closely to specific linguistic operations or categories, many relevant 
instances of agency may be overlooked’ (32-33). In linguistic terms, these readings 
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ignore the reader’s capacity to infer meanings and perceive transfers of force when the 
precise nature of the interaction is underspecified in the language of the text.  As was 
discussed in the preceding chapter (2.3.2), much has been made in the psychology of 
event perception about the ability of readers to read between the gaps and join the dots 
in incomplete events, in order to arrive at an understanding based on a logical inference 
of causal principles.  This point will be examined further below (3.4), in order to assess 
the applicability of this research to linguistic representations of events more specifically. 
 Secondly, these readings all seem to feed into a pre-conceived notion from each 
author about what it means to perform violence on another human being.  For Benke 
and Wodak (2003) and Grassiani (2011), this problem is compounded by the fact that 
they elicited these narratives through interviews, in which they themselves posed the 
questions which framed the discourse space in which their participants responded.  In 
each of the above papers, acts of violence are presented as unspeakable, and a deviation 
from the most direct possible representation of events is justification for classifying the 
author as avoiding any notion of responsibility.  In actual fact, many war writers are able 
to write plainly about their experiences and actions.  In beginning a letter home to his 
mother in 1916, Julian Grenfell notoriously wrote, ‘I adore War… I have never been so 
well or so happy’.  Grenfell then goes on to describe how he shot several German 
soldiers (in Housman, 1930 [2003]: 177-118, emphasis original), describing his actions 
directly, with a positive emotional evaluation of the scene.  Similarly, Bourke (1999) 
concludes her study of face-to-face killing in 20th century conflict by observing that 
soldiers continue to construe themselves as responsible agents during times of war, in 
order to ‘[give] meaning to the warring enterprise and their lives’ (369-370). 
Constructing a view of war writing as simply aiming to subvert personal agency, then, 
fails to account for the fact that many soldiers actively seek to provide a construal of 
events in which they are positioned agentively.  Protevi (2013) has gone as far as to 
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suggest that many soldiers are ‘irresponsible in taking responsibility, in taking upon 
themselves moral agency, when practical agency lies elsewhere' (135).  The function of 
the stylistic features employed by soldiers to narrate their experiences and construe or 
obfuscate their visibility as participants capable of agency must be considered on a case 
by case basis. 
 Butt et al. (2004), who describe grammar as conceived in SFL as the ‘first covert 
operation of war’, have received a similar critique of their analysis of post-9/11 military 
speeches, as Bar-Lev (2007) notes that their methods appear to rely upon their 
ideological biases for the extrapolation of findings.  Similar criticisms have frequently 
been levelled against Critical Discourse Analysis more generally: as Sharrock and 
Anderson have bluntly put it, critical linguists ‘look in the wrong place for something, 
then complain that they can’t find it, and suggest that it is being concealed from them’ 
(1981: 289).  Although ideological bias will always manifest in the methods or analysis of 
an individual, work can be done to mitigate the impact of this on the research’s findings.  
Hart (2018) advocates a ‘commitment to triangulation’ (400), wherein the subjectivity of 
the researcher as reader can be offset by supporting individual readings with alternative 
data, as well as novel experimental methodologies.  In addition, the reach of CDA is 
enriched by the expansion of the kinds of texts it examines, including those from more 
left-wing sources.  For instance, Walker et al. (2016) worked with the UK’s Green Party 
to engage voters with environmental issues, demonstrating that the party’s present use 
of modal verbs detracts from their perceived ability to tackle the issue directly.  Such 
analysis moves beyond the conventional criticism of right-wing discourse, while 
maintaining CDA’s commitment to produce social change (Ch. 1.4).  By expanding its 
methods to incorporate the perspectives of additional readers, as well as analysing a 
greater range of texts and ideological positions, CDA can begin to mitigate the critique 
of its subjectivity. 
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3.2.2: Specialist vs. ‘Natural’ Reading 
 
 As well as relying on preconceived notions of violence, specialist readers such as 
academics with a critical interest in a text may focus on different aspects of a text’s 
language than a regular reader, according to their specialist interest.  In the studies cited 
above, the researchers’ interpretations of their source material’s language is based solely 
upon their own reflective practices, and while Benke and Wodak (2003) reference a lack 
of material processes, their commentary on the effect of this stylistic choice remains an 
interpretative act.  In other words, without reference to the interpretative practices of 
non-specialists, readers with expert knowledge in mind about the relationship between 
language’s structures and functions may be prone to overemphasising the effect of these 
functions in conventional reading.  As Widdowson (1998) has observed, critical 
discourse analysts themselves ‘are socially constructed to see things the way they do, 
and this, on their own account, renders them incapable of conducting any detached 
analysis at all.  All they can do is to interpret other discourses on their own terms’ (148).  
The readings which CDA produces are themselves open to the same kinds of analytical 
scrutiny as they perform, which Widdowson goes on to argue reveal a foregrounding of 
linguistic data which conforms to the researcher’s pre-existing ideological expectations 
(144-146).  More broadly, Sorsoli (2007) emphasises that the ideological subjectivity 
affects not only the process of interpretation, but the construction of the environment 
in which research questions are posed at all:  ‘as researchers, we hear stories in a 
chamber that holds the echoes of our own stories, our research questions, and the 
stories we have heard others tell’ (320).  In selecting texts based on their attention to 
acts of violence, for example, this thesis engages with a specific subset of war writings, 
and their relationship to the style of the genre more broadly remains to be investigated 
further.  Billig (2008) summarises the issue succinctly: ‘How can we be sure that our use 
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of language is not marked, even corrupted, by those ideological factors we seek to 
identify in others?’ (783). 
 Similarly, O’Halloran has noted that ‘there is little awareness in [Critical 
Discourse Analysis] that the meanings a critical discourse analyst generates may well be 
in line with the high degree of effort they invest in analysis’ (2003: 159).  Not only is the 
process of close reading affected by the researcher’s internalised biases, but the 
researcher often engages with their chosen primary material in order to engage in 
‘reading against’ its primary message, meaning that their interpretative engagement 
with the text differs from an ordinary reader who more frequently ‘reads with’ the text 
without aiming to actively produce a critical reading (Janks, 1997: 330-331). Likewise, 
Stockwell (2009) observes that the evolution of literary criticism as an academic exercise 
has led to a divergence from the reading activities of ‘natural readers’ to an 
‘untraversible extent’ (10).  In both literary and critical analysis, then, there is a 
recognition that a researcher’s textual interpretations arise from a radically different 
reading processes to those performed by everyday ‘lay readers’.  Not only does this 
challenge the validity of the methods by which critical interpretations of the ideological 
function of texts is often produced, but also leads to questioning the analyst’s 
understanding of implicit causal connections.  For example, the previous chapter (2.3.1) 
claimed that readers will readily infer a causal relationship in the form of an action 
chain between the agent of ‘I fired’ and the experiencer in ‘the figure fell’, to conclude 
that the narrator shot the figure and caused him to fall.  In order to produce a critical 
reading of a narrative sequence which focuses on the interpretation of events not 
explicitly described within the text itself, the method by which reading and 
interpretative practices are collected and considered must extend beyond the individual 
specialist reader.   
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 To support these readings, it becomes crucial to consider the ways in which non-
specialist lay readers engage with the text, and the role of stylistic features in relation to 
their understanding of the events described. O’Halloran (2003) develops such a model 
within the ‘Idealised Reader framework’ (167-222).  Distinct from Stockwell’s (2002) 
notion of the ‘idealised reader’, which refers to ‘all of the possible readings available’ (43), 
O’Halloran instead models the interpretative practices of non-critical readers who are 
‘largely unfamiliar with the events being referred to’, and ‘reading for gist and so 
something akin to minimum effort’ (170).  As readers’ attention to discourse details can 
vary, O’Halloran notes (172) that the absence of a direct description of a process in a text 
does not necessarily correspond with its absence in the reader’s perception.  However, 
owing to the need to consider the interpretations of readers who read ‘for the gist’, the 
Idealised Reader Framework seeks to define the kinds of absences which are and are not 
likely to be generated as inferences.  The following section reviews literature from both 
cognitive science and linguistics on the generation of inference, and the consequences 
for the critical analysis and discussion of readers’ possible interpretations. 
3.3: Reading Between the Lines: Interpreting Absence 
 
 So far, this chapter has discussed how traditional approaches to critical analysis 
have been criticised for generalising the reading experience of the specialist researcher 
to represent all readers.  This in turn complicates the extent to which these methods can 
effectively comment on stylistic features such as gapped events.  However, cognitive 
research on inference generation knowledge more generally provides the cognitivist 
approach to language with a distinct perspective from which to discuss the issue.  
‘Filling in the blanks’ is a common process in the day-to-day process of interpreting 
language.  As Kranjec et al. (2012) have put it, ‘thinking about causal relations, even 
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when none are warranted, is arguably our most overarching conceptual bias… the 
tendency to construe two events as causally related is particularly powerful for humans’ 
(12).  Psychological research on event structure perception in language and experience 
(Zacks and Tversky, 2001; Hard et al., 2006; Hard et al., 2011) shows that the 
understanding of everyday events relies on the observation of ‘breakpoints’ between 
actions which conform to recognisable scripts of activity.  In Michotte’s (1963) famous 
study, participants readily inferred intentional activity in their descriptions of the 
animated path of a ball, viewed as colliding with a second ball.  According to Michotte, 
participants directly perceived this causation, rather than relying on ‘causal reasoning’ 
to deduce the agent (Pederson and Bohnemeyer, 2011), ultimately constructing a report 
of the event which emphasises the activity with the greatest perceived significance 
(‘hitting’ as opposed to ‘stopping’).  While Fauconnier and Turner (2002) disagree with 
this conclusion, arguing instead that the perception of causality is a conceptual blend 
resulting from everyday experiences, they too emphasise the significance of causality in 
cognition and perception, suggesting that ‘we cannot fail to perform this blend, and we 
cannot see beyond it’ (78).  Additionally, Black and Bern (1981) provide evidence to 
suggest that causally related events in narratives are more easily remembered.  In day to 
day life, our brains are adept at inferring both motion and the causal relationship 
between participants, even when the events themselves are highly segmented, and the 
participants in question are little more than abstract shapes.   
 Accounting for inference is inherent to the study of language and reasoning.  
E.M. Forster provides a classic example (1927) of the difference between the ‘story’ (the 
king died and then the queen died) and the ‘plot’ (the king died and then the queen 
died of grief), arguing that the addition of causality in the latter creates narrativity 
because the reader infers a causal connection between the two events.  Chatman (1978), 
however, has argued that while this is true in relation to the explicit content of the 
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example, ‘our minds inveterately seek structure, and they will provide it if necessary’ 
(45), suggesting that some readers will infer a causal connection between the two events 
in the former example.  This is also prompted by the pragmatic context in which the 
clauses appear: the utterances will have been produced together for a reason.  Unless 
prompted otherwise, the reader naturally gravitates toward the assumption that there 
must be some causal connection between the two deaths as the most straightforward 
explanation as to what makes them tellable in such close proximity to one another.  As 
Wales (2011) explains, ‘in the construction and interpretation of narratives, inference is 
absolutely necessary.  Without the taking for granted of facts, details, and cultural 
knowledge, a story would be exceedingly tedious to read’ (226).  That said, while the 
tendency to infer a relationship between such events seems natural, the process of 
implicature is not easily demonstrated through a single reading of a text.  The problem 
thus remains that the relationship between the reading practices of the individual, 
unless compared directly to a larger sample size, may not reflect the typical means by 
which the text is interpreted in terms of its construal of causality, or indeed any aspect 
of specificity. 
 Returning to clause-level considerations of causality, the linguistic construal of 
an event in a clause requires the organisation of participants into a relationship 
governed by the direction of motion or force.  In the process of selecting the level of 
detail at which to report an event (cf. Ch. 2.3.2), a speaker leaves out information which 
the listener must infer in order to interpret the meaning of the overall construal.  For 
example, when Ivar Campbell (in Housman, 1930: 59-61) witnesses the deliberate killing 
of an enemy soldier, he writes: 
Then, as a rabbit in the early morning comes out to crop grass, a German 
stepped over the enemy trench – the only living thing in sight.  “I’ll take him,” 
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says the man next to me.  And like a rabbit the German falls.  And again 
complete silence and desolation (60) 
When discussing ‘gaps’ in description for their stylistic effect, Simpson and Canning 
(2014) have noted the difficulty in framing their analysis in terms of transitivity, as a 
transitivity profile designed to compare the descriptions of actions across the discourse 
‘would struggle grammatically to locate the ‘action’ of the (non-)event under scrutiny’ 
(293).  Considered in terms of the cognitive modelling of force transferral, the German 
soldier is construed as the source of the energy which begins the act of falling, as the 
grammar of the passage does not directly connect the soldier to the earlier speaker.  
However, the earlier hypothetical modal (‘I’ll take him’) construes an event model which 
positions the speaker as agent and the German soldier as the goal of a single event 
process.  Although also couched in metaphorical language which downplays the moral 
significance of the action, the clause provides contextual information which aids the 
reader’s interpretation of the gap between the utterance and the falling of the German 
soldier. 
 Within the Idealised Reader framework, O’Halloran distinguishes between 
different kinds of causal inference, and the probability of their being inferred by a non-
critical reader reading ‘for the gist’.  He observes in particular that causal antecedent 
inferences (‘what caused this?’) are more likely to be inferred by idealised readers than 
causal consequent inferences (‘what did this cause?’).  Likewise, ‘connecting’ inferences 
which make sense of the relationship between events are more readily processed than 
‘elaborative’ inferences, which provide further information non-essential to making 
sense of the scene under description (2003: 190).  Additionally, the concept of ‘cognitive 
economy’ (191) refers to the ease with relationships are inferred, indicating that abstract 
associations with high-level goals are less easily inferred than immediate consequences.  
As a framework, O’Halloran’s Idealised Reader provides a valuable starting point for 
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understanding the likelihood of any one absence or mystification within a text being 
overcome through inference by non-critical readers.  Nonetheless, additional studies 
with specific readers will work to challenge or support these assumptions on a case by 
case basis. 
 Further research on readers’ abilities to infer actions and causal relationships 
that have not been directly presented comes from work on visual narratives (Cohn and 
Wittenberg, 2015), where instead of an illustration of an event, readers were presented 
with a jagged action symbol, framed by the setup to and consequences of the event.  
Here, provided that the narrative sequence was not scrambled, readers were readily able 
to infer the kind of actions which fill these gaps in the narrative.  This approach builds 
on the ‘situation model’ (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983), which refers to the reader’s ability 
to model what a text is ‘about’ in their minds, with a greater scope than may be provided 
by textual cues, and bears comparison with Schema Theory (Schank and Abelson, 1995) 
and mental models for understanding inference (Johnson-Laird, 1983).  Given the 
interest in early cognitive research in understanding the role of inference in processing 
meaning, Cognitive Grammar conceives of a conceptual substrate (Langacker, 2008; Ch. 
2.3.5), which represents the relationship between previous experiences, both of language 
and experiences in the world, and the present speech act in order to demonstrate how 
these inform the process of understanding.  In other words, the role of background 
knowledge in inferring meaning is inherent to the system of knowledge upon which 
Cognitive Grammar is founded. 
Scarry (1985), in discussing the language of violence, has observed the tendency 
of descriptions to leave absent a direct description of the act of violence: ‘The written 
and spoken record of war over many centuries certifies the ease with which human 
powers of description break down in the presence of battle, the speed with which they 
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back away from injuring’ (66), and psychotherapist Martha Bragin has come to a similar 
conclusion, observing that ‘extremely violent events are processed differently by the 
brain, causing them to be segregated, fragmented, and outside of the narrative of 
meaning.’ (2010: 319, my emphasis).  In other words, a focus on the description of 
higher-order events renders absent the micro-level detail about the kinds of processes 
which make up these larger-scale activities: if the reader is told that the narrator ‘helped 
to win the war’, precisely what is involved in such an act is not detailed, and the reader 
is required instead to infer the ways in which the narrator ‘helped’, drawing from 
context or prior knowledge.  As Abbott (2015) suggests of ‘permanent narrative gaps’ in 
fiction, ‘readers may imagine a host of different narrative connections lurking in a 
permanent gap, but none of these can ever be converted to a certainty’ (109).  Although 
Abbott restricts his observations to fictional texts, the same is the case in factual 
discourse where the author is no longer able to clarify or expand upon their phrasing.  
As was noted in the discussion of low granularity (2.3.2), when Johnson (1917) describes 
the Gold Coast regiment performing ‘fine work’, exactly what this work was, or which 
aspects of it the author evaluated as ‘good’, can only be inferred.  
 Regardless of where the line is drawn on the necessary perception of more fine 
grained events, the fact remains that the reader’s attention to these high or low 
granularity construals is enabled or prevented by the framing within the language 
choices of the author.  Moreover, shifts in modern discourse now often frame warfare in 
humanitarian terms, as both soldiers and policies frame the act of killing in relation to 
its consequent social benefits (Chouliaraki, 2014; cf. Ch. 5.5).  In these terms, the 
construal of force leaves the wounded party absent from the scope of reference entirely, 
and the kinds of events that might constitute the described act are rethought under a 
new and distinct semantic field of reference.  As Hart (2013) states, then, the objective of 
a cognitive approach to CDA is ‘to demonstrate the conceptual import of ideological 
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language choices and to identify the particular parameters along which ideological 
differences in text and conceptualisation can occur’ (404).  The demonstrable 
manipulation of event representation afforded by the processes of construal provides 
ample evidence of the success of Cognitive Linguistics in detailing the nuances of force 
and motion in language.  
3.4: Resistant Reading and Reconstrual 
 
 As well as forming conclusions about causal connections which are not made 
explicit in the source text, readers are also capable of rejecting propositions advanced by 
the narrative, based on their own background knowledge.  Browse (in press, 2018), has 
adopted the term ‘reconstrual’ to account for the fact that readers’ interpretations are 
not fixed to the construals offered to them by the source text: rather, readers may reject 
this construal, offering instead their own, even contradictory, organisation of actors and 
events.  Just as the language of a given phrase construes a mode of perceiving the event, 
and the causal relationship between its participants, ‘reconstrual’ refers to the reader’s 
active reinterpretation of an event presented to them, rewording it in such a way as to 
reconfigure the force dynamic relationship between the original agent and patient.  
Browse applies the concept of reconstrual to resistant readers of political rhetoric, 
showing that while a speech might present a certain state of events in one way, readers 
will actively draw upon their wider knowledge to counter or correct this construal.   
 Communication is more than just the presentation of one ideology to an 
uninvolved audience; it involves the reconciliation of concepts in a Common Ground, 
and these reconstruals can be used to demonstrate a communicative failure on behalf of 
the original speaker, whose construal fails to appeal to the listener’s understanding of 
the facts or events in question.  Alternatively, as O’Halloran (2003: 234) has noted, 
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readers who are familiar with the subject matter may identify causal connections 
unspecified within the source text.  In this way, Browse observes that ‘in addition to 
simply rejecting the knowledge incremented into the Common Ground… audience 
members can choose to reject the construal placed upon it’ (ibid).  Performing Critical 
Discourse Analysis often relies on the process of reconstrual to demonstrate the 
ideological bias of the original text, which Fairclough (2013) argues serves to ‘identify the 
causes of social wrongs and produce knowledge which could (in the right conditions) 
contribute to righting or mitigating them’ (8).  For instance, when Reisigl and Wodak 
(2001) suggest that absences ‘enable speakers to conjure away responsible, involved 
actors (whether victims or perpetrators), or to keep them in the semantic background’ 
(58), analysing a passage in order to demonstrate which actors have been rendered 
absent is a process of resistant reconstrual. 
 In resisting the ideological frame afforded by a text, readers and listeners employ 
knowledge and personal perspectives that challenge or contradict the original construal 
they are presented with.  For example, it is possible to respond to a narrative such as the 
following: ‘”I’ll take him,’ says the man next to me.  And like a rabbit the German fell’ 
(Campbell, in Housman, 1930 [2002]: 60) by reconstruing the events described into an 
expression such as ‘the man next to me shot the German soldier, who fell like a rabbit’.  
This second construal contains the same semantic information as the first, but the 
inclusion of the verb ‘shot’ represents a direct transfer of energy from the man to the 
German soldier.  Alternatively, reconstrual can include additional information, such as 
whether or not the German soldier posed a threat to the narrator.  Similarly, readers 
may respond directly to the ideological connotations of a narrator’s construal.   In his 
memoir of combat in Singapore during the Second World War, for example, Carpenter 
(n.d.) describes the Japanese soldiers he watches bombing a nearby ship as ‘yellow scum’ 
(35), a phrase which immediately appears to be explicitly ideologically charged owing to 
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its derogatory nature.  Drawing upon pre-existing knowledge and beliefs, readers may 
parse the meaning of Carpenter’s language without agreeing with its ideological 
sentiment.  While all of these new construals still refer to the same act or individuals as 
the original texts, reconstruing them from new persepectives demonstrates a reader’s 
awareness of positions other than those presented to them in the source material. 
 While the process of reconstrual demonstrates the capacity of readers to resist 
an ideological perspective with a presented discourse, the resulting reconstruals of 
redescription are still the products of perspective-taking, and therefore subjective.  As 
academic and non-specialist readers will each draw on a wide range of background 
knowledge in the process of attributing prominence to and interpreting linguistic 
information, this chapter seeks to examine the responses of a range of readers to an 
individual text.  By demonstrating the breadth of these interpretations, the study below 
aims to show the importance of individual background knowledge, while at the same 
time producing evidence to support a critical claim regarding the general ability of 
readers to infer a key causal relationship within the text.  Whether or not the narrator is 
understood as the responsible agent – especially of such a narratively significant act – is 
central to the way in which readers will understand their overall character.  The study 
hypothesises that the process of reconstrual in order to simplify the force dynamic 
relationship between the narrator and the individual who is harmed is not only possible, 
but highly probable as the most straightforward interpretative practice available in 
understanding the meaning of a passage.  Moreover, because reconstrual is a discursive 
act which follows from interpretation, it can be observed and compared with the 
language of the source text.  Although these may seem like common sense remarks, 
producing these responses directly allows for a more concrete discussion of the ways in 
which readers choose to reconstrue and evaluate an act of wartime violence, and they 
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ways in which stylistic choices in event representation do or do not influence the 
perception of agency. 
3.5: A Reader-Response Study of Event (Re)Construal  
 
 So far, the ideological and academic biases which inform researcher readings 
have been identified as potential issues for critical interpretation.  Given the possibility 
that non-specialist readers will be less attentive to specific stylistic features in the 
interpretation of meaning (O’Halloran, 2003), the study below aims to produce ‘natural’ 
readings of one of the primary texts this thesis is concerned with.  The study aims to 
determine to what extent lay readers’ engagement with and reaction to these texts 
differs from a specialist reader.  In order to determine whether or not readers perceive a 
causal relationship between two segmented events, the study asked readers to 
reconstrue the events of the narrative in their own words (3.5.2).  Additionally, 
participants were given the opportunity to make evaluative comments on the story as it 
progressed (3.5.3), the findings of which prompt a critical reflection on both the style of 
the source text, and the perspectives and methods adopted for this research. 
3.5.1: Methodology 
 
This study adapts Short and van Peer’s ‘online written introspection’ (1989) 
method, which asked readers being presented with a text for the first time to record 
their reactions to a text they are reading for the first time, as they do so.  In their paper, 
the authors selected a poem neither had read before, and read through it line by line, 
making note of any themes or linguistic features that caught their attention, as well as 
more general impressions of the text.  This allowed for a comparative study of their 
reading processes, and consequently an assessment of the similarities and differences 
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between their readings in terms of attention and interpretation, noting how readers 
responded and attributed meaning and significance t0 particular linguistic features.  
Necessary adjustments were made, however, in order to reflect the particular aims of 
this study.  Firstly, as the aim of this research is to consider the interpretative practices 
of readers without a specialist interest in the language of the text, readers were recruited 
through university wide emails to staff and students, calling for ‘volunteers to take part 
in a short online reading study investigating how readers respond to short narratives of 
violence in a military context’ (see Appendix A).  The language of this call for volunteers, 
as well as the participant information sheet referred to the potentially disturbing 
content of the study in relation to ‘violence’, as opposed to ‘killing’, or any other 
construal which would predispose the participants to be mindful of a given causal 
relationship within the text.  The study was conducted online through a Google Forms 
questionnaire, and participants were required to complete a multiple choice consent 
form demonstrating an understanding of the ways in which their data would be stored, 
used and reported.  In addition, the information section asked participants whether they 
studied or worked in the School of English.  In the end, 10 participants were recruited: 5 
members of staff and 5 students with an equal gender split, and a mean age of 41.2.   
The study asked participants to respond to a 1500 word extract from the Private 
Papers of D Evans (1991, see Appendix A), a British soldier from the Second World War 
whose memoir is held publicly in the Imperial War Museum.  This extract was selected 
for its concise, self-contained nature, as the narrative could be broken into seven 
sections, broadly corresponding to Labov and Waletzky’s (1967) framework of narrative 
structure.  Beginning with an orientation of the setting, the narrative moves to describe 
the complication of conflict, and builds to the act of killing, the resolution of victory in 
battle, followed by an evaluation by the narrator of his own actions.  This ensured that 
participants would be able to focus on the content of the narrative, and allowed for the 
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text to be presented in manageable and meaningful sections of 150-250 words each.  For 
example, Section 5, in which the narrator describes identifying and firing at an enemy 
soldier, was presented as follows.  Below each question (in bold), readers were given an 
expanding text box to provide answers of any length: 
I saw one of the enemy soldiers slip from behind one tree to another, nearer 
one.  As the two were almost in line with us he hadn’t been seen by anyone 
else.  Realising that he must be standing upright and sideways on so as to be 
hidden, I reckoned that, though the centre of the trunk was thick enough to 
stop a bullet, the edges would certainly let one through and, as the tree was 
not too broad, I would stand a chance of getting the man behind it.  My Sten, 
with its low-powered pistol ammunition, stood little chance of this so I 
grabbed Frank’s rifle, aimed at a point about a third in from the edge of the 
trunk and fired: the man pitched forward to lie on his face.  All this took far 
less time than it takes to tell. 
Please summarise the events of this section in your own words: 
Use this space to write any further thoughts or feelings you may have 
about this extract: 
Similarly to extracts in other memoirs discussed earlier (2.4.1; 3.3), Evans’ description of 
the act of violence construes the moment the enemy soldier was shot in segmented 
terms (‘[I] fired: the man pitched forward’), without an explicit transfer of force from the 
narrator to the victim.  Fig. 3.1 below models this segmentation of force in this extract, 
and compares it to the language of Lukowiak’s memoir, which Robinson (2011) described 
as being ‘without any consciousness of his own agency’ (583).  Though they differ in 
terms of transitivity, both descriptions segment the act of killing into lower level events 
to the extent that the original source agent is not directly connected by a direct transfer 
of force to the one upon whom violence is inflicted. 
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Fig. 3.1: Comparison of reader response extract (top), and Lukowiak passage (bottom) 
 
Given this highly granular style, it is tempting to follow Robinson’s conclusion and 
assert that the language of Evans’ memoir functions to obfuscate his role as an actor in 
the events described.  Moreover, the inference of agency in both cases is causal 
consequent, but also refers to an immediate goal, the Idealised Reader framework 
provides hypotheses which would support indications of both inference and absence in 
readers’ interpretations (O’Halloran, 2003: 190-191).   In order to determine whether or 
not the inference of the narrator’s agentive relationship with the segmented landmark 
was common, participants in this study were asked to summarise the events of each 
section of the extract in their own words.  Providing an answer was compulsory at each 
stage of the reading, before participants were allowed to view the next section of the 
extract.  In completing this question, participants reconstrued the events of each section 
according to their interpretation of events.  Accordingly, it was possible to observe when 
participants had drawn a direct causal relationship between the narrator and the enemy 
soldier, and had felt that such a construal accurately reflected the information presented 
80 
 
in the passage.  In section 3.5.2 below, the answers to this question are discussed in 
relation to the directness of the transfer of force, and modelled visually to provide a 
comparison between the source text and reader reconstrual. 
In order to cue all participants to produce their own reconstrual of events, 
without drawing particular attention to the narrator’s act of killing, the reading task was 
separated into two sections: a compulsory redescription of the events of the present 
section of text in their own words, and an option to record any thoughts or feelings 
about the text that felt significant to them.  By asking participants to perform two tasks 
across the length of the text, some attention was drawn away from the act of 
redescription as a task.  Additionally, producing such responses across all extracts 
helped to normalise the response process prior to the key passage in section 5, in which 
they redescribed the act of violence performed by the narrator.  Allowing readers to 
complete this process online gave them the freedom to move back and forth between 
the passages at will with no time constraints on the completion of the task, as well as 
providing unlimited digital space in which to record their redescriptions and reflections.  
These qualitative responses are discussed in section 3.5.3, where readers’ impressions of 
the text are discussed in critical and stylistic terms.  In combining these observations 
with their redescription of events, lay reader impressions of the narrator’s language and 
the events described in the extract – provided both consciously and unconsciously – are 
incorporated into the analysis.   
3.5.2: Initial Findings 
 
 As mentioned above, the passage of the source text describing the performance 
of violence segmented the event into discrete intransitive segments.  Overwhelmingly, 
however, participants described this section of the narrative in terms of a single, 
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transitive act, symbolising a direct transfer of force from an identifiable agent (the 
narrator) to an identified source (the other soldier): 
R1: ‘The soldier who has seen him shoots him with another soldier's 
rifle’ 
R3: ‘The narrator kills a man behind a tree’ 
R4: ‘The narrator borrows Frank's rifle to kill an enemy soldier hidden 
behind a tree’ 
R5: ‘The narrator killed him with a carefully aimed rifle shot’ 
R6: ‘[He] shot the hiding soldier’ 
R7: ‘He used someone else's gun and shot accurately where he needed 
to, killing the soldier behind the tree’ 
R9: ‘The writer recounts his ingenuity in finding a way to kill one of 
the enemy’ 
R10: ‘I saw a man hiding behind the tree, so I shot him with my 
friend's better gun’ 
What these readers present in their redescription is an agentive relationship construed 
within the canonical model of event representation, and their ability to assign such roles 
after being prompted to accurately redescribe the scene shows that they must perceive a 
similar causal relationship within the source text, despite the segmented descriptive 
choices of the author.  The reconstrual of this inference in these terms by all readers, 
despite being causal consequent, may indicate that the inference is more connecting 
than elaborative (O’Halloran, 2003: 190).  In other words, understanding that Evans 
causes the man to pitch forward – and that this itself is euphemistic for an act of 
violence upon the enemy soldier – is central to understanding the narrative more 
broadly. 
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Fig. 3.2: Event models for original construal (below), and reader reconstrual (above) 
 
 Additionally, each of the above redescriptions is assumed to be canonical in 
terms of intentional agentive action.  While it is possible for ‘shooting’ or ‘killing’ to be 
construed as unintentional acts, these are typically marked as such.  For readers who did 
not reconstrue the causal relationship in its simplest form, there were still strong 
indications that the readers perceived an agentive relationship between the shooting of 
the rifle, and the falling down of the enemy soldier: 
R8: ‘he borrowed a friends rifle and shot, he was successful and the 
enemy fell’ 
Here, although the acts of shooting and falling are still described separately from one 
another, the inclusion of a state of ‘success’ draws an explicit causal connection between 
the two.  Likewise, R2 employs the euphemistic phrase ‘drop’ in place of ‘shoot’ or ‘kill’, 
but in doing so still construes a direct transfer of force from the narrator to the enemy 
soldier, also reinforcing the narrator’s agency in performing the act by marking success: 
R2: ‘he calculates how to 'drop' the enemy, which he succeeds doing’ 
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 Additionally, having made the methodological decision to recruit participants 
from across the university, it is worth discussing here participants’ use of metalinguistic 
comment on the text. While several readers used quotations from the source text in 
order to demonstrate more precisely where they had felt certain emotional reactions (R3 
gives an example they describe as a ‘rhetorical flourish’), only one participant made 
comments specifically about a stylistic feature of the passage.  Responding to Section 2, 
R10 wrote: 
R10: ‘The passivisation of the last sentence struck me. Killed by whom? 
It's not like he just happened to have died, the officers were the ones 
doing the killing’ 
 R10 identifies passivisation as a linguistic feature within the text, and goes on to 
reconstrue the event in such a way as to emphasise the absence of an identifiable agent, 
before suggesting a construal in which ‘the officers’ are assigned this role, in a turn that 
strongly resembles CDA’s functionalist close reading methods.  Of the ten participants, 
R10 was the only one who either studies or works in the School of English at the 
University of Sheffield, and is specifically an English Language and Linguistics PhD 
candidate, though does not have any experience with Critical Discourse Analysis.  
Although it would be unreasonable to draw strong conclusions about the influence of 
specialist knowledge on the reading process from such a small sample of appropriately 
trained readers, R10’s passing use of linguistic terminology in greater detail than any 
other participant does suggest that a broad spectrum of readers will yield the most wide-
ranging results, and therefore help demonstrate which features a greater number of 
readers are likely to find significant in their reading.  For future research, maintaining 
an awareness of participants’ background may be a useful supplement to the analysis of 
their responses, and it may be worth actively controlling for specialist knowledge among 
a larger sample size. 
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To summarise these findings, while the language of the text deviates from 
canonical and direct event modelling, readers are still able to readily construe this 
relationship between actor and patient, and often do so in the most direct possible sense.  
Where this does not occur, readers nonetheless demonstrated marked recognition of a 
closer causal link than is specified in the source material, either through a reduction in 
the length of the action chain, or an attribution of ‘success’ to the original agent.  In 
other words, though it may seem from a critical perspective that these segmentations 
function to reduce agency between the narrator and the individual he harms, readers are 
nonetheless able to recover this sense of accountability.  That having been said, I now 
examine participants affective responses to the passage.  By more closely considering 
participants’ emotional and free-form responses to the text, we may gain further insight 
into the functional effects of the text’s language.  After all, it remains possible that while 
readers construe an agentive relationship in the description of violence, the language 
choices therein may afford a ‘feeling’ of distance. 
3.5.3: Qualitative Responses to Stylistic Choices 
 
               Although reporting any evaluative comments participants may have had for 
each section was optional, many readers chose to report their affective responses to the 
events described.  As these readers are predominantly unfamiliar with technical 
linguistic terminology, their responses provide a more impressionistic basis from which 
to develop a precise stylistic account of the reported effects.  For example, the following 
responses come from Section 4, where the narrator describes witnessing violence 
performed by his fellow soldiers, where R10 commented on the passivisation of killing 
(3.5.2).  Emphases are my own: 
R1: ‘This one made me feel sad because it brings home the impersonal 
and violent nature of war’ 
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R2: ‘But still the action sounds mechanical, as if the soldier himself is 
just part of a bigger machine’ 
R3: For all the graphic parts […] it feels oddly emotionless. Kind of like 
there is no moral stance being taken here beyond a very simple binary 
us and them’ 
R9: ‘The story is told with utter absence of empathy for the enemy’ 
 Although these readers did not make metalinguistic comments about the 
stylistic structure of the extract, their comments suggest a shared perception of 
emotional distance in the description.  In particular, the comment by R2 indicates that 
agency is removed from the narrator, who is instead ‘part of a bigger machine’.  Similarly, 
R4 reports surprise at their own lack of an emotional response: 
R4: This is by far the most graphic passage so far. I am shocked that 
I'm not shocked at all. I feel that the horror of war has been normalised. 
It seems that this kind of thing is seen almost daily on TV and films, 
and its hard not to read this as a similar fictional piece. I was almost 
jubilant that Les got the German before he managed to kill any of 'our 
lot'. I think the 'Nazi bad, Allies good' simplistic WW2 narrative runs 
deep within our culture 
Following the earlier discussion of the importance of cultural knowledge to the process 
of inference (3.3), R4’s response demonstrates the role of personal background 
information in the interpretation of the text as a whole.  In comparing Evans’ narrative 
to works of fiction, R4 identified oversimplified representations of wartime experiences, 
and employs the primary text to challenge and revise their cultural expectations.  While 
the reader is emotionally unaffected by Evans’ construal, then, this reaction in itself 
appears to prompt a critical evaluation of the readers’ beliefs.  Other comments 
demonstrate indirectly the fact that readers were not shocked by the content of the 
passage.  The entirety of R5’s reflective response for Section 4, for instance, is as follows: 
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R5: The enemy troops appear to be poorly lead. Surely. A spandau 
machine gun (MG42) was a crewed served weapon. It wouldn't be 
used in a frontal attack of this type 
That R5’s attention is turned to the technical details of the scene, as opposed to its 
emotive content, suggests that this reader is more concerned with the factual accuracy 
of the narrative than its emotive content.  Moreover, the modal evaluation that the 
Spandau machine gun ‘wouldn’t be used in a frontal attack of this type’ indicates a 
resistance to the validity of the construal itself, as the reader draws on their own military 
experience and knowledge to produce a different context model for their relationship to 
the text than other readers are able to call upon.  
In general, the fact that readers can be so indifferent to a description of such a 
controversial act – and even be surprised at their own apathy – demonstrates the 
significance of comparing specialist and non-specialist readers’ interests in the same text.  
Though participants made few metalinguistic comments in their reflections, comments 
that the action felt ‘mechanical’ or ‘scientific’ support a critical reading of the author’s 
stylistic choices as emotionally distant from the content of the narrative.  In addition, 
readers made direct comparisons between the style of each Section, the consequences of 
which are discussed further below (3.6).  In the example responses below, emphasis has 
been added to comparative, evaluative, and stylistic judgements: 
R1: This text has not evoked as much feeling in me as the others, I'm 
not sure why! 
R3: It's very rational in the sense that is a presentation of a sequence 
of events and the thought processes he has about them. Again, there 
seems very little emotion 
R4: Again, action packed. Part of me felt triumphant that the narrator 
got one up on 'jerry', another part of me feels I shouldn't approve of 
killing and glorifying war 
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R8: The soldier is putting thought into how to kill the enemy in a sort 
of scientific way and is successful 
As with the passivized extract in Section 4, readers indicated an emotional distance from 
the actions performed, both for themselves and in terms of the text’s style.  Accordingly, 
while readers may be able to infer a causal connection between highly granular acts 
which segment transfers of force, a common trend in the responses to this study 
suggests that such construals are viewed as mechanical, or emotionally distant.  As has 
been noted throughout this chapter, however, readers have the capacity to respond to 
the same text in a variety of contrasting ways.  Indeed, R4 even reports feeling 
‘triumphant’ before reflecting on the context of the passage.  Further to this, two 
participants’ responses were pithy or humorous:  
R5: ‘Nathan Bedford Forrest "do unto them as they would do unto you, 
But do it fur'stest”’ 
R10: ‘I bet the other man thought he was so sneaky and cunning 
sneaking around behind the trees.  And then he died.’ 
The diversity of readers’ responses to the same source text, both in terms of their 
reconstrual of events and their qualitative assessments, supports the suggestion that 
Critical Discourse Analysis should consult additional perspectives to triangulate its 
critical interpretations (Widdowson, 1998; O’Halloran, 2003; Hart, 2018).  In 
demonstrating that most readers can readily recover the direct causal relationship 
between segmented actors and events in this highly granular description of violence, 
this study limits the extent to which Evans’ style could be described as rendering absent 
his agency in the act of killing.  Instead, readers viewed his description as mechanical, 
prompting self-reflection on their own emotional reaction to his actions.  In this sense, 
while Evans’ description could still be described as ‘breaking down’ and ‘backing away 
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from’ the act of injuring itself (Scarry, 1985), doing so encourages the reader to respond 
more critically to their own beliefs about killing in war.   
3.5.4: Unexpected Findings 
 
While the initial aim of this study was to challenge a perceived bias in existing 
critical commentary with regards to individual stylistic features, additional findings 
suggest further variety in readers’ responses.  As the texts explored throughout this 
thesis were collected in order to facilitate an analysis of the narration of violence in war 
writing, the moment in which Evans describes the act of shooting the enemy soldier 
(Section 5) was foregrounded in my own reading as the most significant moment within 
the narrative.  However, the graph below represents the average word count for 
participants’ responses to each section.  While there is little correlation between the 
length of the descriptive and reflective response in relation to one another, Section 5 
contains the shortest average word count in response to both questions.  Additionally, 
the inclusion of reflective responses to each section was not compulsory, and four 
participants chose to write nothing, although two provided reflections relating to all 
other sections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3: Average word count of readers’ reflective and descriptive responses 
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 One explanation for this modulation may be that, in the design of the material’s 
presentation, participants were provided with a shorter section of text than in other 
parts of the study.  As the graph below shows, Section 5 was one of the shortest extracts 
shown to readers (actual word counts for the sections have been halved, for visual 
clarity), but only six words shorter than the previous passage, which received more 
extensive commentary, and forty words longer than Section 1.  Furthermore, while 
sections 2 and 6 were considerably longer than the others, this is not reflected in the 
average word count of readers’ responses in either the reflective or descriptive exercise.  
While there is a small increase in the length of descriptive responses to these passages, 
moderate variation of around 200 words between the length of extracts, then, does not 
seems to significantly affect the rate and length of readers’ qualitative reflections.  
Moreover, Section 4 was closely concerned with descriptions of violence.  These actions 
were witnessed, not performed, and Section 4 shows an average word count for 
redescription, alongside an increased word count for evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4: Average response length, including length of source passage per section 
 
 It would be unfounded, therefore, to immediately conclude that shorter 
responses to the text directly correlate to a disinterest in its content.  Norrick (2005) 
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proposes a ‘dark side’ to tellability in narrative: just as an event can fall below the 
threshold of tellability, leading the reader or listener to ask Labov’s famous ‘so what?’ 
(2013), events can also be too tellable, and their taboo nature means that readers are less 
likely to comment lightly on their contents.  Accordingly, while some readers appear to 
have been desensitised to the witnessing of violence (3.5.3), making judgements on 
those who perform it during the telling of their story may remain impolite.  Fig. 3.4 
shows that the average length of responses increased in section 6, where participants 
were able to produce extensive evaluative judgements of Evans’s own evaluation of his 
actions, agreeing or disagreeing with his assessment of whether he should have killed 
the enemy soldier.  This may be because Evans himself reflects on the morality of his 
actions in this section, cuing participants to provide their own evaluations, whether they 
agree or disagree.  Alternatively it may reflect part of a pragmatic response process, 
where readers wait until the end of the narrative before presenting their own thoughts 
more thoroughly.  In fact, of the seven participants who chose to leave an evaluative 
comment for this final section, six discussed the act of killing described in Section 5 
directly, while the other chose to engage primarily in challenging Evans’ evaluation, 
which itself reflected predominantly on the killing of the enemy soldier.  
 But this theory alone does not account for change in length of readers’ affective 
responses.  The many quotations from reflective responses above show that participants 
felt apathetic about the emotional impact of the passage, often to their own surprise.  As 
R4 put it, ‘I am shocked that I’m not shocked at all’.  One reason for this may be the 
cautious way in which participants were informed about the content of the material 
prior to reading.  To ensure that participants consented to reading the potentially 
disturbing content of the study, the information sheet which preceded the consent form 
warned that the text would contain ‘scenes of graphic military violence’.  It may be, 
therefore, that some readers anticipated a bloodier text, and consequently found the 
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text itself not to be as graphic as expected.  Alternatively, as R4 reflects, however ‘the 
horror of war has been normalised’.  Fictional and factual acts of violence are 
inextricable from modern news and media, and readers may simply consider killing in 
war time to be culturally expected or even acceptable. 
 In response to stylistic research which involves the study of actual readers’ 
responses to texts, Myers (2009) comments that ‘they pose a problem, or maybe an 
opportunity, for stylistic analysis, because these readers do not necessarily address the 
concerns of literary stylistics, even when they are talking about language, literature, and 
style.’ (338, emphases in original).  Recognising the potential for a disparity between the 
interests and focuses of specialist and non-specialist readers with regards to the 
language of this text, the present study embraces these differences in order to ensure 
that the critical close readings performed throughout this thesis are closely connected to 
the interpretative practices of everyday readers.  This in turn has worked to justify the 
hesitancy expressed earlier in this chapter in connecting a lack of explicit description of 
causality to a perceived absence of causal relationships between discourse participants 
(3.2.1), as lay-readers consistently re-construe these passages in such a way as to indicate 
their understanding of a direct causal relationship between the narrator and the 
individual who has been hurt.  In addition, the affective responses from individual 
participants have provided novel insights into the ways in which readers approach and 
evaluate these texts and the actors and events they describe. 
 In some cases, participants mentioned biographical information which they felt 
was pertinent to their interpretative process in their final evaluation, when prompted to 
reflect on the study and the text overall.  R4, for example, explained that: 
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R4:  ‘as the daughter of a soldier (who has certainly killed people) this 
has made me think about my dad and the horrendous affect [sic] of 
military service on his mental health. In war there are no victors’  
While R5 offered an explanation for what they perceived to be a reserved reaction to the 
text: 
R5: Having spent a year as a casualty officer, a year doing 
neurosurgery and more than 25 years as a coroner, I'm afraid that the 
nature of fatal injuries, and survivors' reactions to them doesn't upset 
me as much as perhaps it should. When you see a 25 year old woman 
who has, quite literally, blown her head off with a shotgun, it gives you 
a certain perspective. 
As participants were not asked to supply this information when evaluating their 
responses to the text, the fact that they do so willingly indicates that these readers 
perceive these experiences to be significant to their own interpretative practices.  
 Ingulsrud and Allen (2009) have critiqued the general use of the term ‘lay reader’ 
in Critical Discourse Analysis, arguing that ‘it is impossible to ascertain how exactly a lay 
reader reads’ (81).  Given the breadth of experiences brought to this text by the readers 
in this study,  the division between specialist and non-specialist readers is relatively 
arbitrary, as each reader draws upon personal experiences from unique aspects of their 
lives to inform their interpretations.  Just as the soldiers who write about performing 
acts of violence are diverse in their evaluations of their own activities, so each reader 
brings with them a wealth of experience, beliefs, and ideological perspectives.  Had this 
study sampled military veterans or pacifists as its readers, for example, no doubt the 
responses produced would be radically different.  That said, focusing in this study on 
readers without an academic expertise in linguistic analysis resulted in the production 
of evidence for a variety of emotional responses to stylistic effects elicited by particular 
linguistic stimuli, such as passivisation.  Such comments from non-linguists provide a 
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valuable grounding for critical close readings, in order to ensure that the analysis 
conforms to observed reading practices.  Similarly, it must be remembered that all of 
these participants engaged with the text in the context of a research study which, while 
performed at their leisure and at their own pace, may not reflect their everyday reading 
practices.  Nonetheless, comparing the interpretative practices of language specialists to 
those of other readers only improves the range of data used to support these critical 
analyses, the findings of which may be used as a starting point for further research, 
drawing upon a larger cohort of readers to confirm or challenge these general 
interpretations. 
3.6: Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the way in which conclusions are drawn from 
linguistic data in critical close readings, through a practical study to support the 
readings of this thesis.  In particular, it has focused on the ways in which causal 
connections between highly granular construals of action are inferred by non-specialist 
readers.  Using Cognitive Grammar’s Canonical Event Model to visualise the causal 
structure of events in the source text, and Browse’s (in press, 2018) approach to resistant 
reading and reconstrual for the analysis of events, it has shown that readers are capable 
of reconstruing the events described in terms of a higher granularity.  As a result, the 
study limits the extent to which event segmentation can be described critically as a 
linguistic tool for the mystification of causation and action.  Likewise, this chapter has 
demonstrated the reductive nature of direct parallelisms between linguistic and 
practical agency, showing instead that readers are capable of inferring agentive 
relationships left absent from the source text.  Just as the perception of everyday 
experiences as conforming to our expectations of cause and effect requires the blending 
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of experiences and concepts (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002), so the interpretation of 
events in discourse requires the inference of higher or lower granularities, connecting 
gaps and filling in generalisations where necessary.  As well as deconstructing 
preconceptions, however, the qualitative responses given by readers presented a new, 
empirical basis from which to examine the stylistic effects of the narrator’s language.  
Thus, while Evans’ highly granular construal does not mask the causal connection 
between the initial agent and more distant patient, it contributes to a sense of emotional 
distance, or mechanisation. 
While these developments have been valuable for clause-level analysis, the focus 
of this discussion has been limited.  In these opening chapters, linguistic events have 
been examined in isolation from their broader context, and the reader response survey 
above begins to demonstrate the limits of such an approach.  In providing evaluative 
commentary on Evans’ narrative, participants in this study referred to actions from 
across the text, as well as informative experiences from their own lives.  As Hart (2013) 
has also noted, ‘conceptualisations of an event, of course, are not based on single 
sentences within the text.  Rather, we gain an 'impression' of the events described based 
on the common threads that permeate the text as a whole’ (418).  The following chapters 
will connect these clause-level linguistic observations to macro-scale narratological 
research: what is the relationship between individual events and the narrative structures 
that connect them?  From a cognitive perspective, how do these structures allow us to 
make sense of ourselves and, by extension, make sense of others?  The notion that 
readers hold a sustained conceptualisation of a character’s identity has been discussed 
briefly (3.4), but the process through which identity is constructed and perceived in 
narrative will now be examined in greater detail. 
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Just as the boundaries of an ‘event’ are a construct of human perception, ‘what it 
means to be an ‘agent’ does not appear to be a stable, universal property of events in the 
world.  What people see and believe to be an agent is constructed in context' (Fausey et 
al., 2010: 1).  As readers’ responses to Evans’ narrative show, the evaluation of individual 
actions draws upon contextual knowledge, both of the style of the narrative more 
broadly (3.5.3) and their own personal experiences (3.5.4).  When reading a clause as 
part of a larger narrative, readers may draw on this extended narrative context as a 
factor in the perception of agency, and the character of the narrator across the text.  
Understanding the contexts which affect the perception of agency and identity therefore 
requires that the scope of analysis be broadened to consider the narrative structures in 
which the construal appears, and the relationship between the act and the 
representation of the actor more generally. 
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Chapter 4: Situating Events in 
Narrative Contexts 
4.1: Identity and Narrative – Preliminary Definitions 
 
Following the conclusion that the process of reading and interpreting at the 
clausal level within discourse relies on the context of the narrative, this chapter serves to 
introduce narrative research – its terminologies and philosophies – into critical analysis.  
This approach echoes Herman’s (2002) explanation of the relationship between 
individual actions and narrative structures.  Actions, he argues, ‘should be characterized 
not as prefabricated building blocks of story-worlds, but rather as construction materials 
that have to be fashioned – custom-fit – in a manner directed by the kind of narrative 
being told.’ (2002: 73).  In this view, it makes no sense to talk about the specific 
linguistic representation of an event outside of its narrative context.  Rather, the study 
of a specific action as represented in language requires a more holistic consideration of 
its narrative context.  Moreover, the importance of the act of constructing a narrative of 
experience is well documented in the discourse on war (cf. Nordstrom, 1997; Bourke, 
1999; 2006; McLoughlin, 2009).  As O’Brien (1990) explains: 
In any war story, but especially a true one, it’s difficult to separate what 
happened from what seemed to happen.  What seems to happen becomes its 
own happening and has to be told that way.  The angles of vision are skewed.  
[…]  And then afterward, when you go to tell about it, there is always that 
surreal seemingness, which makes the story seem untrue, but which in fact 
represents the hard and exact truth as it seemed. (175-176)  
Narrative structure affords the narrator the opportunity to construe events in a 
sequence which makes experiences intelligible to themselves, and communicable to 
others.  The aim of this chapter, then, is to define the limits of this relationship between 
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narrative, and experience, and to relate these concepts to the function of discourse in 
Cognitive Grammar, in order to relate this discussion to the clause-level analyses of 
previous chapters. 
After outlining a broad definition of narrative and its relationship with actions 
and events as considered thus far (4.1.2), the chapter begins by outlining the approach to 
identity taken throughout this chapter and the remainder of this thesis, which builds 
upon Dennett and Ricouer’s models to suggest that narrative informs and is informed by 
broader conceptions of selfhood (4.2).  Following this, I introduce narratology’s 
‘cognitive turn’ (Herman, 2013b: online) and the role of narrative in making sense of the 
world to directly relate this narrative-level research to the cognitive linguistic focus of 
the previous chapters (4.3), situating Langacker’s approach to discourse (2008: 458-498) 
in relation to cognitive narratology.  With these functions of narrative outlined, the 
chapter then considers the way in which the role of narrative in sense-making has also 
been discussed by researchers primarily interested in war writing, without a specific 
linguistic or narratological focus (4.4).  Identifying the fallacies in the naïve position 
advanced by many of these researchers paves the way for a discussion of Strawson’s 
(2004) critique of the implicit ‘Strong Narrativity’, prompting a definition of the 
parameters of narrative’s role as a tool for sense-making (4.5).   By considering the 
relationship between trauma and narrative (4.6), this chapter advances the ‘Narrative 
Self Shaping Hypothesis’ (Hutto, 2016) as a practical definition of the role of narrative in 
cognitive activity and critical inquiry. 
 Many narrative theorists have proposed their own precise definition of narrative, 
and these typically differ with regards to the minimum number of events required to 
constitute a narrative.  For instance, Genette (1982 [1997]) argues that a narrative can be 
a representation of a single event, while others (Prince, 1982; Bal, 1985; Labov, 2013) 
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emphasise that narrative is defined by the temporal, sequential relationship between at 
least two distinct events.  Moreover, Hühn (2013) has distinguished between different 
subcategories of events in language.  Event I describes events which simply ‘happen’ 
within a narrative, while Event II is defined by the presence of ‘relevance, 
unexpectedness, and unusualness’.  In general, narratology takes Event II descriptions as 
the focus of its analysis, as ‘unexpected’ and ‘unusual’ events often indicate narrative 
significance, as disruptions to the reader’s expectations traditionally justify the telling of 
the story in the first instance (cf. Labov, 2013).  In Cognitive Grammar terms, Event I can 
be compared to the concept of ‘Ground’, the background setting against which the 
‘Figure’ of the unexpected Event II is described and made significant (Langacker, 2008: 
58).  Even before considering the social contexts in which readers in the previous 
chapter’s study interpreted the narrative show to them (Ch. 3.5.4), understanding the 
ways events are perceived as meaningful requires the consideration of context beyond 
the individual clause, as events are compared to other occurrences across the text. 
In his review of narratological literature, Richardson (2000) identifies four 
distinct approaches to the concept and definition of narrative: temporal, causal, 
minimal, and transactional.  Of these, temporal and causal represent two competing 
views of which features most essentially define narrative.  More recently, Popova (2015) 
has expanded the argument for the causal definition, drawing parallels between 
narrative and every-day processes of perception.  As was shown in the previous chapter 
(3.5), the reader’s need to create a causal connection between events is an important 
part of the interpretative act.  According to Herman, however, this is only one of 
narrative’s possible functions, as stories can be used to ‘segment the stream of 
experience, posit (but also question) causal relations among events, bring what happens 
into relation with what was expected to happen, develop protocols for sequencing 
actions, and distribute ways of knowing across space and time.' (Herman, 2013: 251).  
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Events do more than simply function as the building blocks of narrative – narrative is 
fundamentally an exploration of events, typically structured in relation to one another. 
Indeed, for narrative theorists the relationship between individual events and 
their overarching narrative structure is so close, that it makes little sense to discuss 
events without reference to narrative more generally.  This is exemplified by Labov’s 
(2006) notion of ‘narrative pre-construction’.  In essence, Labov argues that in order to 
produce a narrative – spoken or written – the narrator must first go through a series of 
premeditated ‘cognitive operations’ (38), working backwards from the most reportable 
event which serves as the focus of the story, in order to find a setting or abstract which 
requires minimal introduction.  Likewise, Toolan suggests that a view of narrative in 
which the teller simply uses the overarching structure to frame isolated events ‘ignor[es] 
the possibility of a reverse order of impulses, namely that, guided by the prior awareness 
of the tellability-requirement, our evaluations shape our plots’ (2001: 154).  From this 
position, the idea of examining a sentence requires a synthesis with the discursive 
context in which it appears.  The implications of this stance are important from a critical 
discourse perspective, as a top-down approach situates each individual, sentence-level 
construal within the broader ideological aims of the narrative, from the moment of 
production.  Essentially, the view being taken here is that narrative, defined as a means 
of constructing an account of actions and events in a causally connected in a temporal 
relationship, is a way in which meaning is ‘in some sense as much made as found’ 
(Freeman, 1993: 30, emphases original).  Situating events within their narrative context, 
then, is more than just an exercise in extended analysis.  Rather, ‘narrative has the 
function of giving explanations of actions and events’ (Teichert, 2004: 183, my emphasis), 
and this top down view of the relationship between narratives and their component 
events, and their expression, makes the consideration of their relationship essential. 
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 Herman (2013a) also provides an overview of the relationship between 
traditional and cognitive narratological analysis.  In doing so, he also distinguishes 
between a separate axis of analysis: ‘worlding the story’, which describes an interest in 
the ways in which readers come to understand the internal workings of a narrative’s 
world, and ‘storying the world’, or the role of narrative as a means of organising and 
communicating one’s experiences linguistically.  Although Herman notes that many 
research projects will move between each of these positions in the course of their 
analysis, these methodological poles provide a useful outline of the distinct aims of 
potential narratively-focused studies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1: Intersections of narratology and cognitive research (cf. Herman, 2013a: 1-8) 
 
As the diagram above shows, the relationship between cognitive and narrative research 
is multivalent, allowing the researcher to approach the texts in question with regard to a 
variety of aims.  While this chapter is primarily concerned with the role of narrative in 
‘storying the world’, the process of considering the stylistic effect of language choices 
A) Using findings from cognitive science to inform narrative research 
B) Using narratological methods (to support inform an understanding of narrative or cognition) 
C) Narrative as the object of study D) Narrative as a resource for sense-making 
‘Worlding the story’ 
‘Storying the world’ 
B+C) Conventional 
narratological research 
A+C) Typical approach 
of cognitive narratology 
A+D) The role of narrative 
in general cognition, e.g. 
narrative therapy 
B+D) Narrative as a means 
of negotiating experience 
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upon a reader’s impression of a text necessarily involves considering the way in which 
narrative contributes to ‘worlding the story’.  As a result, while the working definition of 
narrative minimally includes the occurrence of at least two events, the discussion of this 
chapter will soon broaden to consider the wider context and implications of meaning 
making and narrative structure associated with practical examples concerned with 
experiences of conflict. 
4.2: The Storytelling Self 
 
Authoring a memoir is a process of producing a narrative order to a selection of 
experiences and actions from one’s life, which presents an interpretation of the events 
which occurred and the identity of the experiencer.  As Herman (2013a) has noted, 
narrative can be viewed as an ‘instrument of the mind’ (227), which allows the teller to 
organise and make sense of their experiences after the fact, share knowledge, and 
examine the folk-psychological reasons behind the actions performed by oneself or 
others.  Given the ubiquitous role of narrative’s retrospective organisation for many 
thinkers, some theorists have described this as the fundamental means of sense-making 
regarding everyday experience.  Bruner (1987), for example, defines life as being 
‘constructed by human beings through active ratiocination, by the same kind of 
ratiocination through which we construct narratives’ (13), while Schank and Abelson 
(1995) suggest that ‘when it comes to language, all our knowledge is contained in stories 
and the mechanisms to construct them and retrieve them’ (2). Gallacher (2007) also 
draws a close connection between narrative and memory, suggesting that, 
‘To form a self-narrative, one needs to do more than simply remember life 
events.  One needs to reflectively consider them, deliberate on their meaning, 
and decide how they fit together semantically.  A life event is not meaningful 
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in itself; rather it depends on a narrative structure that lends it context and 
sees in it significance that goes beyond the event itself.' (210-1, my emphasis).   
Interestingly, in asking research participants to evaluate their own narratives, Marsh 
and Tversky (2004) found that while 61% of participants labelled their own stories as 
distorted by exaggeration or omission, only 42% described them as inaccurate.  The 
process of structuring a narrative of personal experience, then, is often a selection of 
events and perspectives which contribute to a preferred construal of the self, even at the 
expense of factual accuracy.  Hence, why a critical analysis of such texts values the 
consideration of additional context, as the ability to compare descriptions to the events 
as they occurred can reveal ideologically-charged redescriptions. 
 So far, the analysis in this thesis has been concerned with readers’ 
conceptualisations of the transfer of force relating to events at the clausal level.  
However, as Chapter 3 concluded, the observations produced in such a reading are 
divorced from the narrative context that surrounds all but the most abstract of linguistic 
examples.  When events are construed as part of a larger narrative or discursive unit, the 
construal itself is affected by its context, both in terms of its production and 
interpretation.  In order to bridge the gap between the study of clauses and larger units 
of discourse, this chapter is primarily concerned with the relationship between narrative 
and identity.  As autobiographical military memoirs are predominantly concerned with 
recording the actions and experiences of the first person narrator, both individual action 
descriptions and large-scale narrative structures can be discussed in terms of their role 
in negotiating a coherent identity of the narrator across the text. 
Exploring how narrative relates to the concept of selfhood, Daniel Dennett has 
described identity in terms of a ‘narrative centre of gravity’ (1992), a metaphor which 
presents ‘self’ as an intangible concept affected by its ongoing performance.  Dennett 
builds his case gradually, imagining first a machine which can produce a convincing – 
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but entirely fictional – biography.  As Dennett posits a machine which gradually looks 
and acts more in accordance with this biography than before, he presents discussion of 
self as ‘an abstraction one uses as part of a theoretical apparatus to understand, predict, 
and make sense of, the behaviour of some very complicated things’ (8).  In this view, 
narrative and selfhood are related through a network: no one story necessarily provides 
a complete sense of an identity, but contributes to the way in which the individuals 
involved in the narrative are perceived and understood.  In the case of military memoir, 
for instance, the narratives produced by individual soldiers work in tandem with the 
reader’s more general understanding of the wars in which they were involved, in order 
to make sense of the individuals and experiences they describe.  Moreover, the stories 
we tell about ourselves work with and against one another to produce a narrative 
identity which can at times contradict or conflict with itself.  Hence, Fludernik’s (2007) 
conclusion that: 
We do not merely tell stories about our recent experience in which we try to 
make ourselves look good; we also narrate and retell our lives to ourselves.  In 
order to create continuity between past and present, in order to lend 
meaning to the experiences that we have undergone, we construct a story of 
our life (262) 
While Dennett’s and Fludernink’s approaches focus on the centrality of 
narratives told by and about ourselves to the construction of our own identities, this 
isolationist attitude requires expansion to account for the social aspects of the self, 
where the sense of an individual’s identity is both perceived and constructed by others 
around them.  Hence Ricoeur’s (1991; cf. Teichert, 2004) position that narrative self is a 
participatory, public self that we can influence, but not fully control.  For Ricouer, the 
self is more than a tool wielded by the individual in order to make sense of their own 
actions and experiences, because the narrative dimension of our lives extends beyond 
ourselves.  While an individual might choose to present facts about themselves in such a 
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way as to construe one impression of their character, others may resist these narratives, 
countering them with new narrative organisations, which in turn affect the public 
impression of the narrated individual’s character and are open to further negotiation.  
This is most obviously the case for individuals who live in the public eye, and whose 
actions are often reported on and discussed at length by parties other than themselves, 
but the same can be said of all of us.  The stories told about us by other members of our 
social circles demonstrate this, as do archival practices in which records and documents 
provide evidence of our past actions, against which the stories we tell and are told can 
be weighed for authenticity.  Thus, as Wallen (2009) puts it, ‘our narratives of identity 
are not strictly our own.  Who we are is always also now produced by archival machines 
[…] Our identities are woven for us, and the archive is the loom’ (269).  Even in its 
narrative form, identity and selfhood is not exclusively constructed by the individual, 
but is instead borne out of the relationship between their own narratives, and those of 
others, even archival processes which can be traced and reconstrued into narrative.  Put 
simply, the process of telling about oneself and the narrative construction of public-
facing identity is not simply reflexive.  Others can tell about us, and we can feature in 
narratives about other things, hence Dennett’s metaphor of a narrative ‘centre of gravity’ 
remains a useful visualisation of the interaction between self and society. 
In short, there is a common connection between the structure of narrative and 
the sense of identity.  In telling a story, narrators can include facts learned after the fact, 
re-order events for dramatic effect, and adopt perspectives (hypothetical and otherwise) 
beyond those they perceived during the experience.  Lambrou (2014), for example, 
demonstrates that the inclusion of facts learned after the original experience affects the 
way in which individuals structure their reports of events stylistically.  As R.J. Campbell 
writes of a 1918 retreat in which he was involved, ‘It’s much better on TV or at the 
cinema.  The battles there look far more realistic’ (1977: 78).  The process of situating 
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personal experience in its historical context relates to the concept of granularity (2.3.2), 
as the narration of events involves the selection of the level of detail at which they are 
described, in both physical and social terms.  In this sense, the act of narrating affords 
an opportunity to engage in sense-making through the construal of causal relationships 
across levels of abstraction, which the reader is open to accept or challenge in their 
reading. 
4.3: Narrative for Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 Having now defined narrative for the purposes of this thesis, and contextualised 
it in terms of the previous sentence-level analyses, it remains to consider the stylistic 
methods for the effective study of concepts as broad as ‘narrative’ and ‘identity’, as 
opposed to the more precise features of clausal analysis.  Ryan, in critiquing cognitive 
approaches to narratology, observes that theories which make strong claims about the 
relationship between narrative, identity, and the mind ‘treat narrative as an unanalysed 
whole, rather than attributing the effects they claim for storytelling to specific 
constituents of narrative’ (2010: 483), in which the category of narrative itself – as 
opposed to its constituent components – possesses some faculty of perceptual 
scaffolding.  However, approaching narrative in terms of its linguistic constituents, 
cognitive models of language at the clausal and narrative levels can be employed in 
tandem to facilitate further investigation into how larger units of discourse establish and 
maintain overarching conceptual themes and structures.  
4.3.1: Cognitive Grammar and Discourse  
 
 Outlining the conceptual model of Cognitive Grammar, Langacker (2008) 
introduces the role of discourse as the ‘second phase’ (viii) in the development of the 
model, acknowledging its central role in determining linguistic structures.  Establishing 
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a relationship between discourse and smaller units of language, Langacker outlines the 
various units of language which form the basis of his linguistic inquiry, from single 
words ‘to multiword constructions, to full nominals and clauses, and finally to complex 
sentences.  The next level is discourse, where any number of sentences are connected to 
form a coherent linguistic production’ (457).  While this definition allows for the 
discussion of a few short, hypothetical examples of conversational discourse, 
Langacker’s detailed focus on the minutae of linguistic utterances prevents the 
discussion of longer examples, such as whole narratives, factual or literary.  In fact, the 
difficulty in extending such an analysis to whole texts prompts Pincombe (2014) to 
question the applicability of Cognitive Grammar as a tool for stylistic research, 
suggesting that ‘it would be wonderful to have a whole short-story diagrammed this way.  
But who would do it?  And who would read it?’ (174).  So far, Cognitive Grammar has 
typically been employed for the analysis of short passages of text, and Harrison (2017: 
25-27) acknowledges that the ‘scalability’ of Cognitive Grammar to narrative structures 
remains a topic of ongoing research.   
 The functionalist model of transitivity analysis (Halliday, 1971; Simpson, 2o03; cf. 
Ch. 2.2.1) provides an indication of how clause-level analysis might be adapted to the 
analysis of discourse by selecting the specific stylistic feature of transitivity as a singular 
focus across a narrative, and establishing a profile of the agents and identities construed 
in doing so.  In its most basic sense, the process involves identifying the frequency with 
which social actors are assigned an agentive or passive grammatical role, which informs 
the analysis of the overall perception of the actor’s construal within the discourse.  
Segmenting actions into semantic categories such as ‘material’ and ‘mental’ provides 
further nuance, specifying the ways in which actors are seen to interact with the world, 
and the discrete semantic classification of types of activity allows transitivity profiling to 
clearly distinguish between different kinds of action and actor in a longitudinal study of 
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activity over the course of a narrative, or comparatively between texts.  According to 
Hart (2014), attending to the differences in the transitivity profiles of social actors will 
‘not only reflect alternative ideologies but serve to construct institutional identities’ (30).   
While these findings can then be supported with closer consideration of other stylistic 
features within the language of a text, transitivity profiling provides a short-hand 
indication of the linguistic construction of actors’ identities with regards to their 
capacity for agency. 
As the application of cognitivist approaches to the construal of force and motion 
in descriptions of action for literary and critical purposes remains in relative infancy, 
greater time is necessarily devoted in their analysis to outlining the operation of 
individual acts, as opposed to large-scale comparative exercises across a number of 
actors or texts.  However, Stockwell (2009) employs the notion of action chaining to 
discuss the stylistic ‘texture’ of an extract from J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings 
(185-190).  In particular, Stockwell’s reading focuses on the dynamic interaction between 
two participants in the narrative (Gandalf and the Balrog), in order to demonstrate how 
the continued switch between the two as agent and patient in descriptions of action 
provides narrative tension.  By sustaining his analysis over the course of several 
paragraphs of narration, Stockwell is able to demonstrate how the profile of Gandalf 
shifts from the agent associated with strength and defiant experiencer roles, to a weaker 
character who staggers and falls, acting upon nothing.  As a result, the reading 
transitions from the explication of the dynamic operation of individual actions to begin 
to establish the development of the character’s narrative identity, affirming Cognitive 
Grammar’s applicability to the study of discourse and identity in passages of narrative.  
Likewise, recent analyses have shown how action chains and the cognitive modelling of 
force can be used in the study of poetry (Giovanelli, 2014; Yuan, 2014).  In each case, 
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however, Cognitive Grammar continues to be applied to shorter texts, with the scaling 
of the model to book-length narrative an ongoing project (Harrison, 2017). 
In order to bridge the gap more effectively between clausal and textual analysis 
for practical purposes, it still remains for Cognitive Grammar to identify levels of 
meaning which afford the selection of primary material comparable to transitivity.  
Once equipped with the capacity to discuss extended units of discourse, a stylistic 
examination of a text grounded in Cognitive Grammar will more closely relate the 
process of construal associated with singular moments with the narrative to the reader’s 
overall engagement with and interpretation of the text.  This issue will be addressed 
further in Chapter 6, which argues that the reader’s recognition of a profile of 
interconnected intentions across a character’s actions can be used to make the 
connection between sentences and narratives.  For now, these reviews of stylistic 
approaches to narrative and other extended modes of discourse demonstrate that 
analytical tools developed in functional and cognitivist linguistics have the capacity to 
inform the discussion of the ways in which identity may be constructed and presented 
within narrative. 
4.3.2: Critical Applications of Narrative Research 
 
 Additionally, the study of narrative structure brings with it its own terminology, 
which might be meaningfully applied to the study of military memoir.  In describing the 
events leading up to or shortly following an act of violence, many soldiers not only 
describe the events which did occur, but those which could have occurred had they 
acted differently, a phenomenon which Prince (1988) terms ‘disnarration’.  Warsop 
(1965), for instance, precedes a description of the moment in which he kills an enemy 
sniper with the observation that ‘if we stayed in the trench we should have been shot 
from above like rats in a trap’ (15), while Evans (1991), following the discovery of the 
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solider he wounded, puts it more bluntly: ‘if I hadn’t shot him, he would have taken the 
greatest pleasure in shooting me’ (64).  By explicitly positing the other possible 
outcomes of the events described, the narrators justify and expand upon the significance 
of their original actions.  In terms of both transitivity and the perceived cause and 
direction of force, by focusing on what could have happened, these narratives make 
manifest a kind of agency which, though it never occurred, had the potential to occur to 
the extent that the possibility of it influenced other events and actions.  As a result, 
despite the fact that each narrator’s enemy is not construed as having exerted force 
upon the narrator, the reader is readily positioned to understand how such force could 
be enacted without the narrator’s pre-emptive action.  In that sense, Warsop and Evans’ 
disnarration serves as the cause of their decision to perform violence, reducing their 
agentive role and providing a moral justification for their actions in the form of self-
preservation. 
 Not only can disnarration be employed to justify a specific act of violence, but 
the narrator’s world view more generally.  In an evaluative passage which accompanies 
the diaries and a memoir submitted to the Imperial War Museum, Latchford (1999) 
argues that those opposed to the idea of war and killing lack perspective: 
But I often wonder now why the Anti-war people do not do a little killing. [...]  
If I felt so strongly about Peace instead of being divided about its merits I 
would like a chance with twenty others to kill a War-maker.  One gun would 
get him – it would be no worse than taking a machine gun with a company of 
infantry.’ (63, my emphases) 
The role allocation (van Leeuwen, 1997: 42-46) of the victim as a ‘War-maker’ provides a 
semantic frame which serves to justify Latchford’s intent to commit an act of violence, 
while the disnarrated comparison to the image of ‘taking a machine gun’ grounds the 
abstract act of killing in relation to Latchford’s own experiences.  Instead of justifying an 
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individual violent action by employing the context in which it occurred, Latchford 
instead prefaces his memoir with a demonstration of his overarching ideological 
perspective.  
 As well as narratological terms for specific passages of narrative, the overarching 
organisation of events into a narrative order can be examined in terms of its effect on 
the ideological impression of the text.  Especially for memoirs which aim to represent a 
progression through a series of lived experiences, events are presented in a linear 
chronology.  However, the significance of a particular event in terms of its tellability, 
and the theme of the narrative in general, may displace the order in which information 
is presented to the reader from the order in which events actually occurred.  For 
example, in the structure of news articles Bell (1991) observes that ‘perceived news value 
overturns temporal sequence and imposes an order completely at odds with the linear 
narrative point’ (153, cf. Toolan, 2001: 207).  Essentially, the ‘pre-construction’ of 
narrative allows the teller to configure the sequence of events into an alternative order, 
where the presentation of information which only became known to the teller after the 
fact earlier in a narrative, for instance, may allow the reader to make greater sense of 
events, or experience a particular response, such as dramatic irony.  Hence, narrative 
structure has been described as producing a ‘double arrow of time’ (Mishler, 2006), 
where clock/chronological time can contrast with narrative/experiential time.  Likewise, 
Ricoeur’s notion of ‘historical time’ and ‘human time’ (1980) make an effective 
distinction between the way things occur in the world, and the ways they can be 
organised into a narrative structure.  As Evans (1991) writes at the end of his account of 
combat, ‘All this took far less time than it takes to tell’ (65).  When a great number of 
tellable narrative events occur within a short space of historical time, the highly 
granular construal of the narrative gives prominences to a number of actions which 
occurred in quick succession. 
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Equally, the pacing of a narrative may pass over periods of time as originally 
experienced.  Consider, for instance, the temporal transition in the following passage, 
underlined, in which Carpenter describes an assault on a Japanese patrol during the 
Second World War: 
I made motions to the others to prime their grenades and as soon as the 
patrol was within range to throw them and run like hell back to the boat, as 
we ran three explosions were heard followed by screams of agony […] Those 
grenades had done their job well. (Carpenter, n.d.: 29) 
Sequentially speaking, this passage lacks a description of an event integral to the 
progression of the narrative as presented to the reader: namely, that grenades are 
thrown by Carpenter and his allies.  However, the non-verbal reporting of Carpenter’s 
intention precedes this, and the reader can readily understand what has happened, even 
though a direct description is left out of the passage.  Much as individual clauses may 
selectively focalise dimensions of activity which render absent particular events, the 
process of connecting these actions together in a narrative affords a further level at 
which selective stylistic choices are made in the act of construal.  The order in which 
events are presented in narrative thus presents an angle of critical inquiry into the 
effects of the selection on the ideological interpretation of the scene(s) described.  
Similarly to the concept of granularity (Ch. 2.3.2), the time and detail dedicated to a 
narrative moment may affect focalisation, drawing the reader’s attention to or away 
from certain kinds of activity. 
4.4: Perspectives on Narrative from War Studies 
 
 So far, narrative has been examined in terms of its interest to researchers 
primarily concerned with the study of language.  However, given its ubiquity and claims 
that it represents the primary structure of meaning by which humans make sense of the 
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world more generally, narrative often plays a key role in other qualitative fields of study.  
Indeed, war writings have been studied in their own right, as well as in the context of 
military history more generally, and war theorists themselves have often reflected on the 
role of narrative in making sense of language.  In many cases, these researchers have 
made strong claims about the significance of narrative in the processing of experiences 
of violence and war.  Bourke (1999), for instance, concludes her study of close-combat 
violence by observing that ‘there is no ‘experience’ independent of the ordered 
mechanisms of grammar, plot, and genre and this is never more the case than when 
attempting to ‘speak’ the ultimate transgression – killing another human being’ (369).  
In line with theorists such as Bruner (1987) and Fludernik (2007) discussed earlier in this 
chapter (4.2), Bourke privileges a view of the relationship between language and 
experience where processes of sense-making and linguistic organisation are inextricable 
from one another.  Indeed, Bourke (2006) affirms this position, writing that ‘the very act 
of narrating changes and formulates the 'experience'.  Men 'really did' kill: but from the 
moment of killing, the event entered into imagination and language, to be interpreted, 
elaborated, restructured.' (34). Likewise, McLoughlin’s suggestion that language 
‘impos[es] verbal order on the chaos’ of war (2010: 19) implies that the experience of 
conflict is incomplete without being construed within a narrative order.  In his review of 
Paul Fussell’s The Great War and Modern Memory (1975), Campbell (2005) suggests that 
for Fussell, literary tropes ‘represent the primary manner in which his mind makes 
meaning’ (268), and which inform his study as he writes that ‘the further personal 
materials move from the form of the daily diary, the closer they approach the figurative 
and the fictional’ (2013: 336).  Sneddon and Guddall (2013: online) also place emphasis 
on the role of narrative structure as a means of making sense of personal experience of 
conflict:  
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Rather than seeing this type of memoir in terms of its factual accuracy, we 
should see it as a representation resulting not simply from manipulations and 
ideological distortions, but from narrative strategies of sense-making.  
Reading war memoirs narratively means disentangling a process of 
interpretation whereby the chaos of lived experience is transformed into 
orderly storylines. 
In other words, researchers writing about the relationship between narrative and the 
experience of conflict tend to describe the construction of narrative as the initial act of 
sense-making itself.  However, given that many soldiers never share their experiences in 
a narrative form, an argument which erases the sense-making activities of soldiers who 
choose not to repeat or record their experiences in narrative form requires closer 
reflection.  Accordingly, the following subchapters will critique this position in relation 
to philosophical critiques of this attitude towards narrative and identity (4.5), as well as 
introduce the concept of trauma as a factor in the relationship between experience and 
narrative (4.6). 
In addition to considering narrative as a tool for sense-making, researchers 
interested in war writing have also reflected on the stylistic and literary effects of novel 
features of the genre.  Hynes (1997) coins the term ‘battlefield gothic’ to describe how 
straightforward descriptions of scenes of combat, ‘emptied of abstractions’ (27) can 
nonetheless appear uncanny: ‘flat and uninflected; but realism somehow doesn’t seem 
quite the right word for such grotesque occasions’ (26).  Thus, descriptive passages 
fitting the ‘battlefield gothic’ seem to go beyond the ideational metafunction, almost 
producing the opposite effect, where the great sharing of detail leads to a less knowable 
or recognisable experience for the lay reader to relate to.  From a cognitive linguistic 
perspective, however, this outcome is perhaps less surprising: the more detailed the 
author’s description of their experience of combat, the further from the Common 
Ground the scene strays, leaving the reader less able to either associate with the 
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descriptions themselves, or employ their own schematised knowledge of conflict to 
make sense of the scene.  Similarly, McLoughlin (2011) observes the challenge of 
balancing a detailed representation of events with the need to make the description 
relatable and sensible to an external reader: ‘the difficult question raised by presence in 
warfare concerns the usefulness of representation, an ongoing issue that becomes 
particularly acute in the midst of killing and dying’ (48).  As the quotation from O’Brien 
(1990) at the beginning of this chapter makes clear, setting down in words what takes 
place in war is not a straightforward process of relating what happened, but instead one 
which necessitates perspective taking, and active decisions must be made in selecting 
the details to be described, as well as the way in which they are structured linguistically.   
The challenge of conveying the experience of war and the distinction between 
civilian and military life raises further challenges with regards to the relationship 
between war and narrative.  Leed (1979) has argued that war is an uncontrolled time 
beyond conventional social boundaries, which leads Chouliaraki to observe that war is 
‘so discontinuous with soldiers’ out-of-war lives that it makes it hard for them to hold 
together a sense of themselves as enduring and developing through life’ (2016: 62).  
Leed’s continued emphasis on the liminality and spectacle of military experience, as well 
as the potential psychic break of trauma (37-38), actively resists the notion of narrative 
and identity as contiguous throughout life.  John Keegan has also commented on the 
disjointed nature of experience, comparing ground soldiers to commanders positioned 
away from the battlefield, when he writes that: 
battle, for [the soldier] takes place in a wildly unstable physical and 
emotional environment; he may spend much of his time in combat as a 
mildly apprehensive spectator, granted, by some freak of events, a 
comparatively danger-free grandstand view of others fighting; then he may 
suddenly be able to see nothing but the clods on which he has flung himself 
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for safety, there to crouch – he cannot anticipate – for minutes or hours (1976: 
47) 
For Keegan and Leed, war makes a continuous and singular identity impossible through 
‘an environment that reversed the normal relationship between actor and action’ (Leed, 
1979: 38).  When soldiers cannot identify a causal origin of their actions, either through 
taking orders or reacting to the environment and combatants which act upon them, 
narrative’s structural requirements are not met.  As a result, when Chouliaraki (2014) 
suggests that military memoir as a genre organises these experiential fragments in order 
to ‘produce a sense of self that invests their war experience with meaning’ (603), the 
resulting ‘self’ is not necessarily an integration of the military into the everyday.  Rather, 
these memoirs typically discuss the time frame of the war in question, which serves as a 
boundary to the narrative identity produced within: the story and the self begin at the 
outbreak of war and end at its closure, with the consequent return to civilian life rarely 
documented in any substantial detail. 
4.5: Objections to ‘Strong’ Narrativity 
 
 In both narrative theory and studies of the experience of war, the construction of 
narrative has been presented as a central process in making sense of experience.  
Despite differing definitions of narrative, the research discussed above has generally 
contributed to the notion, either explicitly or implicitly, that narrative is ‘the 
fundamental instrument of thought’ (Turner, 1996: 4) or at least one of the most 
important ways in which individuals make sense of the world.  However, Strawson (2004) 
has notably objected to this position, arguing that it is possible to make sense of one’s 
identity without recourse to narrative.  The following discussion outlines Strawson’s 
argument in greater detail (4.5.1), objecting to his claim that narrative structure can be 
circumvented altogether.  As a result of this, the explication of an alternative approach 
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to the relationship between narrative and identity (4.5.2) draws on the concept of 
Common Ground (Werth, 1993; Browse, in press 2018; cf. Ch. 2.3.4) to situate narrative 
as the primary means by which most individuals make sense of experience. 
4.5.1: Strawsonian Objections 
 
Strawson separates his argument that narrative theorists overstate the role of 
narrative in the mental conception of selfhood into two distinct theses: the 
‘psychological Narrativity thesis’, which argues that all humans use stories as the 
primary means of making sense of the world and of themselves; and the ‘ethical 
Narrativity thesis’, often implicit within the presentation of the psychological thesis, 
which states that a narrative view of one’s life is good, and something to aspire towards, 
‘essential to a well-lived life, to true or full personhood’ (Strawson, 2004: 428).  Firstly, 
Strawson attacks the notion that all people make sense of their lives as a single, 
coherent narrative structure, arguing that people who do have this approach are 
precisely those likely to study, and therefore advocate, the role of narrativity in identity.  
As a counterpoint to a narrative sense of self, Strawson offers the ‘episodic’.  Put simply, 
Strawson believes it is possible to segment one’s life in such a way that different 
episodes are not connected into a single sense of selfhood.  Although we are aware that 
the events experienced and actions performed in these previous episodes of our lives are 
attributable to our present selves, there is no sense that the self as currently understood 
is formed from these experiences.   
As Leed (1979) and Keegan’s (1976) emphasis on the fragmented nature of 
military experience suggests, the notion of ‘episodicity’ – the perception of a period of 
one’s life as compartmentalised from the present sense of self – is readily applicable to 
the genre of military memoir.  Hynes (1997) has claimed that ‘war narratives aren’t like 
autobiograpy’, because ‘military service is a kind of exile from one’s own real life’ (1997: 8, 
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my emphasis).  For Hynes, at least, this separation between ‘real’ and ‘military’ life 
demonstrates the kind of divorce between periods of one’s life indicated by Strawson.  
However, while the divorce between different episodes of one’s life challenges the 
notion that narrativity can always be claimed as the primary means by which identity is 
constructed overall, the claim does not refute the role of narrative as a sense-making 
structure with regards to the internal logic of individual episodes.  Although recognised 
as distinct from other aspects of one’s self, the experiences which comprise an episode 
must be ordered to some extent according to temporal and causal connections, in order 
to be recognised as a coherent unit at all.  So, while Strawson casts doubt on narrative as 
an exclusive means of making sense of a life, the fundamental mechanics of narrativity 
remain at the centre of the linguistic relation of experience at the level of individual 
events. 
 Though the above has suggested that Strawson’s notion of the episodic still relies 
on a minimalist understanding of narrative form, this position requires further 
clarification.  In order to answer to similar concerns voiced by Ryan’s (2010) critique of 
the role of cognition in narratology, theorists who hold strong positions on the 
relationship between narrative and identity believe in ‘the innate possession of a 
narrative faculty… that allows us to have a self’ (2010: 483).  The view expounded here is 
of narrative as a composite, made up of smaller processes including causal connectivity, 
temporal ordering, and focalisation which allow us to select the elements of experience 
we wish to present as meaningful.  Rather than being a cognitive faculty in its own right, 
narrative is the sum of the processes which organise lower-level events, and the result of 
our way of reasoning, given our chronolinear perceptions.  In the construction of 
autobiographical narratives, some of the associated features of narrativity may help to 
make events communicable, but it is possible for reporting and tellability to conflict 
with regards to how the author chooses to describe their experiences.  After all, life is 
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not bound to the same conventions as storytelling, as dramatic twists, satisfying 
resolutions, or explanations do not always occur.  Compared to a purely fictional 
narrative, where all detail can be selected for a functional role (cf. Lamarque, 2007), 
stories relating actual events are constrained by their association with reality, and a 
tension can arise between the most tellable and most accurate ways to report events.  
For Peter Goldie, this artificial parallel in the structure of fictional and non-fictional 
narratives affects our understanding of events, both how they occurred and why: 
there is a danger here, in autobiographical narratives, of a prejudicial 
reconstruction of what happened, seeking to explain what happened, to find 
agency and internal meaningfulness, precisely where it is not to be found, even 
though what happened was no doubt caused, and caused by you.  The demands 
of narrativity on us as external narrators looking back on our past, seems to 
drag us towards thinking of our past thoughts, feelings, and deliberations as 
more determinate than they in fact were, and as reflective on an agency of 
which at the time we seemed quite bereft […] It is as though we cannot bear 
the thought that there is no narrative explanation available of what happened 
in a way that provides internal meaningfulness. (Goldie, 2012: 148, my 
emphasis) 
 As was noted previously (Ch. 3.3), Fauconnier and Turner (2002) suggest that the 
observation of cause and effect is a conceptual blend, and the process of construing 
events in discourse requires the selection of a subjective perspective.  Accordingly, it 
becomes impossible to know to what extent the events described in the texts analysed 
across this thesis are narrative constructions: either through lexicogrammatical 
constraints or in order to suit a particular perception of the narrator’s character.  Indeed, 
in asking research participants to evaluate their own narratives, Marsh and Tversky 
(2004) found that while 61% labelled their own stories as distorted by exaggeration or 
omission, only 42% described them as inaccurate.  Just as the setting down of an event 
within a single clause requires a construal of force dynamics, so narrative requires the 
representation of a relationship between the events, objects, and contexts.  In the 
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context of violence, where causality and the ability to perceive responsibility in activity 
are essential, the narrative organisation necessitates drawing relationships between 
experiences, either through grammatical construal, or textual proximity.  Outside of the 
context of war, soldiers may wish to explain why they acted the way they did, and in 
doing so create a greater sense of agency or volition than ever existed at the time. 
4.5.2: Reframing Narrativity 
 
In short, there are reasonable doubts to be raised in relation to a stance which 
takes narrative as the exclusive means by which we make sense of the world.  The 
approaches to the narrative self outlined thus far, and which Strawson and Ryan call 
upon most frequently in their criticisms, can generally be categorised as ‘Strong 
Narrativity’.  That is, these hypotheses take a narrative perspective on selfhood to be the 
defining means by which one can make sense of one’s experiences.  For researchers 
working in the field of narratology, the temptation to adopt such a position is readily 
apparent: if narrative is the exclusive means by which individuals organise and make 
sense of their experiences, then the study of narrative is essential to understanding 
phenomenology and cognition.  In breaking this position down into the psychological 
and ethical narrativity theses, however, Strawson demonstrates that maintaining a 
Strong Narrativist position across all experience erases the complexity of a sense of 
selfhood which can at times appear inconsistent across the span of a lifetime.  
Nonetheless, narrative structure remains a significant means by which to organise and 
communicate ideas and experiences, and the rejection of Strong Narrativity requires a 
new account of the ways in which narrative organises and affects the perception of 
experience. 
One such proposal for an alternative definition of narrative’s role in sense-
making and everyday identity construal is Hutto’s (2016) Narrative Self Shaping 
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Hypothesis.  Put simply, the Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis (NSSH) attempts to 
reconcile criticisms of Strong Narrativism with a continuing view of narrative as the 
primary means by which the majority of people organise and make sense of their 
experiences.  According to Hutto, a ‘modestly construed’ form of NSSH argues that 
‘personal narratives are among the main instruments that individuals regularly use to 
engage in projects of defining themselves in important respects’ (2016: 26).  Like Strong 
Narrativism, then, NSSH makes claims about the effectiveness and primariness of 
narrative as a means of making sense of experience for most people.  It differs, however, 
in its acceptance of the idea that there may be individuals for whom the construction of 
a narrative does not emerge as a part of the sensemaking process.  Although Strawson 
positions himself as one such individual, his primary claim is to acknowledge that not all 
lives are compatible with a narrative structure.  Instead, while ‘episodes’ of life may be 
distinct from one another, the internal consistency within an episode is a smaller 
narrative of an identity made meaningful in relation to a select period of the narrator’s 
life.  The practical value of this ‘softer’ claim is readily demonstrable in the context of 
traumatic experiences, where the formation of a narrative is often seen as a challenging 
end to a process of working through an experience.  Nordstrom (1997) has been keen to 
emphasise the distinction between the experience of producing a narrative, and the 
experience a narrative reports: 
While all narrative is experience, not all experience is narrative.  This sounds 
like a simple truism, but too often the two terms are relegated to a single 
process: the event which occurs, and which we recognise in thought, speech, 
and action.  A strong philosophical tradition justifies the fusion of the two 
processes.  Researchers need to believe that when they ask an informant what 
her or his experiences, are, the ensuing narrative will convey the nature of 
that experience.  Narrative is experience.  But it is not the experience of that 
which it narrates. (20) 
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This distinction between the original experience, the identity of the individual, 
and the narrative form of both, is expressed in the phrasing of name ‘self shaping’.  
Rather than viewing the self as entirely construed through narratives by and about the 
individual in question, NSSH allows for the view that identity is altered by these 
narratives, but at the same time persisting beyond them.  After all, we exist as part of 
nebulous social networks, in which we are talked about by others.  Additionally, 
autobiographical narratives must also withstand the possible authentication of the facts 
they relate.  While it is obviously possible to lie about one’s actions or experiences, in 
order for such fictions to enter into others’ conceptualisations of ourselves and be 
confused for fact, they have to relate to the semantic domains with which we are 
associated.  If, for example, you are aware that the Battle of Hastings took place in 1066, 
and that humans do not live for more than a hundred years or so, you would be highly 
unlikely to believe me if I claimed to have fought in the Battle of Hastings.  No matter 
how this claim is construed, it would be unlikely to become part of your conception of 
my identity, although pragmatically your impression of me may be affected by the effort 
to make such a claim. Thus, when we create stories about ourselves, or when stories are 
created about us, they ‘shape’ a perception of self from an existing framework of possible 
perceptions.   
In other words, the relationship between narrative and identity relies on the 
‘common ground’ (Werth, 1993, Browse, 2018) discussed earlier, and the ‘maximal scope’ 
of Langacker’s (2008) model of discourse in Cognitive Grammar (cf. Ch. 2.3.5), where an 
understanding of a given event, actor, or object is based on the mutual understanding of 
all participants in the communicative process.  In telling and reading stories, authors 
and readers build upon existing knowledge and scripts of action, shaping their 
understanding with each usage, the influence of which may fluctuate according to 
existing knowledge. 
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While the NSSH is predominantly concerned with addressing the issues 
surrounding the psychological narrativity thesis, it remains to explore the issues raised 
by the ethical narrativity thesis: the notion that a narrative construction of the self is 
good, and even ideal.  While Strawson (2004) argues that this is mostly implicit within 
Strong Narrativist claims, the claim has been argued explicitly.  For instance, McIntyre 
(1984) claims that ‘the unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest’ (219) which 
Schechtman (2011) interprets as the idea that ‘to lead a life is to search for and aim 
towards the good’ (396) while Rudd (2012) views ‘ethical self-evaluation’ as something 
which ‘must take a narrative form’ (7).  Essentially, Rudd and McIntyre claim that the 
process of recognising and evaluating oneself ethically – either in positive or negative 
terms – requires a recognition of oneself as a continued actor, whose actions can be 
plotted across time in a narrative form.  While the ability to refer to a single sense of self 
diachronically appears at first glance to be a useful definition of moral virtue, the study 
of soldiers’ war writings provides a practical demonstration of the limits of its 
applicability.  With the exception of the short story ‘A Nightmare’ (Hyder, 1930, cf. Ch. 
7.6), the descriptions of violence discussed throughout this thesis are accompanied with 
little directly evaluative language.  Although these authors have each been able to 
construe a representation of events within a narrative structure, the act of narrating 
itself appears in some cases to be divorced from any moral self-evaluation.  
Moreover, the ethical narrativity thesis, that narrative facilitates a 
conceptualisation of selfhood in a ‘‘quest’ for its good’ (Rudd, 2012: 2), is readily 
problematized by these texts.  Soldiers writing about their experiences have control over 
the events they choose to describe, and Bourke (1999) has shown extensively that some 
soldiers choose to write about the pleasure they take in the act of killing, knowingly 
violating social norms in the process.  By constrast, the Narrative Self Shaping 
hypothesis asserts that ‘narrative understanding of reasons is an important basis for and 
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natural means of certain forms of self-understanding’ (Hutto, 2016: 40, my emphasis) 
without suggesting that such processes are required in order to produce a complete or 
ethical account of oneself.  NSSH gives primacy to narrative as a tool for sense-making, 
but with parameters to its ubiquity which allow for exceptions such as episodic 
approaches to self, or the disruptive nature of trauma.  Whilst identities can change over 
time, or according to social setting, narrative produces a sense of self in relation to one 
or more episodes of experience.  As a result, even when the narrator sees themselves 
primarily in episodic terms, narrative remains the primary means by which the 
experience within that individual episode is structured. 
4.6: Narrative and Trauma 
 
While the predominant interest in narrative’s sense-making capacity has been 
concerned with every day perceptions, narrative has also been studied in relation to the 
processing of traumatic experiences (Pennebaker, 2000; Robinett, 2007).  Although the 
role of trauma in conflict has been alluded to throughout this chapter, a full discussion 
was delayed in order to situate its relationship with identity and language in context 
with the challenges to Strong Narrativity.  Not all soldiers describe the experience of 
killing as traumatising, and the pre-emptive categorisation of their narratives within a 
folk-psychological framework, where no professional diagnosis is available, would be 
reductive to the broader aims of the research.  Indeed, according to Kleinreesink (2014: 
329), only 28% of soldiers publishing memoirs publicly do so with the explicit aim of 
writing as a self-help process, where ‘for individually deployed soldiers writing is used as 
a tool to deal with deployment experiences as a substitute for sharing them in a group 
that has gone through the same experiences’ (330).  In other words, it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that all military memoir can be thought of as having been written 
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for the same purpose.  Contributors to the BBC’s ‘World War II People’s War’ archive 
and the Imperial War Museum collections, for example, often explain that they have 
produced their accounts as a matter of historical record, ‘so that anyone interested 
would have all the facts available to them’ (Bowpitt, 2004: online).   That said, given the 
topic of interest to this research project, these narratives do all describe stressful and 
difficult moments in the authors' lives, and the relationship between narration and 
trauma does need to be considered, with the caveat that it cannot be used to account for 
all authorial relationships with violent actions, or indeed all military memoirs.  With 
this in mind, the present discussion considers the relationship between narrativity and 
trauma, and the impact of the relationship between the two on our previous 
theorisation of the narrative self.   
The narrative theorists discussed throughout this chapter (4.2; 4.4) have been 
keen to explain how our everyday perceptual processes operate though a narrative 
framework, and traumatic experiences can be framed within this view.  Comparable to 
Hühn’s (2013) distinction between Event I and Event II (4.1), Bruner uses the concept of 
‘canonicity and breach’ (1990: 39-40) to argue that stories are typically only told when 
our prototypical expectations of experience are subverted.  Hence, the traumatic 
experiences are highly tellable as breaches of expected experience, although as Norrick 
(2005) has shown, this may lead them to become too shocking or personal to 
conventionally narrate.  That said, there is clear neurocognitive evidence to suggest that 
there is something special about trauma, and the way our minds process it. Working 
with soldiers suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, psychiatrist Martha Bragin 
asserts that ‘extremely violent events are processed differently by the brain, causing 
them to be segregated, fragmented, and outside of the narrative of meaning.’ (Bragin, 
2010: 319, my emphasis; cf. Siegel, 1999; Schore, 2003).  Although what Bragin means 
precisely by ‘the narrative of meaning’ is unspecified, this close association between the 
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two terms demonstrates the ubiquity across various academic disciplines of the 
assumption that stories and their structure, in which events are linked and causes are 
identified and assigned, is the way in which we produce meaning. 
This research indicates that narrative may not always be the primary means by 
which traumatic experiences come to be configured in memory.  Nonetheless, when 
narratives of trauma are produced, they provide informative resources for narrative 
analysis.  Lambrou (2014) builds a highly structuralist account, based on Labov and 
Waletzky’s (1967) structuralist framework of oral narrative, but with a stylistic interest 
in understanding how narrative structure differs depending on the teller’s location, with 
regards to temporal distance from the events being described.  What Lambrou finds is 
that stories told years after the fact incorporate factual information and perspectives 
unavailable to the teller at the time of the original story, which Lambrou suggests may 
be a ‘coping strategy’ (49).  In fact, this development of a singular narrative of the 
experience correlates with the findings of van der Kolk and Fisler (1995), who 
demonstrate that, as time passes, survivors of traumatic experiences rely increasingly on 
narrative reports above specific sensory memories as the means by which they 
understand their own experiences.  Being able to incorporate external perspectives is 
more than a coping mechanism, but an integral part of the way in which our experiences 
are integrated into our understanding of the wider world.  In the case of memories of 
geopolitical conflict, the great number of historical documents and publications 
between the time of fighting and the time of writing mean that events which may have 
been unknown or uncertain at the time can instead be situated within an established 
chronology of the war at a macro scale. 
While these views of narrative and its relationship to trauma are useful, their 
focus on the value of narrative as a coping strategy moves toward the ethical narrativity 
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thesis and the notion that a narrative organisation of experience is the most desirable 
form, to which Strawson’s objections have already been noted.  Trauma has traditionally 
been conceptualised as an unnarratable experience (LeCapra, 1994; 2001; Caruth, 1995), 
and Nordstrom (1997) lays out a clear argument against limiting our understanding of 
the self to that which can be made sense of in narrative terms (cf. 4.5.2).  Similarly, 
Uehara et al. (2001) provide compelling discussion of the concept of ‘antinarrative’ in the 
face of atrocity, which relates ‘time without sequence, telling without meditation, and 
speaking about oneself without being able to reflect on oneself’ (Frank, 1995: 98).  In 
short, there are times when forming experience into simple temporal and causal order is 
simply impossible, either because the narrator does not fully understand how or why 
things came to be, or because they find it too difficult to commit this to explicit 
expression.  In either case, the possibility of trauma serves as a reminder that narrative 
cannot be considered the only means by which sense-making occurs.   
The challenge of trauma to language’s capacity to represent experience presents 
a possible limitation to the linguistic frameworks which inform this project, as Halliday 
and Matthiessen (2014) assert that ‘there is no facet of human experience which cannot 
be transformed into meaning’, and describe the ideational metafunction of language (cf. 
2.2.1) as ‘a theory of human experience’ (30).  Particularly in the context of trauma and 
the experiences of war and violence, it is clear that the process of transforming 
experience into language is a difficult and sometimes impossible process.  To that end, it 
is important to consider the limits of language as a means of communicating and 
conceptualising experience, and the resistance an individual might feel when it fails.  
While Cognitive Grammar is interested in the ways language construes understandings 
of events, its notion of the common ground in communication, and Browse’s (2018) 
study of resistant reading in transferring these linguistic notions to ideological analysis, 
can provide a framework for understanding how language is misunderstood, and 
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recognising when and how communication fails because of an unreconciled experiential 
or schematic difference between the participants in the act of communicating.  By 
contrast, the Systemic Functional approach, as per Halliday and Matthiessen (2014), sees 
the transformation of experience into language applicable in all scenarios, and it is 
unclear how traumatic experiences are configured within the ideational metafunction. 
Cognitivist models of language from grammar to narrative offer the possibility of 
accounting for scenarios in which the failure of communication may occur, either 
because of the content – or the context – of the utterance.  As a result, the moments in 
war writings when the narrator’s ability to describe or evaluate a scene breaks down can 
be readily configured within the communicative function of common ground, and the 
conceptual substrate of discourse.  As veteran of the Second World War Eric Patience 
writes in his account of his role in the D-day landings, ‘as we waited for the order to 
move forward, please don’t ask how I felt because I could not tell you’ (Patience, 2003: 
online, my emphasis).  Breaking the pace of the narrative in order to address his reader 
directly, Patience’s plea not to ask him to express his emotions suggests a social pressure 
to manifest experience in language, and the anticipation of which aspects of his 
experience are most tellable, and expected to be reported in his narrative.  In cases 
where the ability to share experience ultimately breaks down, acknowledging the limits 
of discourse, communication, and narrative is as important to a linguistic model as 
effective language use.  In practical terms, this requires modelling language as an 
attempt to communicate an event or experience, wherein any number of limitations 
could prevent a common understanding from being realised.  
Additionally, conceptual metaphors provide a means of communicating beliefs 
associated with an identity, without recourse to narrative structure.  For example, 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002), examine how conceptual metaphors contribute to the 
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construction and extension of an identity (251-253), while Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
examine a range of metaphors associated with selfhood (267-289).  Blended inputs, such 
as ‘I am a rock’, can express propositions which advance the perception of the self or 
another character, without the construal of events associated with the described 
individual.  Although it would make no sense to ask ‘what happened’ in response to this 
statement, it nevertheless conveys to the reader certain information about the first 
person narrator, therefore contributing to an understanding of their identity through 
acceptance or rejection with the assertion.  Consequently, while narrative serves as a 
means through which experience and identity may be construed in language, not all 
linguistic constructions which contribute to the understanding of experience and 
identity are narrative. 
While the trauma theorists above are primarily concerned with demonstrating 
the limitations of narrative in representing extraordinary experiences, recent research 
has begun to return to narrative, and explore the instances in which it can be a useful 
medium for coping with trauma.  In essence, ‘second wave’ trauma theorists argue that 
textual analysis should move away from moments which the narrator does not articulate 
directly, and look again at the way in which the text itself is used to attempt to articulate 
and reflect on the traumatic experience.  Pederson (2014) argues that ‘critics seeking to 
engage trauma in literature should turn their focus from gaps in the text to the text itself’ 
(338), and Shaw (2004) has demonstrated the importance of narrative frameworks to the 
process of meaning making in relation to both fictional and non-fictional violence.  Far 
from suggesting that all trauma is communicable, these theorists’ arguments support an 
approach which favours a recognition that while some experiences will simply be 
untellable, these are far from the only instances which can be classified as traumatic, or 
worthy of the attention of trauma theory.  Moreover, this new direction for trauma 
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theory fits well with the capacity for stylistic analysis to draw attention to the effects of 
specific linguistic features with the text. 
4.7: Conclusions 
 
 This chapter has explored how philosophical assumptions regarding the 
relationship between narrativity and selfhood necessarily underpin much of narratology, 
but also how these ideas spread outward to broader discussions of event construal in 
language.  In configuring this top-down approach, it becomes clear that narrative is 
more than a structure in which otherwise isolated events appear, but a dimension of 
stylistic production essential to making sense of the components.  As Brockmeier (2015) 
puts it: 
In making sense of ourselves we do not start with events, experiences, 
memories, or what we take to be facts of our lives as a "given" and then 
construe narratives around them; any more than we start with a pure sensory 
or bodily given, which we then go on to represent conceptually.  We start 
with a story, or more precisely, with a number of stories, or fragments or 
traces of stories because we are born into, grow up, and live in the midst of a 
world of narratives that - a point noted before - for the most part are not our 
own.  In this world, an event, experience, memory, or a fact can only be 
understood as a segment cut out of a narrative web, a web that would exist 
even without my actively being involved in weaving it. (180-181).   
Brockmeier’s position here differs from the claims of Strong Narrativity, although it does 
make strong claims about the universality of narrative as a sense-making process, a 
position which has been questioned in this chapter.  Nonetheless, Brockmeier’s point 
that our stories exist as part of a social ‘web’ to which we contribute - but which we can 
never hope to control entirely - marks an essential parameter to discussions on the self-
construal of identity in narrative.  Individuals do not only tell stories about themselves, 
after all, but stories can be told about them by others, and are always situated within the 
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readers’ pre-existing knowledge of associated concepts, such as event models (van Dijk, 
2009; Ch. 2.3.5).  Rather than existing in isolation, narrativity is always connected to 
social practices, which influence and structure the ways in which we think, talk, and 
write about ourselves.  
In addition, the discussion of narrative and its role in sense-making has been 
connected to literature concerned with war writing.  In particular, a review of this work 
from a narratological perspective indicates that much of this research is positioned 
within a naïve Strong Narrativist approach to narrative and its relationship with identity, 
which undermining the applicability of their discussions of these texts in terms of their 
narrative structure.  In relating this military research to work on the philosophy and 
structure of narrative, there is meaningful work to be done in marrying military and 
narrative studies more closely.  Narrative as a system of causal and temporal 
organisation is often seen in both fields as an essential means of making sense both of 
our own experiences, and relating to the experiences of others.  Understanding the 
limits of such claims, however, is equally important to ensuring that the discussion of 
narrative and sense-making more closely reflects actual perceptual processes. 
 Throughout this chapter, the discussion of narrative and the perception of 
identity across discourse has been continually related back to Cognitive Grammar, and 
the model of event representation employed in Chapters 2 and 3.  As recent research has 
acknowledged (Pincombe, 2014; Langacker, 2014; Harrison, 2017), scaling Cognitive 
Grammar’s detail-oriented model to the discussion of larger units of discourse remains 
an ongoing challenge.  Contributing to the development of this will be at the forefront 
of the following chapters, which seek to investigate how actions are perceived across 
narrative, working through these theoretical challenges via practical analyses of war 
writings.  Beginning with the discussion of two book-length autobiographical narratives 
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in Chapter 5, the analysis is accompanied by a reflection on the limitations of present 
applications of Cognitive Grammar to literature.  Consequently, Chapters 6 and 7 
expand and revise the ways in which actions can be conceptualised across larger 
discourses, and in relation to the reader’s perception of actors’ identities. 
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Chapter 5: Author(is)ing Violence in 
Two Memoirs of Drone Warfare 
5.1: Flesh-witnessing in Drone Warfare 
 
Participation in war, in the form in which it has been considered so far, is the 
extreme disruption of everyday life, and the discussion of episodic identity in the 
previous chapter (4.5.2) indicated that many soldiers view their time at war as a 
departure from their everyday sense of self.  As Sam Hynes summarises, 
‘autobiographies narrate continuous lives; but a war narrative concerns a separate life 
that, however vividly it remains in the memory, is not continuous with the life the teller 
lives as he writes’ (1997: 8).  Until the late twentieth century, taking a direct role in 
conflict – be it as an infantry soldier or bomber pilot – required a degree of geographical 
disruption: soldiers have been required to ‘go to’ war, and even those means of waging 
war which create an extended distance between the one who performs an act of violence 
and the one who suffers from it, such as aerial bombing or long-range mortar fire, still 
disrupt the soldier’s everyday experiences, and place them at risk of retaliatory injury.  
However, the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as ‘drones’, has 
allowed for soldiers directly involved in the performance of violence to operate from air 
bases on the other side of the world to those affected directly by the violence of conflict. 
More than being physically and psychologically disorientating, drone warfare’s distances 
challenge another fundamental concept of warfare.  Most soldiers are understood to 
have unique and authoritative knowledge about the horrors of war by virtue of having 
been there.  Harari (2010) has termed this ‘flesh-witnessing’, a phrase derived from a 
quotation attributed to a French soldier of the First World War: 'the man who has not 
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understood with his flesh cannot talk to you about it' (in Hynes, 1997: 2).  Alternatively, 
as Evans puts it:  
It is virtually impossible to convey the atmosphere of battle to anyone who 
had not had the experience.  Even the most lurid film cannot do this as the 
spectator – comfortably seated with perhaps an ice-cream in hand – knows he 
is safe  and that the ‘good guys’ will win in the end. (1991: 90).   
In other words, the privileging of the physical experience of combat is part of the 
dominant ‘ideological-discursive formation’ (Fairclough, 2010: 30) of war writing.  The 
ongoing reliance on the authority of flesh-witnessing across texts concerned with 
warfare helps to ‘win the appearance for them as non-ideological ‘common sense’’ (ibid).  
That drone pilots operate at a distance of thousands of kilometres from the battlefield, 
however, calls into question their ability to describe their accounts of war as flesh-
witnessing.  Providing a narrative account of the experience of drone pilots, then, 
requires negotiating the predominant ideological-discursive formations inherent to the 
genre of war writing in order to produce an account of military experience that does not 
rely on flesh-witnessing to support its authenticity.   
 According to van Dijk, 'language users not only construe mental models of the 
events or situations they talk, write, read, or hear about, but also of the very 
communicative situation in which they ongoingly participate’ (2017: 31), which he labels 
the ‘context model’.  Similarly, Langacker (2008) describes the ‘current discourse space’ 
as ‘everything presumed to be shared by the speaker and hearer as the basis for 
communication at a given moment’ (466), including the context in which discourse 
participants communicate.  Given the ubiquity of the flesh-witness authority for soldiers 
as an ideological-discusive formation which mitigates the questioning of their 
experience by non-combatants, the discourse space involved in engaging with 
autobiographical writing evokes a context model which positions the soldier as an 
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authority with access to a kind of knowledge which remains unknowable to the reader 
even in the act of telling about it.  For drone pilots, this context model is challenged by 
the unfamiliarity of their experiences, which cannot be grounded in the same flesh-
witness authority as traditional ground troops. 
 The aim of this chapter is to explore these novel challenges in the representation 
of military experience, through the presentation of conflict in the memoirs of drone 
pilots: Predator: The Remote Control Air War over Iraq and Afghanistan: A Pilot’s Story, 
by Matthew Martin and Charles Sasser (2010, hereafter Predator), and Hunter Killer: 
Inside the Lethal World of Drone Warfare by T. Mark McCurley and Kevin Maurer (2016, 
hereafter Hunter Killer).  As Daggett (2015) has argued, by not physically going to war, 
the experience of the drone pilot ‘cannot be located along the hierarchy of militarised 
masculinities that helps to render killing in war morally intelligible’ (362). By staying out 
of danger, drone pilots not only risk ethical challenges to their role in conflict, but this 
deviation from the context model of the veteran as a flesh-witness calls into question 
the authenticity of their wartime experiences.  Putting into narrative the perspective of a 
drone pilot, then, is the renegotiation of the relationship between soldier, distance, and 
the authority to speak as a veteran of conflict.  Taking this as its starting point, this 
chapter explores the way language is employed to deal with this issue, both at the level 
of individual clauses, and in terms of the narrative structure of the texts more broadly. 
 Herman (2002) characterises narrative as ‘a discourse genre and a cognitive style 
that relies fundamentally on perspective taking’ (303), and the analytical aim of this 
chapter is to unpack how these perspectives are structured linguistically, how they affect 
the perception of the personal identities of the pilots they describe, and the relationship 
between the language of drone pilots and the memoirs of more conventional ground 
soliders explored so far.  For instance, as was shown in the previous chapter (4.3.2), the 
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use of disnarration is a common strategy in military memoir, and allows soldiers to 
imagine alternative outcomes to events, and justify their actions as leading to the best of 
these possible worlds in terms of the violence that could have been inflicted upon them.  
In Hunter Killer, however, disnarration is actively shown to fail, as McCurley is unable to 
hypothesise a course of events other than the one which took place: 
Because we are not face-to-face and our lives are not in danger, we can’t tell 
ourselves it was either us or them.  It was never us, and they had no chance.  
There was coldness to the way we killed, but it never lacked humanity: at the 
end of the day, the pilots and sensor operators took the images home 
(McCurley and Maurer, 2016: 135, emphasis mine) 
This passage is typical of the discursive relationship between drone pilots and more 
conventional military memoir, as McCurley and Maurer continue to enact established 
context model markers such as disnarration even when they explicitly no longer apply to 
the situation at hand.  Moreover, the passage suggests that McCurley has been exposed 
to harm.  As the one who ‘took the images home’, the authors argue that the pilot is 
exposed to an emotional injury. 
Whether or not a phenomenological distinction exists between the flesh-
witnessing of ground troops and the eye-witnessing of civilians, and possibly drone 
pilots, the social status afforded to the soldier who has ‘gone to war’ demonstrates the 
way value and authenticity is assigned to the experience of conflict.  Outside of this 
traditional narrative, the drone pilot must either develop linguistic strategies by which 
to replicate the ‘flesh-witness’ status, or find an alternative rhetorical position from 
which to authenticate their war story.  As the following chapter shows, both Predator 
and Hunter Killer employ stylistic features which serve to position the pilots within 
physical and psychological proximity to the acts of violence with which they are 
associated.  For Predator in particular, however, proximity comes with complications, as 
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the strikes described within the book lead to the deaths of innocent civilians, including 
children.  As such, the discussion of proximity which serves as this chapter’s analytical 
focus will be framed in terms of the paradoxes it entails.  The readings below examine 
these differences and similarities further, concluding with observations of the ways in 
which the narrative construction of identity and agency in these memoirs does begin to 
differ from established practices, and the implications of this for future writings on the 
subject of military drones. 
Having introduced the concept of authenticity as a central theme of this 
chapter's analysis, the question of authorship is addressed (5.2).  With this position 
established, the analysis turns again to the language of the text, dealing first with the 
representation of psychological distance and proximity through metaphor (5.3), before 
examining the representation of physical space through deixis (5.4), and the event 
models construed in the description of violent actions (5.5).  Following this, the chapter 
examines the ways in which both memoirs attempt to establish alternative ideological-
discursive frameworks.  First, violent acts are reconstrued in terms of their peacekeeping 
goals (5.6).  Second, the narrative construction of enemy combatants (5.7) suggests a 
discusive technique which allows drone pilots to position themselves in close emotional 
proximity to the consequences of conflict. 
5.2: Questions of Authorship 
 
In the case of both Predator and Hunter Killer, although they each pertain to the 
military experience of a single soldier, their front covers indicate that the memoir has 
been written ‘with’ a second writer.  McCurley addresses this in the ‘Acknowledgements’ 
section of Hunter Killer: explaining that he contacted co-author Kevin Maurer to ‘feel 
out the market’ for Hunter Killer, and that Maurer taught him ‘how to write the way 
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publishers wanted’ (346), while Maurer himself has affirmed (personal correspondence, 
see Appendix B) that McCurley wrote the first draft, and Maurer ‘revised it from there’.  
In other words, the finished version of Hunter Killer is not simply a narrative of 
McCurley’s military experiences in the narrative form of his choosing, but a product of 
unknown revisions in order to appeal to a commercial market.  In the case of Predator, 
the role of the secondary author is even more significant, as the book was written by 
Charles Sasser after taking notes from interviews with Matthew Martin, along with the 
addition of his own research (personal correspondence, see Appendix B).  Sasser is a 
professional writer, with over 60 books to his name, and 29 years of military experience 
as a ground soldier himself (ibid).  To that end, the extent to which both of these texts 
can be called ‘autobiographical’ is initially uncertain, as it is impossible for the reader to 
know which elements of the narrative were composed by the pilots themselves, and 
which were edited by their co-authors in preparing each book for commercial 
publication.  According to Sasser himself, the process of co-authoring Predator involved 
‘tak[ing] extensive notes, but not always on the minor details other than the subject’s 
interaction with whatever his mission might be’ (personal correspondence), with no 
indication of what might constitute a ‘minor detail’.  As a result, it is unclear to what 
extent the ideology associated with particular construals, such as the comparison 
between the narrator and God (Martin and Sasser, 2010: 3)  are metaphors Martin would 
employ to describe his own beliefs and experiences, or chosen by Sasser to make his 
story as entertaining and commercially successful as possible. 
Despite this initial uncertainty with regards to the precise authorship of these 
memoirs, they remain valuable resources for the study of the discursive practices 
involved in the representation of military action.  As Foucault notes, ‘the task of 
criticism is not to bring out the work’s relationships with the author, but rather to 
analyse the work through its structure, its architecture, its intrinsic form, and the play of 
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its internal relationships’ (1986: 102).  With this aim in mind, Foucault works to replace 
the discussion of an ‘author’, instead focusing on the concept of the ‘author function’.  
Rather than the straightforward identification of an individual as the author of a given 
text, the author function is instead ‘the result of a complex operation that constructs a 
certain being of reason we call “author”’ (213).  In other words, the author is a product of 
the interaction between the reader and the author function within the text; an 
interaction that shifts and changes depending on the kind of text being read, as well as 
the socio-cultural context in which it is received.  Foucault develops his approach in 
relation to literary and scientific texts, where the ‘death of the author’ (Barthes, 1977) in 
the former and scientific method in the latter render the question of authorship 
irrelevant to the content of the text.  The notion that the identity of the author is or 
could be irrelevant to autobiographical writing seems initially problematic.  However, 
Foucault goes on to suggest that in first person fiction, ‘neither the first-person pronoun 
nor the present indicative refers exactly to the writer or to the moment in which he 
writes but, rather, to an alter ego whose distance from the author varies’ (215).  
Extrapolating this approach to autobiographical writing, it makes sense to consider the 
subject of the writing at some distance from the author themselves, as the process of 
transforming experience into narrative will inevitably require a focalisation which 
influences the perception of both events and individuals involved.  However, the genre 
of memoir evokes a tacit social understanding that these narratives refer as closely as 
possible to the lives and views of their narrating subject. 
On the subject of uncertain origins of narrative content, and its relationship to 
truth, Vice (2014) examines literary hoaxes, where memoirs purporting to tell true 
accounts have later been revealed as fictional.  She argues that ‘the clear presence of 
intertextuality’ can help to determine whether an author’s representation of events 
elides with other, external influences, from ‘recall through the prism of later reading, to 
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the deceptive substitution of research, and the adoption of others’ memories, for 
experience’ (30).  Although it is not the aim of this discussion to suggest that these 
memoirs are deceptive, given that Sasser claims to have supplemented interviews with 
Matthew Martin with his own research, an authentic reproduction of the drone pilot’s 
experience is inextricable from the additional research and external perspective of the 
second author.  Moreover, as Sasser himself has 29 years of military experience, the 
possibility must be taken into account that Sasser has drawn upon his own experience to 
infer Martin’s reactions, creating a hybridised first-person narrator borne of both drone 
pilots’ and ground troops’ perspectives. 
To summarise the position taken in this chapter on the question of joint 
authorship of these memoir, then, the authorship of these memoirs will be treated in 
terms of a function which ‘does not refer purely and simply to a real individual, since it 
can give rise simultaneously to several selves, to several subjects – positions that can be 
occupied by different classes of individuals’ (Foucault, 1969 [2014]: 225).  Whether a 
given detail is produced by the drone pilots themselves or their co-authors, it 
nevertheless constitutes an element of an authorised narrative of the subject’s 
experiences.  Likewise, if a description has been altered to produce writing ‘the way 
publishers wanted’, the author function of McCurley-Maurer-publisher has produced 
and authorised this collectively and consensually.  Moreover, the value of these memoirs 
for this thesis is not their factual accuracy per se, but rather the linguistic strategies 
chosen to represent experience, and the ways in which this language and the overall 
narrative contribute to the soldier author’s public identity.  Weist (2013) observes a 
similar function in the memoirs of veterans of the Second World War, asserting:  
These veterans were not merely telling stories.  They knew that their stories 
would be published, thereby creating a large audience and providing a means 
for story preservation.  They shared stories that will remain unchanged, even 
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after they are gone.  This knowledge certainly factored into what they 
decided to share, as it was important to construct a story that established an 
image of their experiences and themselves by which they wanted to be 
remembered. (94) 
As the present chapter develops, I will explore the attribution of responsibility 
for acts of violence resultant from UAV military engagement as emergent from a group 
of participating individuals.  Given the parallel challenges presented by both authorship 
of these texts and the moral and legal responsibility for the acts they represent, it may 
perhaps be less productive to think of these texts on the level of renegotiating the role of 
the individual.  Instead, they present an approach which challenges fundamental 
preconceptions about the self as a part of an emergent assemblage of moving parts – 
both in the process of writing and fighting.  
5.3: Deixis and the Drone  
 
Although these sections discuss the concept of proximity and distance, 
Chamayou (2015) notes the problematic nature of these terms in relation to drone 
warfare.  As drone pilots are physically distant from war, yet have constant access to 
high definition camera footage and reports from support staff, ‘it is now possible to be 
both close and distant, according to dimensions that are unequal and combine a 
pragmatic co-presence’ (116), and Riza (2014: 270) has noted that existing research has 
produced conflicting results in determining whether such technology enhances or 
makes distant the experience of killing.  Moreover, this physical distance from the 
battlefield makes drone pilots themselves immune to injury or death during conflict, 
creating both a psychological distance from their targets, and an ethical challenge to 
their role in war (Coeckelberg, 2013).  Accordingly, this section reviews the ways in 
which Predator and Hunter Killer construe their affective relationship with war and 
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enemy combatants (5.3.1), as well as the perception of their spatial position (5.3.2).  As 
was discussed earlier (2.3.3), perspective is one of the key features of construal in 
Cognitive Grammar, and the application of deixis to Cognitive Poetics provides a useful 
framework through which to discuss the positioning of the reader within the space of 
the discourse. 
5.3.1: Psychological Proximity 
 
Despite the challenges this chapter faces with regards to the authorship of its 
primary sources, the issues raised in the fundamental theory of drone warfare 
demonstrate the necessity of their inclusion.  In exploring the language of drone warfare, 
the aim is both to unpick the changes that this reassessment brings about, but also to 
uncover the persisting similarities: what modes of expression might a drone pilot and a 
soldier fighting in close proximity have in common, when it comes to articulating 
violent actions and events?  Ultimately, this text still functions as a representation of 
Martin’s experience of conflict as a drone pilot.  The complication of the author function 
challenges the authenticity of this representation on a surface level, but Martin’s 
involvement makes it the authoritative account.  In McCurley’s ‘Author’s Note’ at the 
beginning of Hunter Killer, he writes that ‘I have strived to accurately portray events as 
they occurred, but the fog of war may have clouded how I perceived actions or 
remembered details’ (xiii).  As has been discussed throughout this thesis, the very 
process of representing events in language is necessarily one of selection and 
focalisation, and perhaps embellishment.  After all, readers of these texts have no access 
to any external authority, able to verify that the events relayed took place exactly as they 
are described, if at all.  Fundamentally, the concern of this thesis is with the language of 
the text and accounting for the functions of particular stylistic choice in the reader’s 
perception of events, not the assessment of veracity. 
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So far this chapter has outlined the conceptual issues which frame much of the 
contemporary discourse on and around drone warfare.  Now, an initial analysis of the 
primary texts examines how the language employed by the pilots themselves 
corresponds with these ideas, beginning with their metaphors.  As mainstream coverage 
of drone pilots’ experiences has tapped into the shocking nature of this kind of language, 
and Pilkington (2015) draws attention to this by quoting drone operator Michael Haas in 
the title of his article, ‘ever step on ants and never give it another thought?’.  A similar 
metaphor appears at the very beginning of Predator, where the opening scene describes 
‘perfect conditions for cockroaches and vermin to crawl out of the gutter’ (1).  This 
semantic field appears later on, and is extended: 
Captain Bobby Rangler the Okie had come up with the idea.  Johnny Rico in 
the movie Starship Troopers always wanted to kill “bugs,” giant insect-like 
invaders.  My 46th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron therefore became 
known as “the Johnny Rico Squadron.” (198) 
In drawing parallels between their military experiences and Starship Troopers (1997), 
there seems to be little sense of the satire of the film’s representation of conflict, and the 
fascist attitude of the humans toward the ‘bugs’ (King, 1998; Strzelczyk, 2008; Crim, 
2010).  Rather, the metaphors encoded within this passage (ENEMIES ARE INSECTS, KILLING 
IS CLEANING, WAR IS ADVENTURE, SELF AS HERO) provide conceptual frames which 
complement and extend the perceived identities of the pilots and their enemies (cf. 
Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 251-253; Ch. 2.3.4; 4.6).  Moreover, the character of the 
pilots themselves is framed in the ideological role of the ‘hero’ of the film, providing a 
moral justification for the act of killing, as well as blending their experiences with 
soldiers who fight in close-quarters ground conflict.  The design of Predator’s cover 
produces a similar association with science fiction action films, as it uses the same font 
as its namesake, Predator (1987), invoking imagery of the near-invincible predatory 
threat (see Fig. 5.1). 
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Fig. 5.1: The title fonts of Predator (2010, left) and Predator (1987, right) 
 
 While these images and redescriptions serve to distance the pilot from those 
affected by their actions, this strategy can also be inverted.  In Hunter Killer, for instance, 
a religious semantic field redescribes the violence performed, and those acted upon: 
The gravity of what I’d done overtook my emotions.  My mind and body 
struggled to cope.  I had just taken the one thing from two men that I could 
never return, no matter how hard I tried.  I had ended their existence.  Worse, 
I had removed one of God’s creatures from His world. 
What greater sin could I have committed?  (McCurley with Maurer, 2016: 135, 
my emphases) 
In this description, McCurley does not simply construe himself as acting against the 
individuals he kills, but against God.  Although this construal could be described as 
drawing attention away from the act of violence through metaphor (whether the 
description of the victim as a creature of God is elevating or degrading is surprisingly 
ambiguous), the rhetorical question goes on to frame McCurley as a sinner responsible 
for his actions.  Just as with the narrative accounts of ground troops, it remains essential 
to keep an open mind as to the ways in which these authors describe their actions.  As 
will be argued below (5.6), however, drawing attention to the devastating nature of the 
consequences of their strikes can be as important an aspect of drone memoirs as 
linguistic strategies that might disguise them. 
 Shortly after the description of McCurley’s kill as a sin, a second redescription 
frames the same events according to an entirely different theme: ‘we’d bagged a big 
target that would set enemy operations back.  It was big news for the 17th and the 
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Predator community in general. We were quickly making our mark as an effective 
counterterrorism tool’ (136).  In providing multiple redescriptions of the same events, 
the reflections of Hunter Killer signal the versatility of meanings that arise from the 
process of making sense of these acts: as killings, sins, and the demonstration of 
effective tools.  Likewise, Predator’s relational deictic metaphors (Stockwell, 2002) 
produce a shifting relationship with those affected by the acts of violence it describes.  
While it describes them as ‘cockroaches and other vermin’ (1) from the beginning, and 
Martin himself is compared to ‘God hurling thunderbolts from afar’ (3), this position is 
not straightforwardly maintained.  In responding to the criticism that drone pilots 
experience war as comparable to a computer game (Coker, 2013; Stahl, 2013), the reader 
is informed that ‘those who would call this a Nintendo game had never sat in my seat.  
Those were real people down there.  Real people with real lives’ (55).  Even though other 
pilots have described drone operation as ‘like a video game. It can get a little 
bloodthirsty.  But it’s fucking cool’ (in Singer, 2009: 308-9), Martin and Sasser’s 
evocation of flesh-witness authority is designed to anticipate and counter the criticisms 
of Predator’s reader, who does not share Marin’s experiences. 
 Moreover, when Predator describes the process of targeting an individual 
referred to as ‘Rocket Man’, the narrator’s evaluation is reversed: ‘the man wasn’t really a 
human being.  He was so far away and only a high-tech image on a screen’ (43-44, 
emphasis original).  Here, the spatial deixis marker of Rocket Man being ‘far away’ does 
not position the narrator in Afghanistan, as with the earlier example, orienting the 
reader to instead view him through ‘a screen’ at the Air Force base, focalising the 
instrument which otherwise produces the effect of proximity.  According to Chouliaraki, 
‘if looking through the screen immerses spectators in suffering as authentic reality, as 
social theory tells us, looking at the screen reminds them of the reality of the medium 
that disseminates suffering as spectacle and fiction' (2014: 37-8).  In this case, the 
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focalisation of the construal reinforces this distance from violence, with Martin 
consequently absent from the battlefield, too.  The destabilised identity politics of drone 
warfare thus leads to shifting positions throughout Predator and Hunter Killer on the 
relationship between pilots and those affected by the strikes they carry out.  On the one 
hand, they must be clear to make sure that they are seen to be involved in war in a way 
which authenticates and legitimises their experiences: in the absence of physical 
proximity to conflict, this is realised in this passage through an emotional investment in 
the scene (hence ‘sin’, and ‘real people’).  On the other hand, both must make the 
ideological case that performing these acts of violence was the correct course of action.  
The next section will explore this paradox in greater detail, with emphasis on the way 
both memoirs treat the issue of physical proximity to war. 
 These representations of targeted individuals, and the phenomenon of killing 
from a distance, bear comparison with existing research on the attitudes of Israeli 
snipers to their experiences ‘precision warfare’.  As Bar and Ben-Ari (2005) observe in 
their interviews with Israeli soldiers, these soldiers are also likely to shift continually 
between de/humanising labels for targeted individuals (133-4).  In other words, the 
kinds of imagery these soldiers choose to associate with their enemies is flexible, and the 
semantic fields around which their enemies identities are constructed can be inverted, 
resulting in a change in the reader’s ability to empathise with them.  The flexibility of 
drone pilots’ imagery in their construals of killing, then, indicate a broader trend in 
unstable identities across discourse.  As the pilots work to at once insist upon their 
presence in war, yet deny or obscure any immoral activity, the language of killing 
accommodates a range of ideological positions simultaneously.  
 
146 
 
5.3.2: Physical Proximity 
 
As the previous two quotations from Predator suggest, these metaphorical and 
relational deictic descriptions are intimately related to the issues of physical distance to 
the target that characterises drone warfare.  In both instances, the ability to relate to 
Martin’s perspective is directly associated with his position, either as flesh-witness or as 
long-distance operator.  That both of these memoirs are concerned with this tension is 
evident from their opening lines. Although Martin and McCurley begin their books at a 
point where they operated drones from Nevada, the language employed to describe 
their experiences allows them to frame their actions – and indeed themselves – in closer 
proximity to the wars with which they are engaged.  Hunter Killer takes the direct 
rhetorical strategy of arguing that McCurley is ‘still an operator. A fighter’ (xi).  
Meanwhile, the very opening lines of Predator include spatial deictic markers to just 
such an effect: 
From ten thousand feet in the sky I peered down upon a large multiwinged 
building, a technical college taken over by insurgents in the heart of Baghdad.  
It was after mignight.  Streets were unlighted or poorly lighted.  Perfect 
conditions for cockroaches and other vermin to venture out of the gutters.  
Using an infrared sensor to register heat signatures I picked out  machine-
gun and rocket-propelled-grenade (RPG) fire coming from top windows of 
the college. […] I carried a pair of Hellfire missiles beneath my wings, but my 
task was not to engage with the enemy directly (Martin and Sasser, 2010: 1, 
my emphases) 
Deictically speaking, this opening positions Martin himself not only in Iraq and 
directly above the battlefield, but his embodiment elides with the drone itself.  The 
description reads as though Martin is physically present in Afghanistan, with the 
narrative perspectivisation orienting the reader to a first person narrator looking down 
on the battlefield.  In addition, the sensory perceptions described require the reader to 
associate Martin closely with the drone itself, as he describes experiencing the 
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battlefield through the drone’s sensors, which allows him to perceive and react to heat 
signatures, bypassing the poor visibility he describes earlier on.  From the very 
beginning of the narrative, Martin leaves no doubt as to his physical relationship with 
the battlefield: he is present, looking down on Baghdad, witnessing war.  On the very 
next page, Martin describes the aftermath of a lethal drone strike in which he played a 
supporting role: 
My first ten minutes at the controls of the MQ-1, otherwise aptly known as 
Predator, and I had already been in on a kill. 
Then I remembered that Trish had asked me to pick up a gallon of milk on 
the way home. (2) 
The deictic shift (Segal, 1995) in the transition from the first paragraph of this 
extract to the second – from an act of killing in an Afghan battlefield to running errands 
in Nevada in the space of a sentence – requires the reader to drastically reconfigure their 
spatial position within the narrative.  Such a dramatic transition epitomises the 
paradoxical structure of the drone operator’s experience, simultaneously in Iraq and 
Nevada, performing the violent and mundane.  Notably, this deictic shift appears on the 
reverse jacket of the book, although with the references to killing notably made absent 
through ellipses, foregrounding the dual-perspective of civilian and combat experience 
for prospective readers and buyers.  While the lengthy first-hand narrative is 
undoubtedly a valuable starting point for asking how drone pilots might configure 
themselves in language, its agenda as a published work should not go without 
consideration.  
 Similarly, McCurley and Maurer draw attention to the paradoxical relationship 
between the pilot and their proximity to conflict: 
One of the biggest misconceptions surrounding the RPA community is that 
the aircraft allows us some distance from the killing, since we’re thousands of 
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miles away.  The opposite is true.  We are too close.  We know too much, and 
when it is time to shoot, we can zoom in until our target fills the screen (2016: 
135)  
Because the technology of drone warfare allows the pilot a detailed view of their target, 
knowledge of the individual takes the place of physical proximity as the 
incommunicable essence of military experience.  In the process, this substitution 
legitimises McCurley’s experience within the framework of conventional flesh-
witnessing, by framing the pilot as ‘too close’, with a proximity that implies an 
emotional risk in and of itself.   By contrast, Predator continues to place great emphasis 
on the rhetorical importance of physical proximity to conflict, and the text is filled 
throughout with hyperbolic assertions of Martin’s closeness to violence: 
 I was actually in pursuit of Osama bin Laden!  How much closer than 
that could one get to the war? (55) 
 I was about to get even closer to the war. (136) 
 I was no longer a spectator from 7,500 miles away.  You couldn’t get 
much closer than this. (162) 
Predator spends much of the first half of the book making a similar argument, that 
despite a physical distance from the fighting, he retains an emotional involvement, and 
comparable position as flesh-witness, where ‘I couldn’t have been more involved if I had 
actually been inside the plane’ (107).  In Part II, however, Martin is transferred to Ali Air 
Base in Iraq, and the rhetoric immediately shifts (162).  Once it becomes possible to 
argue that Martin’s experiences are authenticated by physical proximity to conflict, this 
strategy is adopted, suggesting that alternative modes of understanding the experience 
of drone pilots remain unstable, and any opportunity to account for experience within 
an existing framework of knowledge is adopted as soon as possible. 
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 The significance of a soldier’s perceived physical proximity to conflict can be 
observed in readers’ responses to the study in Chapter 3. In Section 6 of the extract, in 
which Evans approached the body of the solider he killed, readers noted an increased 
empathy for the narrator.  As R4 puts it, ‘I warmed to the narrator as the harsh reality of 
war hits him’.  Likewise, R1 describes how ‘I said that the last passage didn't evoke much 
emotion, but now that I have seen the other side of the story, it has made me reflect 
more on the last passage and brings home the reality of war. The people you shoot from 
far away are real people, with real lives, not just 'the enemy', employing phrasing almost 
identical to that used by Martin and Sasser (cf. 5.3.1).  The language of Predator, then, 
closely mimics the thought processes in which civilian readers come to empathise with 
other soldiers, thereby drawing an implicit parallel between their experiences of combat. 
 The opening paragraphs of Part III represent another physical movement, this 
time to Balad Air Base, Iraq, and are accompanied by an immediate thematic shift:  
The base was being attacked and overrun.  Enemy troops charged toward the 
POC and GCS trailers.  Pilots, sensors, mission coordinators – everybody 
became a rifleman.  We grabbed Kevlar helmets and M16A2 rifles and merged 
with security forces, maintainers, services, and anyone else available to form 
combat elements. (185) 
The conceptual blend (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; cf. Ch. 2.3.4) that takes place in the 
statement ‘everyone became a rifleman’ produces a functional transformation of 
Martin’s military role: he becomes a frontline soldier, and his experience of combat 
becomes up close, personal, and categorically authentic.  As Martin enters combat, the 
description of events continues to foreground distal deictic elements of the scene, 
drawing attention to the closeness of the enemy soldier: 
I suddenly spotted an enemy soldier charging out of the undergrowth into a 
clearing of low sparse grass, so near I could see the determined look on his face.  
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He wore a black turban and combat boots. Our eyes met. He opened up with 
a burst of automatic 7.62mm from his AK. 
 The mujahidin filled my sights.  I aimed for center of mass while his 
assault rifle continued to chatter and spit flame on full automatic. I squeezed 
my trigger three times, just as I had been trained.  The guy stopped dead in 
his tracks, looked around as through confused, and then tumbled to the 
ground, apparently lifeless. (187, my emphases) 
Here, the sentential structure of events is comparable to descriptions of violence 
discussed already in Chapters 2 and 3, where the segmentation of events means that 
Martin is described as acting directly on ‘the trigger’, and the causal connection between 
this and the enemy soldier ‘tumbl[ing] to the ground’ is inferred by the reader.  What 
happens next, however, is highly atypical for most comparable reports of combat: 
The “enemy” I shot got up from the ground and dusted himself off.  Others, 
both “friendlies and “enemy”, stood up out of ditches and brush to congregate 
around the instructor. (186) 
 Although the scene is revealed to be a training exercise, this is not made 
apparent in the initial description.  Much like the revelation in the opening scene that 
Martin must buy milk when he goes home (2), the withholding of information from the 
reader plays on the context models of war writing.  The relational deixis used to describe 
actors and components of the scene, firing ‘7.62mm [bullets]’, rather than ‘blanks’, and 
referring to the solider in training first as ‘an enemy soldier’, then more specifically as a 
‘mujahidin’ – or guerrilla fighter – gives the reader the impression that Martin is at risk 
of injury.  Moreover, thus far Predator has been a factual account of Martin’s experiences, 
and the sudden unreliability of the narrator’s initial report is an unexpected shift in the 
style of the narrative. In order to make sense of this new information in the context that 
has already been developed, the reader is required to perform ‘world repair’ (Gavins, 
2007: 141) regarding the way they frame the scene, revisiting the impression of a soldier 
actively attempting to kill Martin, and instead substituting a training partner.  That the 
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reader is given the information required for this repair demonstrates that the aim of the 
passage was not to deceive the reader for an extended period: rather, the delay of this 
information creates a temporary false impression of the scene which exaggerates the 
danger Martin is faced with in order to produce a sense of risk.  Given that the drone 
pilot’s invulnerability during combat not only separates their experiences from more 
conventional military engagement, but has been noted as an ethical concern regarding 
long-distance warfare more generally (Rae, 2014), this construal suggests to the reader 
that Martin is in a position where he could conceivably come to harm.  In other words, 
Predator continually frames Martin’s actions as a drone pilot in relation the 
conventional flesh-witnessing of ground troops, asserting a similarity – and therefore 
authority – in his experience of conflict.  Notably, Martin’s co-author Sasser has 13 years 
of experience as a Green Beret, meaning that the authorship of Predator consists of both 
drone and ground warfare veterans.   
5.4: The Dispersion of Responsibility 
 
 Returning analytical attention to the specific clauses in which acts of violence 
are described in memoirs of drone warfare, there is a direct comparison to be made 
between the protocol by which a drone strike is authorised and carried out, known as 
the ‘kill chain’ (Currier, online; see Fig. 5.2), and the conceptual archetype of force 
transference in Cognitive Grammar, which Langacker refers to as an ‘action chain’: ‘An 
action chain is a series of forceful interactions, each involving the transmission of energy 
from one participant to the next.  In principle, an action chain can be of any length.’ 
(Langacker, 2008: 355-6, cf. Ch. 2.3.1).  Langacker visualises an extended action chain 
through the billiard-ball model, wherein the spatial movement of objects causes a 
transfer of force, beginning with one agent, passing the force through several other 
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participants in the action chain (either agents themselves, or inanimate instruments), 
leading to a final transfer of force which alters the state of a patient. 
 By comparison, the concept of a ‘kill chain’ denotes the strategic and 
bureaucratic stages through which a drone strike is authorised, and the command is 
given to a drone pilot to carry out the attack. Fig. 5.2 below, taken from a Pentagon 
presentation on the authorisation of military force (Currier, online) demonstrates the 
stages of approval a proposed action must undergo before authorisation to act is given. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2: The ‘kill chain’ in the authorisation of a drone strike (from Currier, 2015) 
 
In addition to the individuals who approve the action, Rules of Engagement (RoE) are 
referred to in order to determine if and when an appropriate time becomes apparent.  
Unlike the firing of a rifle, the decision to perform an act of violence using a drone is not 
and cannot be made by an individual.  Rather, it is the consequence of a long chain of 
approval from military, political, and legal authorities, before the command is relayed 
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back to the pilot to act.  In short, the kill chain represents the transfer of responsibility 
and authorisation comparable to the model of force interaction within action chaining. 
Authorisation for a drone strike is systematically produced through a network of 
participants, with a chain of command ultimately leading to the President authorising 
the pilot to initialise a strike.  Noticeably from this presentation, it is hard to identify 
precisely where this chain begins: a series of intelligence workers ‘build a case’ for the 
strike.   
Thus, the kill chain is less an abstract concept, but directly pertinent to the way 
in which Martin conceptualises the structure of action in his memoir.  In the final scene 
of the book, he writes that ‘Rules of engagement permitted an air strike during a hostile 
troops-in-contact.  I spun up a Papa missile as I circled wide to avoid other air traffic 
while I dropped altitude to 6,500 feet.  In the meantime, the ground battle captain 
authorized me to kill the sniper position’ (305, my emphases). In this instance, Martin is 
explicitly enabled to act by two forces (see Fig. 5.3 below): his own knowledge of the 
rules of engagement, and the authority of the ground battle captain.  Comparable to 
Evans’ narrative in Chapter 3.5, the construal of Martin’s actions in this passage is highly 
granular.  Rather than firing a missile, he presses a trigger, and watches as the missile 
comes into focus through a perceptual process, as opposed to a direct material action.  
Particularly interesting is the fact that permission and authorisation are given to Martin, 
thus construing earlier actors in the action chain.  His actions are first authorized by a 
ground captain, and the placement of the statement regarding rules of engagement 
implies that this was an informing factor in the decision-making process.  Lastly, the 
fact that this strike does violence to an individual location is minimised, as the transfer 
of force is instead construed as moving from Martin to a location (‘the sniper position’).  
Martin only reports in retrospect and through the account of another that he ‘later 
learned that a team of army trooper found what was left of three men in the wreckage 
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on the roof, along with an RPG launcher and several rifles’ (306), a description which, 
rather than emphasising the violence of previous events, functions primarily as 
justification and closure.  
In visualisation of this passage below (Fig. 5.3), the ‘air strike’ is first introduced 
as nominalised theme, permitted by the abstract ‘rules of engagement’.  This clause cues 
a script for the process of an air strike, in which a fighter pilot fires a missile towards a 
target, and the conceptual relationship between this and the following clause is 
highlighted by the dashed arrows and boxes.  Further boxes around each process 
represent the temporal deictic shift between the abstract theory regulating conflict 
(‘during…’) and Martin’s present tense experiences (‘In the meantime…’).   By 
introducing the concept of an air strike in scripted, procedural terms, the process is 
abstracted from Martin’s personal agency, as the construal indicates that the events 
should or would occur regardless of the actor in the permitted setting.  In addition, the 
reporting clause of the ground captain’s authorisation of Martin’s actions serves to 
create an additional and more direct force acting upon Martin, and serving as the head 
of the clause’s action chain.  Accordingly, Martin takes both an agentive and thematic 
role within the action chain, his actions being positioned as the product of the 
authoritative forces which act upon him and dictate his actions through schematised 
operational procedures: 
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Fig. 5.3: A visualisation of the action/kill chain in ‘rules of engagement permitted…’ 
 
While this example demonstrates how responsibility for authorising an act of 
violence can be displaced, and the pilot positioned as both agent and landmark within 
an action chain, acted upon in order to continue an order, an earlier passage in which 
Martin observes another pilot leads to the following statement:  ‘The responsibility for 
the shot could be spread among a number of people in the chain – pilot, sensor, JTAC, 
ground commander.  That meant no single one of us could be held to blame’ (212).  Up 
until this point, the analysis produced in the representation of event models and action 
chains has been predicated in part on the identification of a responsible agent.  What 
this scene and its evaluation shows, however, is that modern conflict’s networks of 
constant communication can produce situations in which the actor is not alone, but one 
of an extensive network of participants in an action chain.  In the representation of force 
 Rules of engagement       permitted              an air strike 
during a hostile troops in action contact 
In the meantime 
      The ground captain  authorized              me             to kill           the sniper position 
 AG 
 AG TH/AG 
TH 
 PAT 
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dynamics for ground troops’ writings so far, the first person ‘I’ has been a sufficient locus 
for agency, and implicitly encompassing the range of possible actors who could be 
considered responsible for the actions performed.  But the deliberate frustration of this 
identification of agency and responsibility produces a straightforward critique of such 
an approach to warfare.  As Sifton (2012) explains, ‘Drones foreshadow the idea that 
brutality could become detached from humanity, and yield violence that is, as it were, 
unconscious’ (15). 
These concerns parallel the kinds of questions raised by Hannah Arendt with 
regards to the overwhelming bureaucracy of totalitarianism, with the sheer vastness of 
the system leading to a dispersed ‘rule by Nobody’ (1969: 13), where no single individual 
can be pinpointed as the responsible source of the unethical action.  In the case of drone 
warfare, as Kennedy (2006) puts it, ‘violence and injury have lost their author and their 
judge as soldiers, humanitarians, and statesman have come to assess the legitimacy of 
violence in a common legal and bureaucratic vernacular’ (169).  Although drone warfare 
as yet is not autonomous, and requires a network of active decisions before an 
engagement (cf. Fig. 5.2), the ease with which the pilot can be positioned within an 
action chain, as opposed to at the head of one, represents a loss of agency and 
accountability on the part of the individual.  As a result, Protevi (2013) argues that ‘the 
practical agent of the act of killing is not the individual person or subject, but the 
emergent assemblage of military unit and non-subjective reflex’ (2013: 130, my emphasis).  
In other words, it no longer makes sense to consider the individual as an agent, when 
they are functionally simply an aspect of a much more complex mechanism of action.  
With accountability now removed from any one individual, the participants within a 
sprawling bureaucratic system become ‘thoughtless creatures at the mercy of every 
gadget which is technically possible, no matter how murderous it is.’ (Arendt, in Shaw 
and Akhter, 2014: 229).  In Predator, this relationship with authority seems to persist: 
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simply because it has been decided by the kill chain that the attack should proceed, 
Martin is assured that it is right to do so.   
However, Protevi notes that even in the case of a complex assemblage of 
individuals being responsible for a given act, individual soldiers seemingly cannot help 
but perceive a sense of personal agency: 'Even when a sense of agency is absent during 
the rage-induced or reflex-controlled act of killing, however, a sense of moral 
responsibility can be produced by a retrospective identification of action and ownership’ 
(2013: 132, my emphasis).  Alongside the ‘myth of agency’ reported by Bourke (1999), 
Protevi’s observations support the argument that narrative structure allows soldiers to 
organise their experiences after the fact, and create and construe causal relationships 
which may not have been clear at the time of acting (King, 2000; Lambrou, 2014; 
Brockmeier, 2015).  Similarly to the paradox of drone pilots’ proximity to conflict (5.3), 
the sense of agency is a constant negotiation of a position of authoritative presence, at 
the risk of being held accountable for morally questionable actions. 
Verhagen (2007) discusses the conceptual difference between nominal and 
verbal construals (54-5) in perspectivisation, where certain construals foreground the 
process, as opposed to the actor.  While the passages examined here are more complex 
than the individual words and clauses discussed by Verhagen, the overall focus of the 
texts could be argued to draw attention to the action over the actor.  In a sense, many of 
the texts explored throughout this thesis employ some means of transferring attention 
away from a construal which positions the narrator as the agent transferring direct force 
to the victim of an act of violence, typically by acting instead upon an instrument, or 
otherwise extending the causal chain.  In the case of drone warfare, this goes beyond 
individual stylistic features, as the focus of the narrative more generally is more 
concerned with the novelty of the event processes described than other forms of military 
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memoir.  From this perspective, then, the narrator is no longer simply construed at a 
distance from the final physical transfer of force to the enemy combatant, but no longer 
a focal point within the chain at all.  While much research exists debating the ethics of 
drone warfare (Sharkey, 2010; Rae, 2014; McDonald, 2017), the emphasis is rarely on the 
role of the individual pilot.  Instead, the physical agent is framed within the complex 
chain of command outlined above in Fig. 5.2, itself explored within the socio-political 
context of international conflict.  Where the process of producing a critical analysis of a 
ground soldier’s writing can eventually lead to the discussion of the narrator as the 
agentive source of an act of violence, the very structure of drone warfare appears to 
erode this agency from the outset.   
Although the concept of responsibility in the analysis above has been tied to the 
construal of causality in relation to action chains, the concept in general extends beyond 
the identification of any single stylistic feature (cf. van Leeuwen, 1997).  Rather, these 
features cue background knowledge associated with social scripts of what individual 
actors can and cannot be held accountable for, influenced by focalisation around actors, 
objects, instruments, and indeed the chain of action itself.  The concept of agency and 
its precise relationship with lexicogrammatical construal will be examined in greater 
detail in Chapter 7.  For now, it is enough to observe that general academic and political 
discourse around drone warfare reframes the debate regarding responsibility away from 
the individual soldier, focusing instead on the socio-political institutions and ideologies 
which govern the context of their operations, and that the language employed in the 
memoirs of pilots themselves conforms to these broader discursive expectations. 
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5.5: Meta-irony: Keeping Peace by Fighting Wars 
 
 So far, this chapter has primarily discussed the language of these memoirs in 
terms of their inability to escape the ideological-discursive formation of flesh-witness 
authority.  However, other rhetorical strategies appear across the genre of 
autobiographical war writing, which can be aligned with the drone pilots’ engagement 
in conflict. Chouliaraki (2014) argues that contemporary discourse produced by soldiers 
about their role in the military makes a meta-ironic shift away from the modernist 
futility of the First and Second World Wars (Cobley, 1996) toward a reasoning in which 
their function is described less in terms of the violence it produces, but instead in terms 
of the longer-term humanitarian goals they intend to produce.  Hunter Killer, for 
instance, describes McCurley’s disappointment at the possibility of operating a UAV 
without engaging directly in combat: 
Most of the guys here will finish their two-year tour without firing once in 
combat,’ he [McCurley’s instructor] said. 
 My heart sank. 
 I’d signed up to make an impact on the war effort.  I wanted to do 
something productive to keep Americans safe.  Just watching a blacked-out 
hut in the middle of the night didn’t exactly fit that bill.  Shooting was why I 
wanted to be a fighter pilot in the first place.  It wasn’t like I wanted to kill 
people.  But it felt like we were being productive if we destroyed something.  
(McCurley and Maurer, 2016: 53, my emphases) 
McCurley describes his aims as a participant in conflict in these humanitarian (if 
nationalistically limited) terms, ‘doing something productive to keep Americans safe’.  
Conceptually, this construal not only changes the kind of action being performed, as 
violence becomes protection, but it changes the point of view such that attention is 
shifted to ‘Americans’ as the object acted upon, as opposed to those McCurley is actively 
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fighting against.  Predator employs comparable strategies for making sense of the 
consequences of drone violence when he reflects that: 
Flying the Predator, firing precision-guided Hellfires that slammed exactly 
on-target almost every time, contained moral meaning that might not be 
apparent at first.  It saved our soldiers’ lives and, compared to the carpet-
bombing of World War II that wiped out entire cities, demonstrated our value 
of human life and our efforts to do whatever possible to avoid taking it.  If we 
who operated battle machines did our jobs properly, wars would be shortened 
and fractured societies rebuilt more quickly and securely.                                                        
(Martin and Sasser, 2010: 219, my emphases) 
From a cognitive perspective, the framing of the consequences of Martin’s actions shifts 
in this passage away from prototypical expectations of the outcomes of performing an 
act of violence.  Instead, Martin and Sasser reframe the immediate scope – the ‘onstage 
region’ (Langacker, 2008: 63) to which the reader attends – away from the immediate 
transfer of force, instead foregrounding the possibility of more distant but more 
peaceful outcomes.  This passage is represented in Fig. 5.4, which also shows how the 
initial agent of the act of ‘firing’ is left absent from this construal, and moreover that 
each subsequent participant is construed as a thematic, non-agentive causer of the 
subsequent action.  Agency and violence are both backgrounded, with prominence 
instead afforded to abstract and long-term goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.4: Scopes of causation in the firing of a Hellfire missile 
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 Within Scarry’s typology of descriptions of violence, the passage above 
constitutes an act of redescription through omission (1985: 72-4), as prominence is 
instead afforded to the possible consequences of the act of killing.  In addition, the 
nominalisation of the action renders the initial agent who causes the act of firing absent 
from the initial clause, although the implied causal role of violence is reflected in the 
hypothesised action chain inferred from the context of the setting.  Given that the study 
performed earlier (Ch. 3.5) indicates that readers are often able to infer the role of 
grammatically absent agents from context, it is noteworthy that the passage works to 
produce a series of positively evaluated outcomes to the initial action.  In this sense, the 
act is presented as a utilitarian decision, with a rhetorical emphasis on the positive 
effects for a greater number of individuals than are harmed directly by the individual 
strikes.  Similarly to the narrowing down of possible actions through disnarration (4.3.2), 
the extended coordinate clauses present a number of ways in which the negative impact 
of killing is outweighed by long-term, abstract benefits.  This effect is complemented by 
the favourable comparison to carpet-bombing techniques, with Martin and Sasser 
establishing a binary choice between the two methods of attack as viable courses of 
action.  While it is of course understandable that individual soldiers would want to find 
ways to construe their actions positively, to do so whilst erasing the act of killing itself 
does little to assuage the public perception of drone pilots as emotionally distant from 
the conflicts in which they engage (Royakkers and van Est, 2010; Strawser, 2013; Daggett, 
2015). 
5.6: The Narrative Construction of Others 
 
Up to this point, this reading has been concerned with the way the language of 
Predator and Hunter Killer has constructed and situated the author-pilots.  However, the 
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technological and historical distinction between these soldiers and those of the World 
Wars discussed elsewhere in this thesis requires the examination of a further function of 
their narratives:  namely, the narrative construction of the identity of their enemies.  
Unlike the soldiers of the World Wars whose writings have been explored, the notion 
that these pilots are acting against armed combatants is less readily understood.  As one 
First World War veteran describes it: 
the enemy – like the inhabitants of Mars  – only existed by inference: one 
assumed their existence from evidence of their acts.   To think of them in the 
personal instead of the abstract had been difficult. (Stainton, n.d.: 22, my 
emphasis) 
In the examples of ground combat discussed throughout this thesis, enemy combatants 
are often described in simple terms, such as ‘the man’, or even more broadly as just ‘the 
figure’.  Simpson (2003) describes ‘negative shading’ as the foregrounding of the 
psychological and perceptual uncertainty of the narrator, and abstract nominals such as 
‘the figure’ create a psychological distance from the injured individual by establishing 
uncertainty about their character within the discourse.  By contrast, Hunter Killer and 
Predator are able to draw upon reports and long-term observations of individual 
combatants to construct narrative identities for those who they go on to kill.  In 
particular, the first man killed by Martin is dubbed ‘Rocket Man’, and described for the 
reader in great detail:   
Like a rat, he slithered through the slums of Sadr City armed with 100mm 
supersonic rockets equipped with 5-pound high-explosive warheads, killing 
and maiming GIs, marines, and Iraqi bystanders (49) 
As was discussed in the previous chapter (4.3.2), disnarration allows soldiers in close 
proximity combat to justify violence through reference to alternative outcomes which 
involve injury to themselves.  For the drone pilot, while combat involves no risk to 
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themselves, passages such as the above serve as a reminder of the harm inflicted upon 
others, and which the drone pilot is construed as either working to prevent or avenge. 
Žižek (2002, online) examines how the process of ‘schematising’ involves the 
performative distinction between the enemy and oneself, and ‘provid[es] it with the 
concrete features which will make it into an appropriate target of hate and struggle’.  In 
Predator, the assignation of the epithet ‘Rocket Man’ performs this function, and the 
representation of reports and observations of his activities over time lead to the 
conclusion that ‘Rocket Man deserved to be killed if anyone did’ (52, emphasis original).  
In moving closer to Rocket Man psychologically, by constructing an identity through a 
profile of his actions and beliefs, Predator presents a legitimate target.  However, this 
kind of engagement is not just reserved for soldiers Martin feels justified in killing.  
After having been transferred to a commanding role within the drone team, Martin 
witnesses (but does not directly operate) a drone strike in which two children are killed, 
having entered the target zone after the missile was fired.  What follows is an 
extraordinarily candid account, where many details of these two individuals are inferred 
by the narrator: 
The Predator crew spun up the plane’s Hellfires, set up an attack run, and 
fired a Special K, sending the missile on its way with a twenty-three-second 
time of flight. 
Everything looked perfect until… 
Two kids on a bicycle unexpectedly appeared on the screen approaching the 
truck and the insurgents.  Both were boys.  One appeared to be about ten or 
eleven, the other – possibly a younger brother – was balanced on the 
handlebars.  Tooling along on a summer day laughing and talking. (211, my 
emphases) 
The perceptual processes that go into this description indicate that some of these details 
are perceptions associated with Martin’s understanding of the situation, while the 
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choice of words to describe their observable actions, ‘tooling along’ and ‘laughing and 
talking’ reinforce the inferences already made within the description.  Moreover, the 
passage goes on to describe a comparable image from Martin’s childhood, in which he is 
positioned as a child with ‘no idea of impending danger’, further empathising with the 
children in the present narrative.  Throughout these memoirs, distance and proximity 
are dynamic in terms of the deictic relationship between the narrator and the conflict 
zone, and emphasising the innocence of these boys parallels the efforts made elsewhere 
in Predator to emphasise Martin’s emotional closeness to violence.  Indeed, the emotion 
of regret itself implies personal agency and the capacity to have acted otherwise (Frith, 
2013; cf. Ch. 7.6).  Moreover, by presenting their deaths in an overtly shocking manner, 
the reader is able to align their own reaction with Martin’s regret.   Thus, while still at a 
physical distance from the battlefield and unable to be harmed physically, the notion 
that Martin can be subject to emotional harm is an important part of the process of 
legitimising drone warfare, and humanising its operatives. 
In presenting the reader with an estimation of the innocent mental life of the 
victims of drone strikes, their deaths are made more emotionally impactful.  From a 
narrative perspective, then, the development of drone technology’s detailed surveillance 
equipment has allowed these texts to present a more detailed image of the harmed 
individuals.  In some cases, such as Martin’s continued engagement with ‘Rocket Man’, 
this familiarity serves to justify the pilot’s activity, with the victim of the attack 
represented as a threat.  Alternatively, the ability to represent the personality of 
innocent victims shows humility: in facing up to these failures, Martin’s reaction 
produces a sympathetic vulnerability, and the project of drone warfare is presented as 
self-effacingly human. 
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5.7: Conclusions: Language and the Justification of Drone Warfare 
 
According to Leed (1979), ‘war experience is nothing if not the transgression of 
boundaries’ (21).  In the texts discussed in earlier chapters, which primarily deal with 
infantrymen of the First and Second World Wars, these transgressions are primarily 
socio-political, as well as moral, as peace-time attitudes and practices are suspended.  
For the drone pilot, however, the transgression of boundaries of space and identity 
challenges not only the pilot’s identification with the traditional image of the warrior as 
an individual who puts themselves in danger (French, 2005).  This chapter has explored 
how existing narratives of drone pilots are constantly concerned with the ways in which 
their experiences relate to established metanarratives of the conventional experience of 
war.  Military identity has been discussed as fundamentally related to the ability to 
produce a flesh-witness narrative, and in the case of drone warfare where pilots’ 
proximity to danger and conflict is distinct from more prototypical engagements, their 
narratives work to relate to conventional expectations of flesh-witnessing, as opposed to 
developing novel accounts of warfare.   
5.7.1: Authority, Identity, and Discourse 
 
The position of the drone pilot is discursively uncertain, moving at once from 
the distance of thousands of kilometres which draws in the reader, to the close 
proximity and high-definition images which authenticate their experiences as flesh-
witnesses of conflict.  When it comes to acts of violence, these paradoxes remain in play, 
as too great a distance appears cold and inhuman, while appearing too close to an act of 
violence risks inviting questions of moral responsibility both pilots seem to expressly 
avoid.  More than in any of the other stories explored throughout this thesis, these 
soldiers must actively work to establish their identities in the eyes of their readers, and 
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to justify the acts they perform.  What this produces, linguistically speaking, is a 
constantly shifting focalisation – from soldier to screen to sky to soil – distributing the 
pilot’s experience simultaneously across several locations.  In neither book are these 
paradoxes resolved. 
What is presented, however, is the beginning of a conceptual shift, relying at 
first on the understanding of the value of physical risk and proximity to conflict, in 
which emotional closeness to those acted upon is foregrounded.  In these narratives, 
physical proximity and wounding is replaced with an empathy which brings the narrator 
into a social and emotional proximity to the victims of drone attacks.  From a critical 
perspective, however, this rhetoric aims to present an equivalency between emotional 
and physical proximity which does not convert to an ethical attitude towards violence 
during war.  Despite how they might feel, the drone pilot is abstracted from risk of harm, 
and sets a disconcerting precedent for the future of warfare. 
Communicating the experience of drone warfare remains elusive long after the 
occurrence of the events.  Towards its conclusion, Predator encapsulates this frustration:  
Some people would look at me strangely.  “Let me get this right,” they might 
say, and I knew what was coming.  “You’re out there on the air force base 
killing innocent people on the other side of the world while they can’t shoot 
back at you?” 
 
 I tried to contain my temper, I truly tried.  Not always successfully.  
Sometimes I broke down my answer to a few simple words.  “You have no 
idea what you’re talking about.” (Martin and Sasser, 2010: 263) 
This response bears strong comparison to the conventional context model of flesh-
witnessing as indicative of a soldier’s authority and identity, and understanding the 
drone pilot is restricted once again to those who have first-hand experience.  In the end, 
the discursive reimagining of military experience in these memoirs is incomplete; the 
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new bridging of civilian and military life through long-distance warfare has not allowed 
Martin or McCurley any greater communicative ease than any other soldier. This is 
further demonstrated by instances in which the authors rely on conventional refutations 
of non-flesh-witness experience, emphasising their own proximity to war by contrast: 
‘War wasn’t fair… anyone who thought it was hadn’t been there’ (Martin and Sasser, 2010: 
286, my emphasis).  While this rhetoric positions Martin within established conventions 
of military experience, the deictic reference of ‘there’ cannot be exclusively physical for 
the drone pilot.  Phrases such as these demonstrate that drone warfare has not yet 
produced its own rhetorical means of justifying and privileging the knowledge and 
experiences of its authors.  Instead, it continues to rely on context models and frames of 
reference established by combatants able to call on their physical positioning as a 
differentiation from ‘anyone who thought it was [fair]’. 
 The narrative life of the drone pilot, then, is one of contradictions.  Although 
this may seem at first incompatible with the discussion of narrative identity across the 
previous chapter, Brockmeier (2015) observes that recent research on the subject (De 
Fina, Schriffin, and Bamberg, 2006; Hyvärinen, Hydén, Saarenehimo and Tamboukou, 
2010) produced ‘no contours of a coherent and continuous self, but quite the contrary: 
an unstable scenario of tensions, contradictions, struggle, and negotiations’ (180).  As 
Strawson (2004) has shown (Ch. 4.5.1), it is possible to live a non-narrative life, but 
rather than dissociating linear episodes of experience, these memoirs show concomitant 
life experiences that cannot be reconciled with one another.  Instead of the typical 
‘break’ between war and home lives, drone pilots produce an identity which at once 
draws upon both of these aspects, in an as yet unresolved tension between their own 
experiences and the expectations of military memoir.  From a narratological point of 
view, the drone pilot’s presence in two places at once challenges the conventions for 
organising experiences: discrete, contrasting notions of being ‘at war’ and ‘at home’ are 
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no longer applicable, and the failure of both memoirs to replace these concepts 
indicates an ongoing fragility to drone pilots’ warrior identities. 
Additionally, while this chapter has viewed drone technology as an emergent 
and novel means of warfare requiring a reassessment of conventional strategies of sense-
making in war for its operators, this view is not universal.  Carvin (2015) argues that 
academic approaches to drone warfare often become distracted by the ‘newness’ of the 
technology, and fail to consider the historical precedents in military innovation for the 
evolution of greater distance between the aggressor and the victim of a given act of 
violence.  For example, when Ivar Campbell witnesses heavy artillery shelling in France 
in 1917, he describes how 
You perceive, too, in imagination, men infinitely small, running, affrightened 
rabbits, from the upheaval of the shells, nerve-racked, deafened; clinging to 
the earth, hiding and wimpering “O God, O God!”  You perceive, too, other 
men, sweaty, brown, infinitely small also, moving guns, feeding the belching 
monster, grimly, quietly pleased.  (in Housman, 1930 [2002]: 60) 
Much like Predator and Hunter Killer, the mechanised state of warfare reduces the 
agency of the soldiers involved in operating the artillery gun.  In construing the weapon 
itself as a ‘belching monster’, responsibility for the violence it inflicts is transferred away 
from the operators.  As Singer (2010) puts it, ‘each new technology from the bow and 
arrow to the bomber plane has moved soldiers further and further from their foes’ (395), 
and much has been written on technology and distance in the context of war beyond 
drone warfare (cf. Adey, Whitehead, and Williams, 2013), including the study of distance 
on the experience of killing in Israeli snipers discussed above (Bar and Ben-Ari, 2005), 
which begins to factor this increase in both physical and psychological distance into the 
discursive construal of experience.  However, Carvin’s claim overlooks the fact that 
drone warfare is not simply a development of a physical and technological distance, but 
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a form of military engagement which simultaneously brings the operator into closer 
contact with those they act against than they would ever otherwise have, unless they 
were physically in the conflict zone.  Simultaneously receiving criticism for their 
impersonal function as ‘cubicle warriors' (Royakkers and van Est, 2010), yet suffering 
rates of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder at rates equal to or greater than ground troops 
(Riza, 2014), the phenomenology of drone warfare contains a paradox unparalleled in 
other modes of conflict. 
5.7.2: Drone Warfare in Society and Culture 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that this chapter has only been concerned 
with two memoirs of drone warfare.  These represent the sum total of commercially 
available autobiographical literature on the subject and so, while limited in their 
perspective, give the best available indication of the possible future directions for this 
emerging niche of military memoir.  As Rothstein (2015) points out, however, ‘just as we 
cannot treat the drone technology itself as a singular and unique system, we cannot 
treat any particular idea of drones as singular’ (107), and the same is true for the process 
of reading the stories of the pilots who operate them.  In their infancy, the linguistic 
strategies for negotiating a warrior identity for drone pilots should still be examined on 
a case-by-case basis, and the aim of this chapter has simply been to indicate the 
directions in which these early narratives seem to point for future discursive 
development.  In recent years, however, drone technology has become more prominent 
within everyday culture, and public awareness of its military applications has increased.  
For instance, Eye in the Sky (2016) follows a fictional debate between members of 
military staff and political figures over whether to launch a drone strike likely to 
produce civilian casualties.  At the close of the film, General Benson, an officer who 
eventually orders the strike from a Whitehall office, speaks the following line which 
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closes his argument on the morality of his decision: ‘Never tell a soldier that he does not 
know the cost of war’. The quotation was cited in press coverage of the film, and 
described by director Gavin Hood as a ‘winning line’ (Hasan, 2016: online).  Once again, 
the quotation relies on the convention of the VIOLENCE AS COST metaphor (Scarry, 1985: 
74), and a stern imperative which employs double deixis (Herman, 2002) through the 
absence of an explicit addressee, thereby instructing both the homodeigetic discourse 
participant, and the film’s viewer, that they do not possess the requisite flesh-witness 
experience of war to effectively critique the decision. 
As of today, then, the language of drone warfare continues to rely on the 
rhetorical strategies of authenticity produced in ground combat, producing paradoxes of 
proximity when describing the pilots’ relationship with the acts of violence they commit.  
While they remain comparable to the war writings of infantry soldiers in this sense, 
their relationship with the concept of agency is complicated by the nature of the 
technology and operational procedures they employ.  Where the question of 
responsibility is concerned, modelling the construal of acts of violence from the 
perspective of Cognitive Grammar allows for a precise discussion of the ways in which 
action chains are formed, and the transfer of force distributed within these passages.  
However, the notion of ‘responsibility’ itself remains abstract.  This will be the focus of 
the remaining chapters, where the term is considered more closely in relation to the 
linguistic notion of agency and its role in cognition. 
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Chapter 6: Modelling Intentionality 
in Cognitive Grammar 
6.1: Introduction to Intentions 
 
Throughout this thesis, the critical analysis of violence has necessarily been 
concerned with the attribution of responsibility for action.  So far, the analytical focus 
on the transfer of force and the construal of action has primarily focused on the 
perception of causality.  While this has facilitated a discussion of the kinds of acts 
soldiers have been shown to perform, the attribution of causality does not equate to the 
attribution of responsibility, much less explicitly subjective concepts such as praise or 
blame.  As Shaver and Drown have put it, ‘causality is dichotomous; responsibility is 
variable.  It is a judgement made about a stimulus person by a perceiver who takes 
several different dimensions into account’ (1986: 703, emphasis in original).  As well as 
the direct causal relationship between an actor and the outcomes of their actions, the 
perception of responsibility requires a recognition of the actor’s capacity to act 
intentionally.  In many cases, and for acts of violence in particular, whether or not the 
agent intended to perform a particular action or intended its outcome may substantially 
affect their responsibility from a moral or legal standpoint.  While the ‘billiard-ball 
model’ (Langacker, 2008: 355) of force and motion employed so far has been useful for 
the conceptualisation of direct and physical causal relationships between event 
participants in language, neither this approach nor the Canonical Event Model (Ch. 
2.3.1) consider the role an actor’s intentions may play in the social perception of an 
action.  This chapter aims to develop such an account within the framework of 
Cognitive Grammar in order to extend the critical discussion of actions in language 
beyond causality.   
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Intentionality is therefore inherent to the social concept of agency: ownership of 
an action requires the capacity to perform it for some purpose.  Bandura (2006) lists 
intentionality – defined as the capacity to ‘form intentions that include action plans and 
strategies for realising them’ (164) – as one of the core properties of human agency.  A 
closer examination of the linguistic construal of intentionality is therefore required in 
order to understand how this dimension of action can affect readers’ ideological 
assessments.  Much as the perception of an agent’s responsibility is affected by more 
than the language of a discourse, a reader’s sense of intentionality cannot be attributed 
exclusively to the construal presented in the text.  Rather, it is part of the process of 
reading and experiencing the text by a reader, which makes a cognitive model ideally 
situated in accounting for the processes which influence the perception of intentional 
action in language.  This capacity to infer intentionality from action has been described 
as ‘a hallmark of the human cognitive apparatus’ (Behrend and Scofield, 2006: 291), 
allowing us to interact with other individuals on the understanding that their minds 
operate in a manner comparable to our own, and thus that they can act based upon the 
same kinds of private motivations that might drive our own actions.  Much like the 
inference of causality in Chapter 3 was concerned with readers’ ability to perceive 
descriptions of events in terms of scripts and preconceived expectations, so the 
perception of intentionality in discourse is a question of identifying agents as mentally 
comparable to our own decision-making selves.  This situates the studying of 
intentionality within the context of ‘mind-modelling’ (Stockwell, 2009), and this 
relationship to cognitive poetics provides a useful link between clause-level analysis, and 
need to produce readings concerned with the overall  effect of a text and its language. 
While intentionality is not an exclusively linguistic concept, it is the construal of 
events and their perspectivisation in language which informs judgements regarding 
whether a described action was performed for a reason, and consequently whether or 
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not the agent of the act should be considered responsible for it.  In Systemic Functional 
Linguistics, as per Fig. 6.1 below, the subdivision of material process verbs readily 
distinguishes between the kinds of activity that have the capacity to be performed 
intentionally (intention processes), those which can only be carried out unintentionally 
(supervention processes), and clauses which position inanimate objects as agents (event 
processes) (cf. Ch. 2.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Simpson (2003: 83)) 
Fig. 6.1: Modelling intentional and superventional processes in SFL 
 
This model demonstrates the functional difference between intentional and 
superventional acts, although Simpson remarks that ‘these subdivisions should be 
regarded more as handy approximations than as strictly delineated categories’ (83).   
Nonetheless, the process of actively differentiating between intentional and 
superventional actions in Systemic Functional Linguistics demonstrates the stylistic 
significance in distinguishing between actions which connote intentionality, and those 
which do not.  However, although these subdivisions help to distinguish between the 
kinds of material process being construed semantically, the process of identifying 
intentional and superventional processes relies on the interpretation of the analyst.  As 
was shown earlier (cf. Ch. 3.5.4), non-specialist readers can differ substantially from 
researchers in their focus interpreting a text.  As a result, the categorisation of processes 
Material process 
Event Process 
‘The lake shimmered’ 
‘The car backfired’ 
Action Process 
‘John kicked the ball’ 
‘The lion sprang’ 
‘The boy fell over’ 
‘Mary slipped’ 
Intention Process 
‘John kicked the ball’ 
‘The lion sprang’ 
Supervention Process 
‘The boy fell over’ 
‘Mary slipped’ 
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reveals little about the way in which intentionality is perceived in language, only that it 
is perceived. 
 While Cognitive Grammar’s model of verb processes deals in detail with explicit 
directions of force and the causal relationship between grammatical participants as part 
of a ‘highly selective’ (Langacker, 2014: xiv) and fine grained clausal analysis, it does not 
include a representation of the linguistic function – and therefore the conceptual effect 
– of an agent’s intentionality.  There is no explicit distinction in the Canonical Event 
Model (Langacker, 2008: 357) between actions performed intentionally, and those 
events performed by agents without the capacity for underlying goals, desires, or 
motivation (cf. Popova, 2014: 2).  Rather, Cognitive Grammar takes volitional action as 
prototypical to the agent role (Langacker, 1991: 210), and uses the intentional mental 
activity of the experiencer role to describe experiencers as ‘actor-like’ (2008: 392).  While 
this is an adequate model for the majority of processes performed by agents with the 
capacity for intentional action, taking intentionality as prototypical means that 
Langacker’s development of canonical events fails to demonstrate how acts performed 
unintentionally might differ conceptually, or the possibility of ambiguity in determining 
whether or not an action was performed for some reason.  Given the wide-ranging social 
implications behind the distinction between un/intentional acts, it is important to 
understand how these forms of action can be distinguished conceptually. 
 Accordingly, this chapter begins with a definition of intentionality, and a review 
of the different roles intentionality has played in stylistics, literary criticism, and 
cognitive science (6.2).  This review is followed by an exploration of the role of various 
linguistic features in affecting readers’ judgements of intentionality in language (6.3), 
demonstrating how individual words through to narrative context affect the perception 
of purpose.  To account for this in further detail, the chapter then attends to Cognitive 
Grammar (6.4) in order to explain how the perception of intentionality can be modelled 
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in relation to the Canonical Event Model, and to the conceptual substrate, which 
represents the implicit domains of knowledge involved in the interpretation of linguistic 
meaning and context (Langacker, 2008: 463).  While these sections employ practical 
examples throughout, 6.5 returns to two passages analysed earlier in terms of the 
perception of causality (3.2), in order to situate the present work in relation to earlier 
methods.  As the discussion up to this point has primarily dealt with clause-level events, 
the role of intentionality in connecting this kind of close reading with narrative analysis 
is outlined (6.6) and applied (6.7).  In evaluating the developments made in this chapter, 
the conclusion (6.8) outlines the value and nature of a complementary empirical study 
of judgements of intentionality, responsibility, and blame in lay readers, which forms 
the basis of the next stage of investigation. 
6.2: Three Kinds of Intentionality 
 
Before beginning, it is important to clarify the meaning of ‘intentionality’ within 
the context of this chapter and its analytical goals.  Between philosophy and literary 
criticism, concepts of intentionality which overlap yet differ from the concerns of this 
chapter are part of long discussed and debated terminology, beginning with an overview 
of the role of intentions in the understanding of minds generally (6.2.1).  In particular, 
this section distinguishes between the assignation of intentions to the author of a text 
(authorial intent, 6.2.2), and the assumption that actors described within a clause 
generally have the capacity to intend (character intentions, 6.2.3).  While the 
significance of authors’ intentions in stylistic analysis has been famously called into 
question (Wimsatt and Beardley, 1946), this chapter argues that understanding the 
minds and intentions of characters in discourse is indicative of the cognitive processes 
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which govern the perception of meaning and reference to character identities across 
discourse more generally. 
6.2.1: The Intentional Stance 
 
 First of all, Dennett (1987) has described the ‘intentional stance’ as a way of 
inferring and predicting behaviours based on observations we make about our own 
mental lives.  Unlike the ‘physical’ and ‘design’ stances, where the observer forms 
hypotheses based on the physicality or function of the actor in question, the intentional 
stance describes the process in which the observer: 
treat[s] the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then 
you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the 
world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on 
the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will 
act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning 
from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in many —but not all —
instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you 
predict the agent will do. (Dennett, 1987: 17) 
 
To perceive an intention is to recognise a common ground between the self and 
the observed actor, attributing to them the same capacity for rationality as could be 
employed to describe the decisions which account for one’s own actions. Tomasello 
(1999a: 15) describes intentionality as ‘understanding others as intentional (or mental) 
agents (like the self)’.  In other words, intentionality describes the presence of purpose 
behind the performance of a given action or agent.  In literary and linguistic fields, 
however, it is necessary to subdivide intentionality into several related but distinct 
categories. 
 
6.2.2: Authorial Intent 
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Most famously in relation to the study of language and literature, ‘authorial 
intent’ describes the process of interpreting a text according to the perceived intentions 
of the author (Wales, 2014: 230).  Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946) established the 
‘intentional fallacy’ as a flaw in criticism which draws upon an understanding of the 
author’s aims in writing a text in order to frame its analysis, as these intentions are 
ultimately unknowable to the reader, leading Roland Barthes to describe the ‘death of 
the author’ (1977) in critical and literary practice.  Instead, the concept of the implied 
author (Booth, 1961) serves as a ‘streamlined version of the author, an actual or 
purported subset of the real author’s capacities, traits, attitudes, beliefs, values, and 
other properties that play an active role in the construction of the particular text’ 
(Phelan, 2005: 45).  In other words, while the implied author is simply a ‘construct 
formed by the reader on the basis of his or her reading of the work’ (Schmid, 2013: 
online), it serves to demonstrate that the process of engaging with a text involves the 
recognition of an author who writes intentionally.  In doing so, the reader constructs an 
impression of these intentions from textual or paratextual evidence which may or may 
not reflect the intentions of the actual author.  Even in autobiographical writings, such 
as the memoirs analysed in this thesis, the identification of authorial intent can only be 
associated with an implied author. 
Although authorial intent is not the focus of this chapter’s engagement with 
intentionality, it demonstrates several of the central themes of cognitive interest in the 
topic.  As Wimsatt and Beardsley note, the text ‘is detached from the author at birth and 
goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or control it’ (470).  This 
sentiment echoes the concept of Common Ground (Ch. 2.3.5), where the discourse 
exists independently of readers’ and authors’ intentions and inferences.  As a result, the 
process of identifying and ascribing intentions to the act of writing is an engagement 
with this text, dislocated from the author, whose private mental life remains unknown.  
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Nevertheless, the propensity for early critics and everyday readers to consider the 
intentional state of the author in the process of reading demonstrates the centrality of 
minds to interpretation, and the ease with which inferences can be made about the 
decision making processes of others, fallacious or otherwise.  Likewise, just as readers 
can assign intent to the actions of an author, communication requires that authors 
recognise their audience, or implied reader, as a volitional agent with the capacity to act 
with intent.  In other words, both speaker and hearer need to recognise the capacity of 
the other to think about and relate to the world in a broadly similar way to themselves, 
in order to communicate meaningfully, but without recourse to rely on this capacity to 
explain the content of the discourse. 
 
6.2.3: Character Intentionality 
 
As well as attributing intentions to the authors of texts, the process of reading 
narratives involving human agents also involves the interpretation of the capacity for 
characters within the narrative to act intentionally.  For Herman (2013a), the ability to 
relate actions in narrative according to overarching intentions of characters is essential 
to understanding narrative, as stories are ‘rooted in an overall cognitive preference to 
read events as actions - that is, to construe events or happenings in a storyworld as goal-
directed actions that unfold in a larger context of prior, conditioning actions and 
reactions’ (237).  Just as implied authors are ascribed intentions in the process of 
writing, so too are the actors in discourse prototypically considered to act in relation to 
their aims and beliefs.  Palmer (2004) refers to ‘intermentality’ to describe the basic 
reaction to language as an artefact constructed by an author with an imagined mind, 
and extends this sort of reasoning about other minds to readers’ reactions to characters 
within a text, as well as the writers who produce them.  Zunshine (2006) takes it further, 
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introducing Theory of Mind as ‘the default way by which we construct and navigate our 
social environment’ as well as construct explanations for the activities of fictional 
characters.  As Stockwell (2009) explains, however, ‘‘Theory of Mind’ is not a ‘theory’ 
about minds but is a descriptive term aimed at accounting for human psychological 
distinctiveness’ (140), and he introduces the term ‘mind-modelling’ for the specific 
process of interacting with minds in a literary setting.  Put simply, communication 
through discourse ‘is crucially dependent on recognizing others like oneself’ (Verhagen, 
2007: 60), and recognising the capacity for intentional actions within discourse is simply 
an extension of this recognition of intentionality within the author/reader.   
Essentially, this understanding of discourse participants as reliant on similar and 
relatable cognitive and perceptual processes underpins the notion of ‘Common Ground’ 
(Werth, 1993; Browse, in press 2018; Ch. 2.4.4) where both speaker and listener must 
agree on various propositions within the discourse in order to communicate.  In the 
process of telling a story, it is often essential to recognise whether or not a significant 
event was performed intentionally or not, in order to accurately respond to the 
proposed tellability (Labov, 2013) of the story.  As with the earlier discussion of 
construal, explicit descriptions of character intentions can be subject to resistant 
reading: the narrator proposes viewing an agent as acting for certain reasons, and the 
reader will choose to accept or reject this evaluation according to their own background 
knowledge and perspective.  Unlike authorial intent, the perception of intentionality in 
relation to actors within discourse relies on the linguistic construal of information 
afforded by the text.  Although, as will be shown throughout this chapter and the next, 
text-external background knowledge also influences these perceptions. 
Stockwell (2002) describes process of modelling the minds of characters and 
other discourse participants as operating on a ‘principle on minimal departure’ (cf. 
Ryan, 1980), where ‘unless the text tells us otherwise, we assume an identity with the 
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actual world’ (96).  Just as we draw upon prototypical schemata to complete our 
understanding of aspects of a discourse world unspecified by the text, such as the basic 
anatomy of a human character or the applicability of the laws of gravity, so too do we 
imagine that the characters we engage with have the capacity to act intentionally, and 
that their actions may be the result of any number of intersecting beliefs, aims, and 
desires.  This view aligns with literature on the developmental psychology behind 
infants’ recognition of intentionality in others (Tomasello, 1999b; Sodian, 2011; Meltzoff 
and Gopnik, 1993), although Prinz (2012) has recently suggested that the understanding 
of agency and intentionality begins with the observation of others, before we are able to 
recognise these qualities within ourselves.  Likewise, Yuyan and Baillargeon (2005) 
demonstrate that infants default to assign goals to both human and nonhuman agents.  
Although psychological research presently offers competing theories regarding the 
origins of the perception of intentions, this does not pose a concern for the 
understanding of the concept as applied in this thesis, as both positions consider 
intentionality to be a cognitive process developed through the development of social 
schemata.    
6.3: Locating Intent in Language 
 
Functionally, the assignation of intentionality to agents in discourse contributes 
to judgements of responsibility for the performance of an action.  At its simplest, 
individual lexical items can alter the perception of intentionality.  Consider the 
following examples: 
 
a) The wind knocked down the tree. 
b) The lumberjack knocked down the tree. 
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Each example involves the same act (a tree is knocked over), and the only difference 
between a) and b) is the semantic connotation of the grammatical subject.  Yet this 
change alone is enough to demonstrate the impact of intentionality: a typical adult 
reader knows that the wind does not have a mental state comparable to their own, and 
are therefore unlikely to draw the conclusion that the wind intentionally knocked down 
the tree. Though its force can be explained with reference to meteorological patterns, 
the wind as an agent cannot reasonably be said to be acting deliberately for any reason.  
By contrast, when a human being – whose job involves the deliberate felling of trees – is 
positioned as the actor as in b), the frame of the event shifts, as the schemata employed 
to understand the agent now includes a Theory of Mind, and therefore the capacity to 
have knocked down the tree for some reason.  This distinction has been essential to the 
study of intentionality in philosophical terms, and is summed up neatly by Anscombe 
(1957), who defines intentional actions as those ‘to which a certain sense of the question 
‘Why?’ is given application’ (9).  However, it is also possible for the lumberjack to act 
unintentionally, with the same outcome: 
 
c) The lumberjack crashed the car, which knocked down the tree. 
 
Here, the verb ‘crashed’ indicates a non-volitional action on behalf of the agent, as the 
agent itself is still capable of volitional action.  However, the information present in the 
verb ‘crashed’ indicates that the act was not intentional.  Hence the importance of the 
definition of intentionality in this chapter as the capacity to act purposefully.  Although 
intentional actors such as the lumberjack may still perform unintended actions, the 
accidental nature of the knocking down of the tree is only evidenced by the additional 
information supplied in the verb ‘crashed’.  Understanding the process described in 
these clauses in terms of volition thus requires weighing semantic information from 
multiple sources in relation to the same concept. 
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 Strickland et al. (2014) also demonstrate that order of mention does not affect 
readers’ perceptions of intentionality where both participants are construed as 
grammatical agents, as in the sentence ‘John and Susan exchanged books’, although 
Hart (2018) has shown that word order does affect the perception of the associated 
concepts of blame and aggression.  Elsewhere, Astington (1999) shows that adverbs can 
assign or deny intentionality (e.g. ‘he did so skilfully/accidentally’), while Halliday (1970) 
demonstrates that prepositional content, as in, ‘the window was broken by a storm’ and 
‘the window was broken with a hammer’ provides the reader with the semantic 
knowledge required to infer with reasonable certainty whether or not the breaking of 
the window was un/intentional.  Beyond specific grammatical markers, Knobe (2003) 
argues that the blameworthiness of an action fundamentally affects intentionality 
judgements: in otherwise equally presented scenarios, participants are more likely to 
assign intentionality to an actor that they perceive to have performed a morally negative 
action, and withhold intentionality from the agent of a morally positive action until 
further information is presented.  Following this, Hindriks (2008) identifies a ‘praise-
blame asymmetry’, in thinking about normative reasons which typically motivate an 
agent ‘blocks praise, but not blame’ (56).  Likewise, Corrigan (2001) shows that 
‘goodness of the thematic role’ – whether or not the object of an action is perceived to 
have something positive happen to them – affect readers’ perceptions of who caused an 
event more than evaluations associated with the verb in question.  In other words, 
readers draw upon background knowledge they associate with the various lexical items 
which compose a clause, in order to assess the intentionality of the described action. 
 Following this view of intentionality as informed by a composite of inputs, 
Guglielmo and Malle (2010) offer an alternative account to the Knobe Effect, with 
particular reference to how judgements of responsibility relate to the morality of the act, 
and an absence of skill, such as comparing a ‘lucky’ shot that kills with a lucky strike of a 
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ball.  They demonstrate that the act of killing with a gun relies on more basic actions, 
such as pulling a trigger, and argue that in these scenarios, judgements of competency 
are as important to the evaluation process as perceptions of intentionality.  Moreover, 
the process of assessing the intentionality of an action relies on the perceiver’s extant 
knowledge of the skill required to perform the act, where an increase in requisite skill 
leads to a decreased likelihood to assess the act as deliberate.  While an actor perceived 
to be skilled could perform a basic action unintentionally, an actor perceived to be 
unskilled could not intentionally perform a complex task.  Likewise, Nakamura (2018) 
asserts that harmful actions are judged as intentional based on the perceived probability 
of positive and negative human behaviours.  While linguistic features provide cues for 
such assessments, readers’ background knowledge provides the reference points against 
which construed activities can be compared, in order to make such probabilistic 
judgements. 
 In this review of the literature, it becomes apparent that intentionality cannot be 
analysed through any one lexicogrammatical feature.  Rather, both word order and 
semantics can be shown to influence readers’ judgements of whether or not a described 
action was performed intentionally.  Moving forward, both this and the following 
chapter work to expand this discussion beyond clause-level examples, situating 
judgements of intention in discourse, as much as in grammar.  As Herman (2013a) has 
put it, ‘narratives scaffold ascriptions of reasons for acting that are central to many 
engagements with the minds of persons’ (74).  In other words, we are no longer strictly 
concerned with ‘breaking down’ actions into their constituent parts, as this will not yield 
a meaningful discussion of the intentions associated with them.  Instead, it becomes 
more meaningful to consider incorporating a discussion of action and intention into the 
context of the narrative in which they appear.  This is the end-goal of this portion of the 
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thesis: to construct a means by which to critically explore linguistic events within their 
narrative context, without losing sight of one or other end of this spectrum. 
 Additionally, this approach is based strongly on a model of cognition which 
views the process of understanding other minds as an exercise in simulation (Tomasello, 
1999b: 66-70).  Recent innovations in cognitive science have begun to consider a model 
which instead favours enaction through a participatory sensemaking process (De Jaeger 
and Di Paolo, 2008).  Moreover, this approach is beginning to receive attention as a 
means of accounting for readers’ engagement with narratives (Popova, 2015).  While this 
work has demonstrated the capacity of enactive cognition to account for sensorimotor 
perceptual processes, the application of enaction to complex, interpersonal frameworks 
of knowledge is presently in its infancy.  Consequently, this chapter remains concerned 
with framing the discussion of intentionality in terms of a cognitive model which takes 
the process of understanding and interacting with other minds to involve mentalistic 
simulations, both of the events described in discourse and the minds, fictional or 
otherwise, which perform them. 
6.4: Intentional Action in Cognitive Grammar 
 
 As has been discussed in previous chapters (2.4; 2.5), Cognitive Grammar 
provides an intricate means of discussing and investigating the conceptual structure of 
language.  Langacker (1987) defines Cognitive Grammar as a model of language in which 
‘grammatical structures do not constitute an autonomous formal system or level of 
representation: they are claimed instead to be inherently symbolic, providing 
structuring and conventional symbolization of conceptual content.’ (1-2).  For the 
purposes of this chapter, the discussion will simply focus on what this means for the 
conceptualisation of events, which CG approaches via the Canonical Event Model (see 
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Fig. 6.2 below), which functions as an archetypal conceptualisation of how events are 
structured.  
6.4.1: Intentional Actors in Canonical Events 
 
As can be seen in the diagram below, the relationships between agents and 
objects they interact with (in CG, the ‘theme’) of given events and actions are clearly 
demarcated in relation to a transfer of force, represented by the large arrow.  In its most 
straightforward iteration of a sentence comprised of an agent, theme, and force viewed 
from a third person perspective (e.g. ‘The boy laughed at the dog’), the model visualises 
the clearly expressed relationship between each component.  In instances where these 
relationships are less explicit, such as a passivized sentence (‘The dog was laughed at’), 
the agent role can be omitted or visualised less prominently, in order to represent the 
fact that the construal gives no attention to the actor in question. 
 
Adapted from Langacker (2008: 356) 
Fig. 6.2: The Canonical Event Model 
While this model of event representation evidently succeeds in conceptualising the 
relationship between participants in terms of the transfer of force and perceived 
causality, it does not distinguish between acts performed purposefully, and those with 
no guiding intentions.  Returning to the sample sentences a), b), and c) above with 
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regards to the Canonical Event Model, each sentence can be modelled almost 
identically: each has an actor and an object, as well as a clear transfer of force from one 
to the other.  However, it would be erroneous to describe all three as conceptually 
identical: in the case of a) and c), it makes no sense to ask why such events occurred, as 
they cannot have been intentional: wind cannot act volitionally, and sneezing is not 
(usually) a deliberate act.  And while b) could describe the same event as c), it is not 
clear whether the act is performed intentionally or not.  Two further examples 
demonstrate the impact intentional/superventional agents have on the interpretation of 
an event: 
d) The fire killed John. 
e) The firing squad killed John. 
Both d) and e) can be modelled as canonical events within the CG model, where 
an agent acts on or towards a theme, and force is transferred or motion enacted 
regardless of the agent’s intentions.  Langacker himself describes the archetypal agent as 
‘a person who volitionally carries out physical activity’ (1991: 210, my emphasis), in which 
case only e) could be properly considered a canonical event.  But Langacker gives no 
account of what conceptual change occurs if this archetype is subverted: in the case of 
d), an agent still acts upon a theme in a way that remains unchanged in the Canonical 
Event Model’s representation of the event, irrespective of whether the agent has the 
capacity to act intentionally.  In other words, the identification of the grammatical agent 
of an event as being able to act for some purpose influences the reader’s interpretation 
of the event, but in a way not made explicit in the Canonical Event Model. 
Although intentionality itself is not associated with a single grammatical feature, 
there are demonstrable instances in which isolated grammatical variations appear to 
influence readers’ perceptions of agentive intentionality.    As Langacker has put it, ‘it is 
ultimately as pointless to analyse grammatical units without reference to their semantic 
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value as to write a dictionary which omits the meanings of its lexical items’ (1991: 1).  As 
such, while this chapter acknowledges that grammatical structure is not the exclusive 
means by which intentionality can be construed or inferred, modelling the relationship 
between the two will enrich the scope of Cognitive Grammar’s capacity for textual 
commentary.  In the process of developing such a model, this chapter demonstrates the 
broader relationship between grammar, semantics, and narrative form as it relates to the 
understanding of intentionality. 
 As van Leeuwen (1997) observes of social agency, not all aspects of 
understanding evoked in relation to a given word or phrase can be located at a specific 
point in the text itself, and Cognitive Grammar is well equipped to account for the role 
of background knowledge and previous language use in the act of interpretation.  
Langacker (2008) describes the totality of external knowledge that readers bring to the 
text as the ‘conceptual substrate’.  ‘Substrate’ is a term borrowed metaphorically from 
chemistry to refer to the base substance on which organisms live and grow, and the 
conceptual substrate refers to everything the reader understands from their previous 
interactions with language and the world around them (marked in Fig. 6.3 under 
‘Previous Usage Event’), and which comes to bear on their understanding of the 
utterances at hand.  Through continued interaction and usage, meaning is altered or 
stabilised in association with particular linguistic and grammatical features.  In the case 
of intentionality, the repeated use of particular words or phrases across discourse leads 
to an association with a level of capacity for intentional action. 
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Adapted from Langacker (2008: 466) 
Fig. 6.3: The Conceptual Substrate 
The diagram above outlines the conceptual substrate in relation to discourse, 
and demonstrates how the speaker, ‘S’, and hearer, ‘H’, both draw on related usage 
events in order to form comparable understandings of the events S is describing.  
Without comparable knowledge of the objective content, communication is 
meaningless.  Although Langacker’s model indicates that speakers and hearers employ 
the same frames of reference in conceptualising the content of the discourse, Browse (in 
press, 2018) has questioned the directness of this connection, arguing instead that 
discourse participants communicate in relation an ‘idealised common ground’ of the 
knowledge and beliefs of other participants, with which the actual common ground may 
have varying degrees of overlap. 
In order to demonstrate the relationship between intentions and the description 
of actions more directly, the diagram below (Fig. 6.4), represents a clause from Stainton 
(n.d), which appears as part of a passage in which the narrator describes killing an 
enemy sniper.  The area consisting of solid lines represents the clause which appears in 
the source text (‘I squeezed the trigger’), modelled as a Canonical Event Model, while 
189 
 
the dotted boxes represent hypothesised intentions for the initial action.  As ‘I’ 
represents a first-person adult human narrator, they can reasonably be considered an 
actor with the capacity to intend.  Taken in isolation, it may not be clear in many cases 
what the intention behind an act might be, as there may be any number of reasons the 
described act is performed (kicking a ball, picking up a glass).  In these cases, while the 
exact intentions which cause the agent to perform the act remain unknown or 
uncertain, the capacity for the agent to act volitionally is in accordance with Langacker’s 
definition of an actor (1991: 236) and actor-like qualities (2008: 392).  This tendancy to 
ascribe intentionality where none are made explicit is part of everyday perceptual 
processes, and the intentionality bias (Rosset, 2008; Strickland et al., 2014) indicates that 
in speeded conditions, adult readers will assign an intentional cause to ambiguous 
actions, even if the kind of action in question (e.g. hitting someone with a car) is 
typically performed unintentionally.  Hence, as will be discussed in later examples (6.5), 
modelling the potential for intentionality action does not always require the 
identification of a specific intention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.4: Planes of intention in relation to a canonical event 
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In the case of ‘squeezing the trigger’, knowledge of the scripts associated with 
the act identify it as a granular aspect of the process of firing a gun.  Hence, the dashed 
box and arrow extending from the initial construal in Fig. 6.4 represent the fact that 
both the identification of the narrator as a human agent and the act of squeezing 
probabilistically construe an intention, while the patient ‘trigger’ gives the context for an 
event model associated with intending to fire a gun.  The initial intention of squeezing 
the trigger in order to fire the gun is positioned within the immediate scope of 
construal, as understanding the relationship between the action and this intention is 
important to the immediate interpretation of the text.  The intention associated with 
the act described in the source text has been given the label ‘plane of intention’ to show 
that while this particular relationship is not construed explicitly, its structure represents 
how a perceived goal associated with the initial action might itself be construed.  Given 
that this is a direct and instantaneous consequence of pulling the trigger, no other 
alternative intentions at this level are offered.  Beyond the immediate scope, however, is 
the further question of why the narrator intended to fire the gun at all.   
As van Dijk (1975) puts it, actions take place ‘under the “scope” of a global 
intention and purpose controlling the local intentions and purposes’ (281), meaning that 
intentions and goals themselves can be construed as part of an ongoing, larger network 
of intentions which may account for a series of actions.  Similarly, Plaks and Robinson 
(2015) distinguish between ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ intentions, referring to the proximity of 
the goal to the granularity of the event performed.  Moving further ‘up’ a series of 
intentions in a vertical relationship indicates a more distal and abstract intent, which 
may persist over a greater deal of time or number of activities.  These can in turn be 
extended further: the narrator may intend to kill the enemy sniper, for instance, in order 
to win the battle, in order to win the war, in order to return home.  As the intentions 
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related to an action become further abstracted along this vertical plane, they refer to 
longer-term goals, and may serve as a unifying intention to explain a series of actions 
across a narrative.  Equally, however, they become harder to verify as reasonable 
representations of the intentions associated with the initial action without further 
supporting evidence, in the form of either additional actions which support the 
interpretation, or an explicit statement of intent within the discourse. 
In contrast to the vertical relationship between intentions of greater or lesser 
abstraction, possible explanations for an action may have a ‘horizontal relationship’, as 
represented by the dual suggestions that the narrator of the initial clause intends to fire 
his gun to either kill or warn the enemy sniper.  Horizontally related intentions can be 
supported or challenged independently of one another, and in some cases co-occur: the 
narrator may wish to simultaneously warn the enemy sniper to leave the location and 
alert his allies to his location, for instance.  Without broader context to support one 
intention over another, or prior knowledge on behalf of the reader to produce a script of 
expected activity, any number of horizontally related intentions could be considered a 
plausible explanation for an agent’s actions.  Furthermore, just as the structure of events 
around Langacker’s Canonical Event Model can deviate from the straightforward 
transfer of energy from one participant to another, it is also possible for the conceptual 
structure of intentions to deviate from the archetypal form.  As well as prototypical 
transfers of force from agent to goal, intentions may equally be movements to or from a 
location, internal changes of state, or any other possible variation within the event 
category.  Unlike an action chain (cf. Ch. 2.3.1; 5.4), there is no direct causative 
connection between an action and the intentions which drive it, as intentions may be 
unrealised or fail to come about, or be the kinds of abstract goals that do not have a 
force-related representation. 
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Although there are an infinite number of possible reasons for performing any 
given action, making sense of an action does not require considering the reasons for its 
performance from all angles.  Indeed, as Anscombe observes, to suggest that each action 
we perform and observe is actively considered in terms of each constituent reason for 
the act would be ‘quite absurd’ (1957: 80).  The majority of possible explanations for 
action are often instead eliminated quickly with reference to the context in which the 
act takes place, ‘thus usefully constraining our interpretative domain and enabling us to 
start considering endlessly nuanced choices within that domain’ (Zunshine, 2006: 14, 
emphasis original).  Similarly to the principle of minimal departure (Ryan, 1985), 
schematised knowledge may lead the reader to a ‘path of least resistance’ in interpreting 
action: an intention or cause most readily inferred from broader knowledge of its 
context.  This interpretation of an actor’s intentions may later be revealed to be false, 
but these cognitive shortcuts allow the reader to form explanatory models of activity 
which remain open to revision in the course of reading.  In the context of literary texts, 
moreover, Stockwell (2002: 95) has argued that ambiguity in literature provides grounds 
for readers to map their own feelings and experiences to the events and characters 
described.  The ability to interpret the actions of literary characters without the 
prescription of a single, definitive intention behind the act allows for much literary 
discussion, both academically and informally.  In both cases, readers are shown not only 
to have the capacity to extend their understanding of a text beyond the features 
presented to them explicitly in its language, but that doing so is part of the everyday 
process of engaging with literature, and narratives more generally. 
That readers’ knowledge of the intentions which govern action can develop 
according to the information present demonstrates the versatility of an analysis of 
intentionality: actions across a text can be grouped thematically through their 
association with a given order of intention.  Much like the role of granularity (2.3.2) in 
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describing the level at which construal attends to events, a reader can shift the 
specificity of the intentions they are interested in, in order to talk intelligibly about a 
character in the context of a densely described single narrative instance, as well as their 
development over the course of an entire narrative.  In Chapter 5, for instance, the 
analysis of Predator and Hunter Killer necessarily moved from understanding how the 
drone pilots’ actions were construed within specific narrative instances to their 
relationship with the broader context in which the identity of the drone pilot was 
constructed throughout the book.  In much the same way, profiling the expression or 
inference of agents’ intentions can serve as the foundation for a unified understanding 
of their character across a series of events and scenarios.   As this chapter goes on to 
argue below (6.7), the narrative organisation of descriptions of actions may significantly 
influence the reader’s understand of the reasons for actions.  For now, it is enough to 
consider the variation in intentionality across comparable sentence-level examples, in 
order to produce a strong theoretical groundwork for the later expansion to narrative. 
6.4.2: Intentions across Clauses 
 
The previous example was designed to model intentional processes associated 
with an event in relative isolation.  Of course, the process of engaging with discourse is 
not merely the sequential process of interpreting one sentence at a time.  As the 
following example demonstrates, as more information is revealed to the reader in the 
course of reading, possible interpretations of character intentions narrow down, and 
patterns of activity can be recognised.  In describing his experiences during the First 
World War, for instance, A.C. Warsop (1965) writes, similarly to Stainton, that: 
f) [I] very carefully squeezed the trigger (15) 
First of all, the adjective phrase ‘very carefully’ connotes an intentional action.  Although 
it could be the case that Warsop misses his shot or wounds the wrong person, thereby 
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producing unintended consequences, the act of squeezing the trigger itself is intentional.  
Taken in isolation there is is no additional information to suggest that any one reason 
for acting would be the correct one.  Despite the absence of a specific intention, the 
first-person narrator is reconisable as an autonomous agent capable of acting for some 
purpose.  Thus, even though the reader cannot know precisely why the narrator acts 
from the information provided in this sentence alone, it remains possible – even 
prototypical – to consider the agent as performing goal-directed activity. 
Once the analysis moves beyond the clause, however, it becomes clear that the 
broader discourse provides context which affects the scope of probable intentions.  
Warsop describes how ‘I thought I saw two men behind some bushes twenty five yards 
in front.  By now I was thoroughly frightened but I did draw my rifle, check my sights to 
twenty five yards’ (ibid), before carefully pulling the trigger.  Taken as part of a script of 
activity, these actions support an interpretation of Warsop’s actions as granular 
components of a larger goal of hitting the enemy soldiers with his rifle.  An 
interpretation of his intentions which suggests that he squeezes the trigger in order to 
hit these men is also supported by the prepositional phrase which immediately follows 
clause f), where Warsop describes how he squeezed the trigger ‘at the first one then the 
other indistinct figures’.  In other words, narrative context and grammatical structure 
limit the reasonable interpretation of the narrator’s intentions: while we cannot say for 
sure why Warsop fired at the figures (to kill, to wound, to warn), there is a direct causal 
connection between them which Warsop describes as deliberate, via an act assumed 
prototypically to have been performed for some reason. 
 Of course, this example appears in a larger narrative context, in which specific 
goals behind the performance of the action may be deduced.  In some narratives, it may 
even be the case that the intentions which govern an action are stated explicitly.  For 
instance, Heavens (1916) describes how ‘the first line of our infantry jumped in [to the 
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trench] with the intention of capturing it, retiring and leaving it empty’.  Even though the 
narrator provides the reader with a direct presentation of goals relating to the initial 
action of jumping into the trench, a resistant reader may be inclined to infer further 
intentions vertically related to those construed by Heavens, and otherwise rendered 
absent, such as an intention to harm enemy soliders in the process of ‘leaving [the 
trench] empty’.  As with the discussion of resistant reading in relation to shared 
knowledge and construal (2.3.5), it is possible for a reader to reject a narrator’s 
explanation of character intentions, instead substituting their own preferred account 
according to their own knowledge or ideology, whether providing an alternative 
intention behind the act, or rejecting its intentionality altogether.  Mentions of intent 
within discourse thus serve to profile (Langacker, 2008: 68) a particular perspective on a 
character’s goals and motivations. 
 Although narrators rarely state the intentions behind actions explicitly as 
Heavens does, their evaluative comments provide evidence of their reasoning.  In the 
case of Warsop, before describing firing his gun, he describes how he believed ‘there was 
only one thing to do – if we stayed in our trench, we should have been shot from above 
like rats in a trap’ (1965: 15).  Even here, Warsop evades a direct representation of an act 
of violence in which he is positioned as the source of a transfer of energy to the enemy 
soldier.  By employing disnarration (4.3.2), he is able to establish a propositional logic 
which the reader can follow to infer the ‘one thing to do’ without stating it explicitly, 
whilst simultaneously reminding the reader of the risk of harm to himself should he 
choose not to act.  A reasonable series of vertically related intentions to be inferred from 
this passage, then, could be that Warsop squeezes the trigger in order to fire his gun, in 
order to disable the enemy sniper, in order not to be harmed.  This kind of intention 
exists in a vertical relationship with the more immediate goal of squeezing the trigger to 
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hit the men, which is construed here as an activity which allows Warsop to not be 
harmed. 
 Additionally, the negative shading (Simpson, 2003) which precedes the act of 
firing the gun (‘I thought I saw two men…’) both foregrounds Warsop’s intention to fire 
at two individuals, while simultaneously casting a degree of doubt on their presence.  
Likewise, although Warsop suggests that the events which took place require accepting 
that his assessment of events is accurate, in order to explain their outcome (‘how I 
escaped I shall never know unless I got them first’ (16, my emphasis), he continually 
foregrounds his perceptual processes, providing the opportunity to reconstrue the scene 
in a way which avoids positioning Warsop as a violent actor altogether.  Again, it may 
not be the case that the reader of the narrative in which this sentence appears 
acknowledges all of these inferred intentions as the reason for squeezing the trigger.  
The text itself may foreground a particular intention, while the reader may draw upon 
cultural knowledge to parse probable scripts of activity and associated goals.  The role of 
intentionality set out here is a network of possible explanations readers might infer in 
accounting for action, and making sense of the decisions and actions made by 
characters during the course of a narrative.  Abbott (2015) describes narrative as the 
‘perceptible tracks on the surface of a universe of possibility’ (104), meaning much of the 
knowledge we infer about the world of a text is not explicitly stated.  Instead, readers 
employ probabilistic knowledge to fill these gaps.  In the majority of cases, the direct 
intentions behind a character’s actions are not marked explicitly within the text.  
Recognising that characters have the capacity to act intentionally, and using this 
knowledge to begin theorising as to what those intentions may be, means that readers 
employ the kinds of Theory of Mind processing which takes place throughout reading to 
conceptualise the goals, beliefs, and motivations which might precede the performance 
of a given act. 
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6.4.3: Intentionality as Gradation 
 
Although the discussion so far has been primarily concerned with identifying the 
capacity for intentional action and its significance in interpretation, it is clear that our 
conceptualisation of agents with the potential to act volitionally does not preclude the 
same agents from performing unintentional acts.  In the lumberjack example (6.3), this 
information was carried by the verb ‘crashed’, which connotes a loss of control.  This 
example alone implies a binary transition from intentional to unintentional activity.  
However, not all agents are equally likely to elicit an assessment of their actions as 
intentional in otherwise identical clauses.  For instance, consider the following 
examples: 
g) The soldier killed the man. 
h) The child killed the man. 
Here, both agents have the capacity to act volitionally, as per the Canonical Event 
Model.  Though we attribute the potential for intention to the agents of both sentences, 
it seems incorrect to ascribe equal potential to both, assuming that the reader knows 
that soldiers are likely to be conscious of actions that lead to the death of another, but a 
child (though capable of acting volitionally) might be more likely presumed to have 
caused an unintentional death.  So, simply because an agent can be associated with 
intentional actions does not necessarily mean that they are always acting intentionally, 
or that one interpretation is always favoured over another without context. 
 Judgements of intentionality are thus the product of socio-cognitive factors 
affected by prior knowledge individual readers bring to the text. However, these 
judgements are also dynamic, capable of being revised in an ongoing assessment of 
actors and actions as the discourse continues.  Just as in the discussion of ‘world repair’ 
(Gavins, 2007) in the previous chapter (5.5), when the reader of Predator was deceived 
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into believing that a training exercise was an authentic experience of combat, so the 
presence of intentions can cause a reader to revisit their understanding of an event, or 
indeed an entire text.  The following examples introduce an extract of a memoir (Hill, 
1915) gradually, examining how the introduction of new information requires the 
reassessment of probable goals and intentions. Hill (1915) describes how, after a battle, 
German soldiers ‘ran towards us with their hands above their heads crying, ‘Mercy, 
Kamarad’’.  Following this, he narrates how: 
i) We gave them mercy 
In isolation, this clause appears to refer to an act of kindness from a first person plural 
group of actors to an unknown number of individuals.  While the act of giving mercy 
can have semantic associations with killing, this is rarely its primary meaning in 
isolation from a broader context.  However, a construal of the account which 
contextualises the intentions behind Hill’s actions will narrow the reader’s perception: 
j) We gave them mercy, the same mercy they would have given us. 
Here, Hill employs the modal verb ‘would’ to elicit the construal of a disnarrated 
reciprocal action by the enemy soldiers.  As with earlier examples of similar narrative 
acts (4.3.2; 5.1; 6.4.2), Hill’s disnarration construes his actions in relation to other, 
anticipated actions.  Accordingly, while the act of ‘giving mercy’ is as yet undefined, 
Hill’s volitional decision to act in this way is presented to the reader as a pre-emptive 
response to other possible agents, and the possible reasons for acting are now 
foregrounded.  As a result, by the point at which Hill makes explicit the metaphorical 
nature of his construal of his own actions thus far, the reader has already been presented 
with his reasoning for intentionally performing an act of violence: 
k) We gave them mercy, the same mercy they would have given 
us.  It sounds impossible to shoot a man in cold blood but in 
an affair like this, morality seems changed.   
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With these additional clauses, the meaning of the previous sentence is finally made 
explicit: ‘mercy’ is no longer a straightforward description of the acts which took place, 
but a sarcastic reconstrual of events.  Hill’s metaphor of killing as mercy delays the 
perception of his actions as violence.  Such foregrounding of the rationalisation behind 
his action affords Hill the opportunity to remark that the killing was ‘in cold blood’, a 
detail which, if presented earlier, may affect the reader’s perception of the justification 
for killing. Likewise, the potential surprise in revealing the specific details of his actions 
supports his observation that ‘morality seems changed’.  In this short passage, Hill’s 
stylistic choices serve to prime readers with a perceived justification for an act he 
acknowledges as morally ambiguous, perhaps leading to a less critical interpretation 
than alternative construals in which the killing ‘in cold blood’ is presented first, to be 
justified after the initial description.  
 In paying close attention to the attribution of intention, this research can begin 
to make sense of a novel dimension of a text’s stylistic function.  From a critical 
perspective, this emphasises the power of the author over the reader’s response to a 
given series of events.  Although earlier chapters have discussed the extent to which 
readers can resist the construal presented to them by a text in terms of causality (2.4.3; 
3.4), the fact remains that the text delineates the possibilities and probabilities of 
explanation.  By foregrounding or backgrounding contextual information, the narrator 
draws attention toward particular inferences.  In cases where the reader has no personal 
experience of the events described, or any further evidence from which to infer the 
causes of the events or the intentions of the actors described, the possibility of an 
effective reconstrual of events is diminished.  Given that examples i) through k) have no 
further context, the aim of this reading cannot be to uncover any ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ 
intention behind a given action.  As the reader has no access to additional evidence to 
support the validity of either construal, each claim remains equally valid.  Instead, it 
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serves to demonstrate how the linguistic frame provided by an event’s description 
affects not only the construal of a single event, but potentially their schematic 
understanding of the narrator more generally.   Modelling the relationship between 
event structure, cognition, and our understanding of intentional activity allows the 
critical interpretation to comment on the ways in which readers are compelled to make 
sense of actions and characters within the narrative. 
6.5: From Causation to Responsibility, through Intention 
 
 The reader response study from Chapter 3 demonstrates that readers are able to 
infer a closer causal relationship between event participants that is explicitly relayed in 
the source text.  This section returns to the passage analysed in that study, in order to 
provide an explanation for this phenomenon in terms of the perception of intentionality 
to demonstrate the relationship between intentions (or rather, our capacity and 
tendency to perceive and assign them), and the perceptual process of identifying causal 
relationships within narrative acts.  Referring back to the review of existing literature in 
the critical study of military memoir from a linguistic perspective (3.2), scholars 
commenting on the language of these texts have typically associated a lack of direct 
linguistic agency within a given text with an absence of practical agency – a dissociation 
between the actor and the act. Hart (2013) has demonstrated that Cognitive Grammar’s 
focus on the force within events is adept at accounting for the representation of agency 
in newspaper discourse on acts of violence.  This discussion of intentionality, however, 
aims to examine more closely how the perception of agency itself is arrived at. Hence, 
this section returns to two texts discussed earlier (Ch. 3.2), and which were initially 
analysed in terms of the inference of a causal relationship between the narrators and 
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actions from which they are distanced.  The opportunity to return to these clauses 
serves to demonstrate the alternative focus of intentionality in moving beyond causality.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.5: ‘I fired carefully.  The figure fell.’ (Turner, n.d: 49) 
 
 According to Langacker, an agentive process without a theme is ‘conceptually 
incoherent’ (2008: 371).  As was explained earlier (2.3.2), actions such as these can be 
accounted for in terms of an unrealised theme made explicit through context.  In this 
case, interpreting the act of ‘firing’ relies on the reader’s implicit understanding that an 
instrument – the narrator’s rifle – must be fired.  Even so, the acts of firing the rifle and 
the figure falling down have no explicit causal connection within the discourse.  
However, it seems illogical to think of the two events as disconnected from one another: 
given their proximity, an intuitive reading might conclude that the act of firing carefully 
causes the figure to fall, in line with conceptual knowledge regarding what it means to 
fire a rifle.  The dotted arrow and outline at the top of Fig. 6.5 represents the fact that 
first person singular ‘I’ connotes an agent that the reader can reasonably be expected to 
identify as being able to act intentionally.  This observation is supported by the presence 
of the adjective ‘carefully’, which explicitly denotes an intentional action.  While it is 
possible that the narrator fired his gun for any number of possible reasons (as per 6.4.1), 
the proximity of the action to the description of the figure falling is taken here as 
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indicative of a causal relation between the two.  As a result, the reading offered in Fig. 
6.5 represents an interpretation of this construal in which the narrator is perceived as 
acting in order to cause the falling of the figure, despite the segmentation of these two 
processes within the text.  In identifying actors as operating intentionally, readers are 
able to infer causal relationships between events in discourse which are not made 
explicit.  The example below examines a similar fragmentation of causality, showing 
how the relationship between the initial actor and final patient of an action chain can be 
reconstrued into a single intention, even when the two participants are separated by a 
greater distance within the text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.6: ‘I moved the finger on my right hand.  Bullets left the end of my machine gun.  They hit 
the figure in grey.’ (Lukowiak, qtd. in Robinson (2011: 583) 
 
 Fig. 6.6 returns to Lukowiak’s construal of an act of killing (3.2), which Robinson 
(2011) describes as being ‘without any consciousness of his own agency’ (583).  
Robinson’s description is puzzling, as in order to describe the scene at all, Lukowiak has 
drawn a causal connection between himself and the other soldier.  Nonetheless, it is also 
possible to see how the impression of Lukowiak’s agency in relation to the act of killing 
is reduced through his construal of events through the extension of the action chain.  As 
203 
 
the diagram shows, the actor with the capacity to act intentionally (‘I’, Lukowiak), is 
placed at a distance from the final act of violence (‘They [bullets] hit the figure’) through 
an extended action chain.  The intermediary grammatical agent ‘bullets’ lacks 
knowledge from the conceptual substrate that affords intentionality, but ‘I’ can be 
archetypally modelled as a human agent with the capacity to act volitionally.  Hence, 
although no specific intention is given in the text itself, the dashed box in this diagram 
represents a prototypical model of an intention, based upon the knowledge afforded by 
the causal process of the action chain.  By placing ‘I’ at the head of this action chain, it 
remains possible to demonstrate a relationship between the agentive head and the final 
theme, given that the head of the chain causes the process which results in the final 
transfer of force. 
 Moreover, the narrative context in which this extract appears provides further 
indication that Lukowiak acts deliberately in attacking the figure, as he writes: 
‘crouched in the trench was a figure in grey.  I saw him.  He saw me.  He held a rifle’ 
(ibid). In the relation of these perceptual processes and existential descriptors, the 
figure’s threatening status is foregrounded in advance of Lukowiak’s action, justifying 
the violent response as reasonable self-defence, as per passages of disnarration which 
hypothesises the potential harm to the narrator of inaction (4.3.2).  If the head of the 
chain can be thought of as acting intentionally, then, it can be thought of as doing so in 
order to achieve some goal relating to the energy sink within the action chain.  Hence, 
in the plane of intention outlined in Fig. 6.6, ‘I’ is suggested to be acting intentionally 
towards ‘the figure in grey’. 
 That said, Lukowiak’s lexical choices also mark a possible reduction in the 
perception of intentional action.  By framing the action performed by the narrator as 
‘moved’, Lukowiak introduces the possibility of interpreting his action as superventional 
motion.  As per Guglielmo and Malle (2010), even if the context makes such a reading 
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seem improbable, the construal of Lukowiak’s action as an unskilled movement of his 
own body draws attention to the possibility of a non-agentive interpretation.  Likewise, 
the verbs used to describe the later sections of the action chain, ‘left’ and ‘hit’, describe 
equally simple motions.  Accordingly, while Robinson’s claim that the passage shows no 
consciousness of Lukowiak’s agency must contend with the presence of the first person 
pronoun which begins the action chain, a reading which focuses on the intentionality of 
the sequence can also recognise the rhetorical distance placed between Lukowiak and 
the act of injuring – even acknowledging his physical role in the causal chain – while 
maintaining a critical discussion of the displacement of responsibility in the author’s 
broad and ambiguous semantic evocations. 
 Intentionality places emphasis on the reader’s ability to identify actors’ capacity 
to act volitionally as central to their interpretations of these descriptions of violence.  
What the reader is presented with in these extracts are action chains with an agent who 
has the capacity to act volitionally at their head.  Hence, no matter how minimally any 
notion of agency or responsibility is expressed, its potential remains as an interpretative 
function within the text.  While the precise intentions of the actors are not made 
explicit, probabilistic inference suggests that both narrators act for some reason, which 
may be inferred from context on a case-by-case basis.  In both the examples examined 
above, the agents at the head of the actions chains retain the potential to act 
intentionally, which allows the reader to recover a causal relationship between the 
initial agent and the final state of violence.  In this case, to describe such passages as 
entirely lacking in agency is an oversimplification, where agency can more accurately be 
described as reduced, or minimalised, terms which recognise the recoverability of an 
association between the initial agent and the final act framed by the possibility for 
intentional action.  Moreover, the analysis remains limited in its use by virtue of being 
confined to only a few short clauses.  The remainder of this chapter will discuss how a 
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cognitively-oriented critical analysis not only requires narrative context, but that 
profiling intentionality can be used as the avenue by which detailed clausal analysis is 
organised into a manageable way of uniting close reading and overarching narrative 
themes.  
6.6: Situating Intentionality within Discourse 
  
According to Langacker, ‘grammar is shaped by discourse’ (2008: 457), and the 
final chapters of Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction endeavour to demonstrate 
this relationship.  More recently, however, Langacker himself  has acknowledged that 
‘there are limits to what CG can offer literature’ (2014: xiv) at present, as Cognitive 
Grammar’s methods necessarily require extensive close-reading and elaborate diagrams, 
as Figs. 5 and 6 demonstrate (cf. also Ch. 4.3.1).  His previous comments on the 
relationship between the different ‘levels’ of analysis provide an indication as to why 
connecting sentence and narrative-level analyses might be seen as a challenge for 
Cognitive Grammar: 
Structures at a given [linguistic] level have to be characterised in relation to 
constitutive elements of the proper sort.  There is no point describing a 
chapter directly in terms of phrases, or a complex sentence in terms of words.  
It is not just that skipping levels yields an incomplete description – it actually 
makes the descriptive task far more difficult.  (Langacker, 2008: 480, my 
emphasis) 
 
Langacker is keen to establish that grammar is affected and influenced by the discursive 
context in which a given utterance is situated (cf. 2008: 457) but the analytical processes 
often demonstrated through Cognitive Grammar require such a fine-grained approach 
that larger units of narrative are often unwieldy.  Moreover, while he suggests that the 
transition to discursive analysis should employ the ‘proper sort’ of ‘levels’ of attention, it 
is not made clear exactly what these levels are.  ‘Skipping’ directly from a discussion of 
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individual events to large-scale narrative, as we have seen, cannot account for much of 
the nuance of identity development.  Historian Louis Mink has observed a similar 
disparity, arguing that: 
there is something incompatible about our concept of “event” and our 
concept of “narrative”, which might be put as follows: the concept of event is 
primarily linked to the conceptual structure of science… but in this 
conceptual structure it is purged of all narrative connections, and refers to 
something that can be identified and described without any necessary 
reference to its location in some process of development – a process which 
only narrative can represent.  Therefore, to speak of a “narrative of events” is 
almost a contradiction in terms. 
(Mink, 1978: 146-147) 
Mink’s observation is based upon the belief that an analysis of events can be 
meaningfully isolated from their ‘narrative connections’.  As has been shown repeatedly 
both throughout this chapter and the thesis more broadly, however, efforts to model the 
cognitive connections which govern the perceptions of causality and intentionality 
associated with a given action or event eventually require the consideration of the clause 
within a broader spectrum of activity. 
This thinking can be applied to the problem at hand, as the analysis of ‘events’ is 
comparable to the analysis of individual clauses and sentences in language.  The CG 
approach to isolated sentences (including the examples used in this chapter) is adept at 
investigating and explaining clausal structures, but the development of a narrative 
analysis from this lacks an essential understanding of exactly what it is that binds these 
sentences together to form a narrative.  As constitutive elements of linguistic structure, 
narratives and sentences are simply too far from one another in terms of scope to be 
linked directly.  However, the need to contextualise the perception of intentionality 
beyond the clausal level is highly intuitive.  Van Dijk (1975) examines the role of action 
in structuring narrative, and suggests that in categorising whether or not events are 
performed intentionally, ‘the notion of an “action sentence” is not strictly decidable 
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without the specification of the context of the whole action discourse.  In action 
discourses we may be able to interpret or infer that a given action was intentional’ (282, 
emphasis original).  As the examples above have suggested (6.3), considering the 
intentionality of individual acts in isolation does not reflect the process by which 
readers come to develop knowledge of the actors within the discourse.  
In Cognitive Grammar, the notion of ‘reference points’ (Langacker, 2008: 83-88; 
Harrison, 2017: 20-22; 49-69) provide an account of how individual events within 
narrative can be conceptualised in relation to ongoing observations across a text.  
Essentially, as the discourse develops, salient information is construed which allows the 
reader to conceptualise target actions and objects in relation to these established 
concepts.  For example, prepositional phrases such as ‘over there’, ‘towards the path’, 
and ‘behind the shelf’ guide the reader’s attention, and can be built upon with further 
reference points to provide a more salient and granular construal of an object’s position 
in relation to these reference points.   Given that references connect construals and 
propositions from across discourse, van Vliet (2009) has proposed that the Reference 
Point Model can be employed to trace the information associated with actors across a 
text, including background information about characters’ lives and beliefs (455-456). 
While reference points are typically discussed in terms of explicit construals 
within the text, the model of intentionality advanced in this chapter can be used to 
argue that readers’ inferences also produce reference points, against which the 
perception of characters develops across discourse.  Making intentionality the focus of a 
sustained analysis gives grounds for connecting clausal analysis with narrative structure 
without requiring the extensive modelling of each clause within the discourse.  Instead, 
the process requires a thematic selection, based on the kind of agent(s) being 
investigated.  Returning to the Warsop (1965) extract above (6.4.2), it is possible to map 
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each of the actions the narrator performs leading up to and including the firing of his 
rifle (shown in bold) according to an intention (italicised): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.7: Connecting intentions hierarchically across discourse 
 
 Mapped in this way, Fig. 6.7 shows that prior to the act of killing, Warsop’s 
immediate actions and concerns were with risks to his life and his friends.  Following 
the disnarrated clause (cf. 6.4.2) in which he describes the danger of not acting, the 
highly granular description of the acts which constitute the firing of his gun are 
subsumed within an overall concern with personal safety, justifying the act of killing as 
part of an ongoing process of self-defence.  In other words, the descriptions of these 
earlier activities produce intentions which function as reference points when evaluating 
the decision-making associated with the act of killing.  Moreover, this extract simply 
represents the intentions and associated actions of the narrator over the span of a short 
paragraph, and it remains possible to continue to extend the network of intentions 
associated with the actions and construals of Warsop’s narrative across broader sections 
of the text.  Shortly after this scene, for instance, he describes how ‘there was a flash in 
the sky.  I realised with a shock I had been badly hit.  My right arm jumped up on its 
own and flopped down.  It felt as though my left arm and part of my chest had been 
blown away’ (16), before passing out and waking in hospital several days later.  Although 
Ensure own safety 
Leaves trench Kill soldier 
Fire gun 
Squeezes trigger Takes aim 
Warns friends 
Draws rifle 
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Warsop is primarily divorced from the agentive role throughout this passage, and does 
not perform any intentional actions, there is a clear thematic relationship with his 
earlier foregrounded overarching goal of ensuring his own safety, which serves as the 
overarching explicit intention behind each of his earlier actions. 
 The point is, as Pincombe (2014) has observed, drawing upon all aspects of a 
Cognitive Grammar analysis in approaching units of discourse beyond several clauses 
quickly becomes unweildy.  Moreover, examining event structure exclusively at the 
micro level of individual clauses risks treating events as ‘prefabricated building blocks’, 
while the discussion of narrative structure across Chapter 4 has argued instead that 
events are ‘custom fit’ in their construal to suit macro-level narrative goals (Herman, 
2002: 73).  Connecting individual events with the possible intentions which relate them, 
however, provides a means to discuss detailed features of discourse in relation to these 
overarching character and discourse goals.  In turn, these agents can be tracked across 
the narrative, as their actions work towards achieving – or perhaps wrestle with 
competing –goals, beliefs, desires, and motivations, inferred by the reader from the 
narrative context. 
6.7: Intentionality and the Act of Killing 
 
 Given that agents have the potential to be motivated by a number of intentions 
across a narrative, this section aims to expand on the examples which take into account 
narrative context (6.4.2).  In this instance, the intentions associated with the narrator 
shift over the course of the examined discourse.  Taking the perception of this shift into 
account, the analysis presented shows how recognising character intentions at a number 
of levels simultaneously can affect the critical judgement of the events described.  
 On a day filled with greens, blues and gold, suggesting that the whole 
landscape was a joint production by Corot and Constable we were furtively 
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moving from cover to cover to avoid the attentions of snipers and a solitary 
machine-gun.  My young companion, named Milligan, newly recruited, was a 
rosy-faced lad full of fun whom I had to reprove for his lack of caution; we 
crouched together in a warm grassy hollow.  As I lay, the sun caressing the 
nape of my neck, my thoughts strayed to happier days among sweet-smelling 
hay, and I fervently hoped we might be held up for some time. 
 Milligan nudged me; ahead an officer was waving us cautiously 
forward, with a quick dash I made for another point of cover and looked 
back.  Milligan, cheerfully grinning, was scrambling to his feet when a burst 
of fire knocked him backward. 
 I crawled back.  He was dead. 
 In the past, deaths had saddened, sickened, or had merely left me 
unaffected; Milligan’s death roused me to a pitch of fury.  This mere kid, so 
full of life, so happy  – blasted into eternity in the high noon of his existence. 
 The bastards.  The utter bastards!  
 The enemy machine-gunners had been cleverly hidden at the foot of a 
slight bluff.  We had no Lewis gunners that day but rifle fire was making their 
position uncomfortable.  A figure was seen to scramble up and poise 
momentarily unbalanced whilst silhouetted against the sky; rifles cracked, I 
fired carefully – the figure fell.  I felt savagely exultant.  
 Poor little Milligan! 
 When things quietened we moved forward.  I climbed the bluff.  
Spread-eagled and face-down was a young German, younger than Milligan.  
His helmet had rolled off, his scalp was close-cropped, his uniform looked 
absurdly big, his hands clutched grass where he had clawed the earth in his 
last moment of agony, and his childish face was distorted with pain. 
 Poor kid!  And it was such a beautiful day. (48-49) 
 
The clauses from this passage in which the narrator directly describes performing a 
violent act (‘I fired carefully – the figure fell’) were discussed earlier (2.4.1) to 
demonstrate the ways in which construal may segment force, and distance the agent 
from the act of violence in the surface reading.  Now, however, the passage is considered 
in terms of intentionality and context, and how the intentions associated with the act of 
killing are presented across a unit of discourse, rather than within an isolated clause.  
The fact that the act of firing is modified with the adverb ‘carefully’ gives an unequivocal 
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instance of an intentional action: the reader is primed to consider Turner as an 
intentional agent, drawing attention to the fact that the action is performed 
deliberately.  Unlike the earlier example from Warsop (1965), however, in which the act 
of squeezing the trigger was foregrounded as the ‘careful’ act, Turner describes himself 
as carefully firing his gun.  Although the landmark of this action is not construed, the 
reader can infer that Turner fires with an intent to do harm to the enemy combatant. 
 In examining the causative roots of the act of killing, however, the narrative also 
presents a case of ‘emotion as cause’ (Sánchez-García, 2007: 219), in which the reader 
draws upon earlier textual knowledge of emotional frames to infer a causal connection 
between the emotional state and the character’s action.  In the case of this passage, 
Turner’s evaluative statements (‘roused me to a pitch of fury’, ‘the utter bastards’) 
indicate an angered emotional state which is construed as acting upon the narrator, and 
the continued reference to ‘poor Milligan’ provides a frame in which an intention to 
avenge can be readily inferred.  This moves this kind of analysis away from the simple 
observation of events in text, and towards a more holistic analysis of the factors which 
may influence interpretation. 
 With the context of Milligan’s death acting upon the narrator, the reader is 
introduced to new motivations, moving vertically along the plane of intention.  Turner 
intends to harm the enemy soldier, because he has been ‘roused […] to a pitch of fury’.  
As such, Turner’s motivation could be construed as enacting revenge in response to this 
death.  The fact that he immediately returns to reflect on the death of his friend (‘Poor 
little Milligan!’) suggests a direct association between the two. Connecting the transfer 
of force in emotional effect of Milligan’s death to its influence on Turner, and to the 
narrator’s construal that this fury causes Turner to act, then Turner himself is no longer 
the head of the action chain.  Rather, the enemy soldiers set into motion a chain of 
events which cause Turner to wish to harm them.  Turner’s act of violence, then, is 
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construed as a justified retaliation caused by the group the victim was associated with.  
In his evaluative statements, Turner produces explicit language (‘utter bastards’, etc.), 
and notes that he felt ‘savagely exultant’ after firing on the soldier.  Here, causality and 
intentionality are interwoven, as the construal of force in this passage which positions 
the enemy soldiers as the head of the action chain which results in Turner’s act of 
violence affords an intentional construal of the act itself, as part of an ongoing process of 
emotional wounding and justified self-defence. 
 This construal of an individual act of violence within a broader transactive frame 
can be seen in other examples of war writing, such as the earlier discussion of the 
metaphor of interest repayment (Ch. 2.3.4).  More overtly, Sheldon (1987) recalls that ‘it 
is my job as an Englishman and as a member of the good old Sheldon family to return 
the blows of those who create evil’ (24, my emphasis).  Once again, the violence of the 
narrator is construed as retaliatory, as Sheldon construes hypothetical ‘blows’ as the 
source of the transfer of violent force, making the enemy combatants the initial, 
responsible actors.  More to the point, these individual acts are presented in relation to 
these broader reference points: acts of killing in war are not presented in isolation, but 
as part of an ongoing exchange of violent acts, contextualising and justifying the 
narrator’s participation. 
6.8: Conclusions 
 
This chapter has modelled the perception of actors’ intentions in Cognitive 
Grammar’s model of events, and demonstrated how the identification of goal-directed 
activity can be employed to connect actions across an analysis of larger units of 
discourse.  Building upon existing elements of Cognitive Grammar, such as the 
conceptual substrate, it has shown that the differentiation between intentional and 
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superventional actions can be accounted for relatively straightforwardly, and contribute 
to the understanding of meaning in relation to discursive and social input beyond the 
clause in question.  In the study of events in language, intentionality offers a way to 
produce a focused yet manageable transition from sentence-level to discourse-level 
analysis in Cognitive Grammar, in order to fully contextualise the operation and 
perception of intentions within discourse.  This work has gone beyond simply providing 
Cognitive Grammar with an equivalent to SFL’s distinction between intentional and 
superventional actions, instead positing a framework in which goals can both persist 
and develop across a text, as part of a network of probabilistic inferences. 
Identifying characters’ intentions is a process of mapping activity to a network of 
contextual information and pre-existing knowledge which informs readers’ 
constructions of a narrative world and the minds which inhabit and affect it.  In the 
analyses of war writings presented in this chapter, the role of intentionality in a 
cognitive approach extends far beyond the individual clause, working as a network 
which connects individual construals of events to overarching narrative and discursive 
functions.  Further application of this mode of analysis in critical and literary readings 
will help to advance Cognitive Grammar’s position in stylistic analysis beyond the close 
examination of individual clauses.  By developing a network for the thematic association 
of clauses, the analysis of intentions as reference points provides a means by which to 
analyse characters and actions across large units of text. 
 In comparison to the discussion of inference in Chapter 3, the process of 
describing an act or actor as prototypically intentional has so far relied on the individual 
subjective judgements of a specialist reader, an issue already raised as potentially 
unrepresentative of everyday reading practices (Ch. 3.5.3; 6.1).  In critiquing the 
interpretation of lexical items as having a set semantic value to the reader regardless of 
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context, O’Halloran (2003) suggests that this compositional approach ‘produced a 
strategic inference to suit a particular line which is likely to be at odds with […] non-
analysts’ (162).  In other words, researchers with a specialist interest in language may 
infer meanings associated with lexical items that are not always apparent to non-
specialist readers.  In the analysis of intentionality for the purpose of critical 
commentary, the risks of relying exclusively on specialist interpretations of meaning are 
twofold.  First, that the specific intentions associated with an act or actor may not 
represent non-specialist interpretation.  Unless the activity described elicits a very select 
number of scripted sequences which accompany it, such as in the case of squeezing a 
trigger, the above examples have not aimed to account for all possible interpretations of 
intention.   
The aim in this chapter, therefore, has been to represent the judgement of 
intentions as a process of probabilistic mind-modelling, with the possible impressions of 
intention likely varying from reader to reader.  As a result, the examples given above are 
primarily impressionistic, with the analysis itself less concerned with these intentions 
per se, instead being focused on the unifying capacity for an agent to be acting 
intentionally.  Second, and more importantly, is the possibility that non-specialist 
readers may disagree with my interpretation of a given action as intentional in the first 
instance.  This will be examined thoroughly in the next chapter, where the impressions 
of non-specialist readers with regards to the scalar intentionality of given actions 
support the analysis of a short autobiographical narrative.  Supplementing theoretical 
accounts with reader-response data will help to more precisely pinpoint the effects of 
various lexical and grammatical structures in the attribution of agency, or the potential 
for agency, both in isolated texts and larger narratives.  Testing the possibility of degrees 
of agency will further explain the ways in which readers and listeners respond to varying 
levels of potential volition.  Further sustained analyses of protracted narratives with a 
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focus on the function of linguistic agency will also help to outline exactly how the 
relationship between agency within an isolated clause and knowledge of character 
motivations and desires across a text can come together to form readers’ responses. 
 In examining the intentions of actors within discourse, the discussion of this 
chapter has often come close to discussing the concept of responsibility, as well as the 
judgements of praise and or blame for an action.  While modelling intentionality 
highlights an important dimension of the process of conferring such judgements, the 
concepts of intentionality and responsibility are not direct parallels of one another, and 
the assignation of praise or blame represents a social judgement more than a cognitive 
process of interpretation.  Accordingly, as the following chapter develops, attention will 
also be paid to how and when these judgements are made, and what factors may be in 
play as they differ between readers.   
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Chapter 7: Attributing Intentionality 
and Responsibility in Language 
7.1: Narrative Intentions and Assigning Responsibility 
The previous chapter outlined the ways Cognitive Grammar can model the 
concept of intentionality, and the way in which actors’ intentions figure within an 
understanding of their activities across a narrative.  As was noted (6.7), however, 
describing the perception of intentionality requires a judgement on behalf of the 
researcher/reader comparable to the discussion of causality in Chapters 2 and 3.  As a 
result, this chapter reports a reader response study of a short autobiographical narrative 
(Hyder, 1930 [2009]) to ensure that the critical discussion of intentionality in the 
language of the text being examined is grounded in the perceptions of non-specialist 
readers (cf. O’Halloran, 2003).  Moreover, as Labov (2004) has observed, ‘narratives that 
centre on conflict, violence, sickness and death are normally concerned with the 
assignment of responsibility for these events’ (37, my emphasis), and the concept of 
responsibility as perceived by readers is defined and explored in relation to the 
perception and inference of character intentions.  The reader response study in this 
chapter therefore builds upon the theoretical work of Chapter 6, examining how non-
specialist readers perceive intentionality and responsibility for an act of violence in war 
time reported autobiographically.  Readers’ responses to this text and their perception of 
the responsibility of the narrator for the act of killing then form the basis of a stylistic 
analysis, concerned with the linguistic choices which impact readers’ judgements of 
responsibility, as well as their perceptions of intentions and the overall significance of 
individual actions with the context of the narrative. 
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Attributing responsibility often serves as the implicit basis of much Critical 
Discourse Analysis.  Existing research concerning the role of language choices in the 
perception of responsibility has examined everyday language use (Dreyfus, 2017) and 
discourses surrounding violence, either domestic (Clark, 1992), civil (Hart, 2013; 2018), or 
military (Butt et al., 2004; Finlay, 2018), each analysed with regards to the portrayal and 
accountability of violent actors.  Even outside of academia, Bayoumi (2018: online) 
describes how passivisation in media reports surrounding the killing of Palestinian 
protesters by Israeli soldiers ‘works not only to buffer Israel from criticism but also and 
more fundamentally to shield Israel from accountability’.  Identifying agency in 
language for the purpose of critical analysis, then, is combined with a process of 
recognising the construal or absence of responsibility for the actions performed. 
Reflecting back on a phrase discussed earlier in this thesis (2.3.1; 5.4), Bourke’s 
‘myth of agency’ regarding soldiers’ efforts to position themselves as in control of their 
actions has both grammatical and social connotations.  In Chapters 2 and 3, the concept 
of agency was closely tied to the notion of the agent in grammar, and the reader’s direct 
observation of force transferral and causality through the positioning of the narrator as 
the grammatical agent of a verb with semantic connotations of force.  Moreover, folk-
psychological models of agency (Pacherie, 2010; 2013) typically relate agency to the 
conscious intention to perform an action.  However, events can be caused accidentally 
and without intent, and the perception of agency may therefore only require the 
capacity for intentionality within a character or narrator’s described actions (cf. Ahearn, 
2001).  Chapter 6 tentatively explored the ways in which Cognitive Grammar may 
represent the hierarchical and concomitant mapping of a character’s goals and aims in 
the contextualisation of a described action, and synthesising existing theories of 
intentionality with narrative analysis in the context of critical analysis.  With this 
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framework established, the present chapter moves to expand this framework with 
greater reference to the judgements made by lay readers.  
 Following the value of the reader response study of Chapter 3 in challenging 
preconceived expectations in the response of everyday, non-specialist readers to 
memoirs of military conflict, it is equally important to ensure that the intentions 
discussed critically are not the result of a specialist reading of the text.  To that end, this 
chapter revolves around a reader response study, designed to explore how readers’ 
judgements of intentionality and responsibility are brought to task, and how contextual 
information, such as narrative structure and the war-time environment in which the 
described actions take place, may affect these judgements.  O’Halloran (2005a) observes 
that active reflection on intentionality and responsibility is part of an active, critically 
minded analysis of a text: ‘In critical analysis of implied causal relations in hard news, 
our reading can be guided by certain questions: who was responsible for an action?, what 
was their goal?, what were the results of an action? And so on.  But that is an analysis, a 
procedure which requires much effort’ (341).  O’Halloran goes on to compare this to the 
‘‘non-critical reader’ who is not expending as much effort’ (ibid), once again 
distinguishing between the close-reading practices of the engaged reader, and the 
interpretative experiences of readers who, while attentive enough to comprehend the 
meaning of the text in question, do not engage critically with its ideological perspective.  
Indeed, while Chapter 6 was concerned with developing the means to describe 
intentions within a Cognitive Grammar framework of action, such a model does not 
distinguish between specialist and lay readings.  Accordingly, this chapter is concerned 
with the development of this distinction through a study of lay reader attitudes towards 
intentionality and responsibility.   
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 In the case of assessing the perception of responsibility, a review of recent 
cognitive scientific research suggests that ‘our introspection is a very unreliable method 
for uncovering the cognitive basis of our actions' (Frith, 2013: 141).  Indeed, the findings 
of the reader response study in Chapter 3 support this hypothesis, as readers 
demonstrated a variety of affective responses to the same passage (3.5).  The aim of this 
final chapter, then, is to combine the effective methodology of reader response-based 
analysis with a critical interest in the representation of intentionality, and its 
relationship with responsibility and the conferral of praise and blame. 
7.2: Intentionality, Responsibility, and Blame  
 Much like the perception of causality, perceiving intentionality is an inferential 
activity which serves as a ‘hallmark of human cognitive apparatus’ (Behrend and Scofield, 
2006: 290) and allows readers to group actions and events according to theories of why 
events occur, in relation to the ongoing goals and plans of intentional actors.   
According to Plaks and Robinson (2015), ‘people generally hold that there is a positive 
relationship between the degree of intentionality of an act and the actor's degree of 
moral responsibility (Pizzaro et al., 2003; Reeder, 2009; Guglielmo and Malle, 2011; 
Laurin and Plaks, 2014)’.  Likewise, Cushman et al. (2013) show that from the age of 4-8, 
children begin to produce moral evaluations of actions based on the actor’s intentions, 
as opposed to the consequences of the act itself.  As the process of deducing 
responsibility typically relies on perceiving intentionality, the two concepts are often 
treated interchangeably under the umbrella term ‘agency’, which contains the 
perception of intent, forethought, and self-reflection, as well as the identification of an 
agent as causally associated with the act (Bandura, 2006).   
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This conflation of intentionality, causality, and responsibility has also occurred 
in linguistic analysis, and particularly in Critical Discourse Analysis, which is explicitly 
occupied with ‘critically analys[ing] those in power, those who are responsible’ (van Dijk, 
1991: 4).  Elsewhere, for example, van Dijk (1975) has described how ‘we are only 
responsible for those doings (and their consequences) which are within our control and 
which we intended to bring about’ (279, my emphases).  While intended actions 
represent a large portion of the actions for which we are often perceived to be 
responsible, it is also possible to be legally and morally held accountable for unintended 
consequences of non-volitional actions.  Meanwhile, Hart (2013) suggests that the 
symmetrical action schemas of reciprocal verbs when reporting police violence ‘has the 
capacity to mitigate, and thus legitimate, social actions by presenting responsibility for 
them as shared’ (118-119, my emphasis).  Hart (2018) returns to this example to explain 
how alternative event-frames ‘serve to apportion blame and responsibility for violent 
encounters in different ways’ (9).  While it may be the case in Hart’s example that both 
participants are construed as equally responsible, responsibility, intentionality, and 
blame are examined separately in this chapter in order to discuss how they might be 
affected individually by language and context. 
 As Ahearn (2001) observes of the concept of agency in both social and 
linguistically oriented research, ‘scholars often fail to recognize that the particular ways 
in which they conceive of agency have implications for the understanding of 
personhood, causality, action, and intention’ (112) and so this chapter begins with an 
active distinction between intentionality and responsibility, their relationship with the 
general concept of agency, and their role in the conferral of praise and blame.  In a 
framework of human agency which takes intentionality as a definitive aspect, acting 
with intent can generally be seen as a prerequisite for the ascription of agency, which 
itself supports the observation of responsibility.  Indeed, Knobe (2003a) demonstrates 
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that the perception of intentionality is not simply a predictive tool for anticipating the 
observed actor’s future behaviour, but one closely linked with the process of conferring 
a moral judgement on the assessed activity.  In particular, Knobe describes how ‘moral 
valence’ – whether the act described is deemed praise- or blameworthy – serves as an 
indicator of participants’ willingness to define the actor as having acted intentionally. 
  In bringing this research together, it becomes clear that modelling a linear, 
hierarchical relationship between the various aspects of agency associated with 
responsibility and intent is untenable.  While Bandura (2006) defines intentionality as 
one of the four constituents of human agency, supported by the findings of Cushman et 
al. (2013), further research has suggested that the reader’s willingness to praise or blame 
an actor affects their recognition of the intentionality of the action in the first instance  
(Knobe, 2003; Hindricks, 2008).  As Coates and Tognazzini (2013) suggest, the process of 
conferring blame can be imagined as involving ‘a robust blaming context – one that 
seems clearly to involve blame somewhere, even if we aren’t sure where – and then take 
each candidate mental state or activity one by one to see whether it can perform the 
tasks that blame performs’ (7, emphasis original), including beliefs, desires, emotions, 
and other dispositions.  In other words, blameworthiness affects the perception of the 
act as intentional, which in turn affects the capacity to view an agent as responsible, and 
therefore blameworthy.  The precise relationship between the perception of 
intentionality, responsibility, and blame is subject to ongoing research, and resolving 
this apparent feedback loop (see Fig. 7.1) is beyond the scope of the present chapter.  
While it remains uncertain which of these features ‘comes first’ in the evaluation of 
action, it suffices for now to recognise their interdependence as elements of meaning 
affected by linguistic construal and background knowledge. 
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Fig. 7.1: The ‘feedback loop’ of intentionality and agency 
 
 According to Monroe et al. (2012), judgements of morality broadly involve the 
violation of social norms, often reduced to intent+harm+suffering as the basis for 
eliciting blame (179; cf. Cushman, 2008).  Although Monroe et al. explore instances in 
which non-harmful acts can lead to blame, the performance of physical harm remains 
the exemplary model of a blameworthy action, situating the acts of violence in military 
memoir within the field of understanding blame.  As will be discussed below (7.5.2), 
however, readers do not straightforwardly confer blame upon soldiers performing acts 
of violence, even when there is a clear intent and a suffering victim.  In other words, 
while the model above provides a useful abstraction of the various mechanisms which 
interact to produce a moral evaluation and perception of an actor’s intentionality and 
responsibility, the final decision to blame the violent actor is affected by broader factors, 
readily modelled within a cognitive account of language and narrative.  While 
philosophical literature on the subject of killing in war (McMahan, 2002; 2009) debates 
the accountability of the individual from ethical and legal perspectives, this chapter is 
designed to reflect on the ways in which non-specialist readers – that is, readers not 
engaging with the text from a perspective of academic or analytical interest in the first 
instance (cf. 3.2.2) – engage in the process of forming ideological judgements about the 
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actors and acts described.  Accordingly, a series of studies were designed to investigate 
how readers perceived intentionality and responsibility individually across a series of 
different lexicogrammatical instances, as well as their evaluation of an example of 
violence in military autobiographical writing. 
7.3: ‘A Nightmare’, by Alan F. Hyder 
 In this study, participants were asked to read and respond to a short 
autobiographical narrative of a soldier’s experience of conflict and killing, ‘A Nightmare’ 
by Alan F. Hyder (in Purdom, 1930 [2009]: 167-175, see Appendix C).  There are several 
reasons for choosing this text in particular as the focus for this study.  First, as a self-
contained short (2300 words) story, it is possible to present this text to participants in 
full, as opposed to the selection of the passage for the study in Chapter 3, meaning that 
aside from the selection for the text itself, no modifications have been made to the text 
which may draw readers’ attention towards or away from particular themes or responses 
to the text.  In his introduction to the collection in which ‘A Nightmare’ appears, Brown 
(2009) describes the authors of these stories as ‘straightforwardly writing about what 
they knew, about what they saw, about what they experienced […] untouched by any 
modish cult or trend in the literary circles of the time’ (6).  Hyder tells the story in 
accessible, non-specialist language, and its brevity and clarity provide a clear focus in 
terms of the narrative’s thematic content.  
 Secondly, the narrative focuses on a controversial killing, and the narrator 
himself presents conflicting reflections on his own actions, both justifying the act as well 
as regretting it.  This leaves the final decision regarding whether or not the act can be 
described as praise or blameworthy to the reader, inasmuch as any naturally collected 
narrative of such a taboo experience can be beyond producing its own ideological 
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reading.  Hyder’s most reportable event is ‘Crack! Clang!  I put two shots through it’, 
which can be represented in CG terms as reframing the discourse away from the 
shooting of a person, and instead towards the shooting of a hat.  Hyder goes on to later 
reconstrue the act more straightforwardly (‘I had shot him’), drawing attention back to 
the act of killing later in the narrative, as he stands over the body of the soldier and 
reflects on the consequences of his actions.  In other words, a reader who attends to the 
basic premise of the narrative must understand that the narrator has killed an enemy 
soldier in order to make sense of the text.  If narrative context affects judgements of 
intentionality and/or responsibility, this example stands as a complete narrative, and its 
contents can consequently be examined in order to further investigate how this may be 
achieved.  While ‘A Nightmare’ is a complete narrative, it is short enough that readers 
can be presented with the entire story as part of a small-scale study, making the analysis 
itself less selective in its discussion of the material. 
7.4: Methodology 
 Similarly to the reader response study in Chapter 3, participants for this study 
were recruited through the student and staff volunteer mailing lists for the University of 
Sheffield to complete a questionnaire available through Google Forms.  Nine 
respondents with English as their first language (F=5, M=4) with a mean age of 32.6 
completed the participant information sheet (see Appendix C), accurately completed 
the multiple-choice consent form, and submitted answers for the study.  An additional 
participant was automatically excluded from participating in the study for failing to 
accurately complete the multiple-choice consent form at the beginning of the 
questionnaire, and their data was not collected.  Participants were staff and students 
from across the university, none of whom were members of the School of English. 
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 Unlike the reader response study in Chapter 3, which asked questions of readers 
as the narrative progressed, Study 4 was designed to provide an uninterrupted 
engagement with the text with questions saved until the entire story had been read, in 
order to more closely resemble the experience of ‘natural’ reading.  However, it is also 
necessary to assert whether each participant identified the act of violence as the most 
reportable event within the narrative.   Following Labov’s (2013) identification of the 
most reportable event as the one around which the story is built, in order to explain 
and/or evaluate (24), participants were asked what they felt to be the most important 
event in ‘A Nightmare’.  As per the summary following each section of the reading in 
Chapter 3, this question requires the reader to summarise the most reportable events of 
the narrative succinctly, reconstruing in in their own words according to the causal 
relationships they perceive to be significant.  As ‘reportable’, and particularly ‘tellable’, 
are specialist terms from narrative theory which may not be meaningful to lay readers, 
the study instead frames this question in terms of identifying the most ‘important’ event 
of the story.   Not only is the act of killing the most taboo event of the story, but its 
significance is also foregrounded as the thematic focus of the narrative in the narrator’s 
own evaluative statements.  In instances where readers identified an alternative event or 
act within the narrative as the ‘most important’, these are discussed on a case-by-case 
basis (7.5.2), to consider other possible focal points within the text, and their effect on 
the assignation of responsibility.  Importantly, the notion of responsibility is 
distinguished from the assignation of praise or blame, as participants were asked to 
make this judgement in a separate question, which included the option to assign neither.  
As it involves the killing of another human being in a time of war, and also in self-
defence, the moral evaluation of Hyder’s actions requires the assessment of the 
significance of several competing social factors.  As the discussion of resistant reading 
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(2.3.5) has shown, readers can form vastly different opinions of an author and their 
actions, according to their pre-existing ideologies. 
 Finally, participants were asked to voluntarily leave additional feedback on the 
study, providing an opportunity to justify their judgement, and provided with a digital 
form to write and much or as little as they like.  As per the evaluative comments in the 
reader response study of Chapter 3, this allows readers to leave additional reflections 
that might not have been considered in the other questions, but which they felt affected 
their responses and would like to be recorded.  Because of the open nature of this 
question, it is possible for responses to vary significantly.  This allows the concluding 
discussion to evaluate the social factors which readers themselves perceive to have 
affected the process of interpretation. 
7.5: Results  
 This section discusses the results of the study, both in terms of the qualitative 
and quantitative data gathered.  Beginning with a summary of participant responses and 
unexpected findings (7.5.1), it goes on to reflect on the implications of distinguishing 
between intentionality, responsibility, and blame, within a cognitive model of language 
and discourse (7.5.2).  Following this review of the methodological practice and 
assumptions within the study, the findings are used to inform a stylistic account of ‘A 
Nightmare’s’ construals, and readers’ responses.  While summaries of the data discussed 
are present within the text, a full list of the study’s questions and participants’ responses 
is located in Appendix C. 
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7.5.1: Narrative Interpretation 
 
In responding to the questions presented about ‘A Nightmare’, participants in 
this study produced a number of unexpected results.  For five of the study’s participants, 
the self-identified most important event of the narrative was the act of killing.  For 
others, however, this was not the case, as participants drew attention to the scene which 
surrounds the act of killing.  In one instance, a reader determined that the most 
important event was in fact the German artillery barrage which required the narrator to 
hide in the bunker in the first place.  In other words, this reader’s interpretation of the 
prompt led to an emphasis on the primary causal event in the action chain which 
resulted in the events of the narrative.   
R1: The german raid and artillery strike, as this lead to the german 
soldier entering the bunker 
R2: The discovery that the man he shot was not a threat to him but 
was close to death and trying to find safety 
R4: the protagonist waiting in the pillbox, hearing the sound of 
someone approaching and feeling afraid and not knowing what to do 
R5: Sparrer came back with the chisel, and some rum and hot tea. 
From the point of view of the other man, who went on to survive the 
war, that was important 
This variability in readers’ responses may stem from the use of the word ‘important’ in 
place of ‘reportable’.  Labov (2013) defines the most reportable event in a narrative as 
being the one which ‘has the greatest effect on the lives and life chances of the 
participants’ (23).  The process of telling stories about these kinds of events involves 
providing a causal origin of the important event in order to explain how and why it 
occurred.  This process appears to have lead R1 to the conclusion that the initial artillery 
strike is the most ‘important’ event, as it leads to the other events occurring in the first 
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place.  Alternatively, according to Ricoeur, ‘the meaning of an important event exceeds, 
overcomes, transcends the social conditions of its production and may be re-enacted in 
new social contexts.  Its importance is its durable relevance and, in some cases, its omni-
temporal relevance’ (1981: 208).  In other words, the feeling of nervousness and 
anticipation may simply be more relatable to non-combatant readers than the act of 
killing itself.  Equally, some readers focused on Sparrer, the narrator’s friend who comes 
to find him after the killing, providing him with rum and a route back to the trenches.  
For these readers, it could be that relief is significant – the ‘important’ event is the one 
that signals safety, and the end to the titular nightmare.  Moreover, while these 
responses problematise the dataset for the discussion of praise and blame, they provide 
valuable information for the understanding of stylistic foregrounding, realised in the 
close reading below. 
While this divergence affects the final number of participants who identified the 
act of killing as the most important event to which the later questions relating to the 
narrative refer, it remains interesting to note that none of the participants made a 
judgement of blame for the narrator’s actions.  Indeed, even those readers who 
identified an alternative aggressive act, such as the artillery barrage of the German army, 
as the most important event chose to remain neutral in their assessment.  When 
prompted for an explanation, participants indicated that the context of war mitigated 
their willingness to assign a straightforward judgement for the actions described (cf. 
7.5.2 below).  However, judgements of intentionality for the narrator’s killing of the 
soldier were consistently high among the sample, with four of five readers identifying 
the event as the most important of the narrative also grading the narrator’s 
intentionality as 10, with one grading of 6.  On the other hand, responsibility was more 
varied, with one score at both extremes of 10 and 1, one of 7, and two participants 
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grading a responsibility of 8.  The table below shows all participant responses to these 
questions, with answers relating to the narrator’s act of violence marked with an asterisk: 
Participant Intentionality Responsibility Praise/Blame? 
R1 8 9 Neither 
R2 10 8 Neither 
R3* 10 8 Neither 
R4 10 7 Neither 
R5 8 10 Praise 
R6* 10 7 Neither 
R7* 10 10 Praise 
R8* 10 1 Neither 
R9* 6 8 Neither 
 
Fig. 7.2: Participant responses to ‘A Nightmare’ questions 
 
 Overall, participants demonstrated a wide range of responses to the tasks 
involved in this study.  From the identification of a variety of ‘most important’ events, 
through to contrasting assessments of responsibility, the responses here suggest that 
while intentionality, responsibility, and praise/blame are closely related concepts, 
participants will not always correlate these observations predictably.  In particular, 
readers’ attitudes towards praising or blaming the soldier appear to vary independently 
of their assessments of intentionality and responsibility.  In the following discussion, 
these findings will be considered in relation to readers’ qualitative comments, in order 
to further make sense of the ways in which such judgements are produced. 
 
230 
 
7.5.2: Discussion and Critical Consequences 
 
The data collected for this study support the initial hypothesis (7.2) that while 
the perception of intentionality often correlates with judgements of responsibility, this 
is not always the case.  Consequently, an explanation of readers’ processing of activity 
which conflates the two does not represent the ways in which readers form such 
judgements.  Instead, the findings presented above broadly align with Cushman’s (2008) 
theory that two processes factor into moral judgements: ‘one triggered by harmful 
consequences […] and another triggered by analysis of the mental states underlying 
action’ (378).  In other words, readers’ assessments of responsibility can be informed by 
their modelling of agents’ intentional states, but may be affected – either instead or 
simultaneously – by schematic knowledge of an action’s consequences.  That 
participants in this study produced such varied scores for violent actions with 
ambiguous intentionality also reveals that uncertainty under speeded conditions does 
not produce a ‘default’ judgement of intentionality or responsibility.  Instead, these 
judgements rely on each individuals’ background knowledge, and the event models 
which contribute to their understanding of an activity (a single clause) or a context in 
which the action takes place (war as mitigation of responsibility or not). 
As well as demonstrating the distinction in assessing intentionality and 
responsibility for acts of violence in war, Study 4 also supports the need to consider the 
act of conferring blame as a social dimension of interpretation, interdependently 
connected to the cognitive perception of intent.  Labov (1997; 2013) treats praise and 
blame as evaluations produced by the narrator and communicated to the readers 
through narrative.  However, the act of resistant reading (2.3.5) shows that readers are 
equally able to reject a narrator’s interpretation, producing evaluative assessments 
which go against the narrator’s position.  For instance, when Hill (1915) writes that the 
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Battle of Loos was ‘developing into the finest game the world can give, a man hunt […] it 
was very much like hunting rabbits’, the social deixis and metaphorical framing of the 
text provides a perspective on the perpetration of violence which the reader might 
accept or resist, depending upon the relationship between the metaphorical mapping 
and their personal ideology.  As Malle et al. (2014) conclude, conferring blame has a 
cognitive as well as social dimension, as it relies on the observation of norm violation 
associated with predicted or accepted frames of behaviour. 
 In the case of ‘A Nightmare’, the image schemas and knowledge associated with 
the context of war allowed readers to draw a number of competing conclusions about 
the act of killing that would be morally untenable in most circumstances.  Recognising 
Hyder as both an intentional and, in most cases, responsible actor, it is interesting to 
note that none of the participants in this study would describe his killing of the enemy 
soldier as blameworthy.  A partial explanation for these answers may lie in the social 
conditions of the exercise: participants were performing in a highly self-reflective 
environment, and may have been more self-aware than usual.  Knowing that their 
answers are being recorded for research purposes, participants may express greater 
leniency than they otherwise would.  Further explanatory evidence, however, comes 
from the participants themselves.  When prompted to optionally leave any additional 
thoughts regarding the narrative or the questions in general, several readers chose to 
explain that war is a mitigating circumstance for assessing the act of killing, as several 
participants explained in their optional reflections at the end of the study.  In each case, 
the reader identified the narrator’s killing of the enemy soldier as the most important 
event of the story, and their scores for intentionality (I) and responsibility (R) are 
presented next to their respective comments: 
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R3: ‘The fact that it happens in a war zone makes a difference’ (I=10, 
R=8) 
R6: ‘Defending oneself in a time of war does carry responsibility, but 
not as much as it does in peacetime.  The soldiers are responsible for 
protecting their country and neutralizing the enemy’ (I=10, R=7) 
R7: ‘The blame is on the related governments in that particular story, 
for if it weren’t for the greeds of government war might be a scarcity, 
and good people wouldn’t find themselves in such situations’ (I=10, 
R=1) 
Evidently, external factors influence reader judgements, and it is worth considering the 
ways in which the narrative structure of the text functions in relation to the reader’s 
construal of the act of violence, and their evaluation of the primary actor.  In the same 
way that Harari (2010) describes the power dynamic between discourse participants who 
have flesh-witness experience of war and those who do not (1.2; 5.1), the pragmatic 
context extends to affect reader judgements of responsibility.  In the case of R7 in 
particular, their ideological position that governments are to blame for war in general 
strongly affects their judgement of the narrator’s responsibility for the act of killing.  
What the process of completing this form represents, then, is the politicised, 
performative act of judgement elicited for social purposes.  Rather than problematising 
the findings, this reveals more about the social nature of responsibility, situated within 
an ongoing discourse framed by personal ideology. 
 The pragmatic effect of the survey structure was alluded to elsewhere in readers’ 
responses.  After identifying the return of ‘Sparrer’ to the pillbox as the narrative’s most 
important event, one reader (R5) chose to explain their decision by referring to their 
perceived expectations of the research, writing that ‘You’re probably shocked I didn’t 
pick on the German who got shot, but the poor man/boy was never present as an 
individual’.  Being asked to provide an explicit assessment of the praise or blame-
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worthiness of an activity is unnatural, and in this case cued the reader to perform a 
metacognitive assessment of the study’s purpose.  Nevertheless, these results provide 
useful evidence of the stylistic effects of Hyder’s writing, as R5’s impression that the 
German soldier was ‘never present as an individual’ suggests a one-sided impression of 
the mind-modelling made available in the text, which construes the experience from 
Hyder’s first person perspective, thereby focalising the narrator as the predominant 
actor whose intentions and mental state are made known to the reader. 
Additionally, it is perhaps surprising how substantially the addition of narrative 
context affects readers’ reactions to an act as morally challenging as killing another 
human being.  As McMahan (2009) has put it, ‘There is no moral belief that is more 
universal, stable, and unquestioned, both across different societies and throughout 
history, than the belief that killing people is normally wrong’ (189).  In the case of 
sensitive judgements like the blameworthiness of an act of killing in war, context 
provides a recognisable frame in which normative judgements are mitigated.  Similarly, 
Russell and Roger (2011) suggest that moral anger is affected by judgements 
intentionality, where moral disgust is not.  In ordinary circumstances, an act of killing 
would typically elicit a moral anger associated with blame.  Evidently, however, the 
context of Hyder’s narrative mitigates this response.  If readers’ assessments of 
intentionality and responsibility for killing in isolation and in context differ, a critical 
analysis which considers the effects of linguistic construal in isolation from the social 
context of its production is inherently incomplete.  Essentially, the analysis of even an 
individual clause for the purposes of critical commentary is inseparable from the context 
in which it appears.  When they appear in discourse, clauses are not interpreted in 
isolation: rather, the information and perspectives presented throughout the 
surrounding discourse affect the schemas through which the individual clause is framed 
and evaluated.   
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The interdependence of discourse, society, and cognition in the study of 
language is also raised by van Dijk (2014), who argues that in forming schemas or event 
frames, ‘mental models are multimodal.  They represent complex, embodied experience 
of events and situations […] As such they are also uniquely personal.  Indeed, they not 
only represent our knowledge of an event, but may also feature our evaluative or 
personal opinion’ (126).  In the case of intentionality and responsibility in particular, 
understanding how these concepts are construed in language appears to require this 
synthesis in order to form an effective understanding of the factors which contribute to 
readers’ mental and moral evaluations of agency.  As Hart (2016) notes, however, the 
relationship between discourse, society, and cognition is ‘extremely complex […]where 
the cognitive import of textual choices is subject to extra-textual factors like relative 
frequency, resonance, and epistemic vigilance’ (18).  Accordingly, this chapter does not 
claim to provide an account of all the possible means by which intentions might be 
inferred and judgements of responsibility for an action or event assessed.  Rather, it has 
demonstrated the necessity of considering both cognitive and social factors in order to 
produce an adequate account of the variability in readers’ productions of these 
evaluations.  
Beyond Critical Discourse Analysis, Hutto (2007) has also recognised the need to 
consider an extensive range of factors in the development of a sense of self in language: 
to understand which beliefs and desires were responsible for a person's action 
is normally only to understand why they acted in a quite skeletal way.  
Maximally, to understand why someone acted requires a more or less detailed 
description of his or her circumstances, other propositional attitudes (hopes, 
fears), more basic perceptions and emotions and perhaps even his or her 
character, current situation and history.  In short, in order to fully grasp why 
someone took action on a particular occasion requires relating that person's 
'story' (43-44) 
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Hutto’s definition of ‘story’ encompasses general knowledge about the individual’s life 
and experiences, but his narratively-oriented terminology, and reference to the act of 
‘relating’, indicates that this information has to be presented in an act of communication.  
The narrative organisation of individual experience, then, is the organisation of events 
and surrounding information in such a way as to direct the construction of the reader’s 
evaluation, although personal experience and knowledge, varying from reader to reader, 
allows for the possibility of a resistant, alternative interpretation.  In the case of military 
memoir, the primary evaluation concerns the assessment of intentionality and its 
relation to responsibility for the taboo perpetration of violence. 
 All this is not to say that the analysis of aspects of language in isolation is 
worthless.  As the studies which have formed part of this chapter have shown, 
controlling specific variables with regards to language perception can be a highly 
effective way of expanding the understanding of a particular linguistic feature or effect.  
At each stage, this chapter has shown that the analysis of sentences and the perception 
of their meaning cannot simply be transferred to real-world examples of the features 
they discuss.  The act of interpreting a clause within a given narrative will always draw 
upon the broader context in which it is situated.  However, considering these features in 
isolation allows for a better understanding of the relationship between elements of 
lexicogrammar, discursive context, and personal background knowledge.  Stylistic 
analysis relies on being able to comment on the specific effects of a given feature of 
language with regards to the way in which it is used, and isolating these features 
provides a valuable means by which to more confidently discuss their probable effects. 
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7.6: Analysing ‘A Nightmare’ 
 Having established both the importance and variability in readers’ perceptions of 
intentionality and responsibility with regards to both narratives and isolated clauses, 
this section now focuses on ‘A Nightmare’ to perform a stylistic analysis informed by the 
impressions outlined by the participants in the above studies.  Following the imbalance 
in participant evaluations of Hyder’s intentionality and responsibility for killing the 
enemy soldier described above (7.5.1), this section explores stylistic features which may 
contribute to the comparably low ranking of Hyder’s responsibility and 
blameworthiness.  Bearing in mind the variety in readers’ responses to the concept of 
‘most important event’, this reading focuses on the concepts of prominence and 
attention, examining how the structure an language of the text contributes to the 
perception of particular events as the ‘most important’ of the story.  Taking into account 
the variety of events described as the ‘most important’, this section argues that all of 
their readings remain predicated on comparable observations of tension, character 
motivation, and emotional evaluation, suggesting more similarities than differences in 
their overall impressions of the text. 
For most of the readers who did not identify the act of killing itself as the most 
important event of the narrative, their answers focused on the anticipation building up 
to the violence, waiting at the sound of approaching footsteps (R4; R6).  Throughout the 
build-up to the German soldier’s appearance, Hyder’s description of the scene is 
negatively shaded (Simpson, 2003: 58), foregrounding the uncertainty of his own senses, 
describing how ‘he, it, or whatever the thing was, came, silently crawling’.  As in 
examples discussed earlier (4.3.2), Hyder construes possible disnarrated outcomes, 
dependent upon his response to the situation, noting that ‘A bomb tossed into that 
pillbox would have turned me into pictures on the wall!’.  Given that the build-up and 
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anticipation of the enemy soldier’s entry into the pillbox lasts for several paragraphs, as 
opposed to the single clause it takes to describe his death, readers’ interest in the 
anticipation of violence may be attributed to its prominence within narrative time 
(Ricoeur, 1980).  In other words, these passages provide the context and moral 
justification for the consequent act of violence, as well as providing dramatic tension. 
 Despite the variety in readers’ observations of the ‘most important’ event, even 
the most contrastive reading to the expected focus on violence relies on an 
understanding of this narrative tension in order to succeed.  Rather than identifying the 
killing of the enemy soldier as the climax of the narrative’s tension, one reader instead 
interpreted Sparrer’s return as the most important event, writing that ‘from the point of 
view of [Hyder], that was important.  He had never been so glad to see anyone in his life’ 
(R5).  Stylistically, R5’s impression of the text focuses around the significance of the 
same tension in the uncertainty described by Hyder during his time alone in the bunker.  
In Labov and Waletzky’s (1967) terms, this simply represents an assignation of 
prominence to the resolution of the narrative’s central drama, as opposed to the 
complication, as Sparrer’s return marks the dissolution of tension at the centre of the 
story.  Notably, this reader answers the question ‘from the point of view of [Hyder]’, 
meaning that the question was answered less in terms of importance as relates to 
narrative, instead empathising with the narrator’s perspective on events as they occur, 
and their significance. 
Looking again at participants who described the act of killing as the most 
important event of the narrative, the reconstrued descriptions which constituted their 
answers always included an additional description of the German soldier, either as ‘close 
to death and trying to find safety’ (R2), ‘injured’ (R3), ‘already dying’ (R6), and ‘wounded’ 
(R8).  That each reader individually draws attention to this detail in their construal of 
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the shooting suggests that it has some significance in their interpretation of events.  
However, in the narrative itself, information about the state of the soldier is not 
presented to the reader until after the killing, when Hyder is able to examine the dead 
soldier more closely.  Describing the wounds to the soldier’s body, he presents an 
imagined simulation of the soldier’s thoughts on entering the bunker, going so far as to 
correct his previous assessment of the danger to himself in the original situation: 
His left leg is badly smashed, half covered by a blood-soaked bandage with 
the white of bone protruding from hanging lumps of flesh.  He had come over 
with his raiding party, stopped a piece of shell and crawled into the pillbox, 
perhaps to die, perhaps for safety. 
I had shot him. 
In this brief passage, Hyder extrapolates from context and imagines further information 
about the soldier, including a reconstrual of his intentions in entering the bunker: 
instead of intending to kill or harm Hyder, the German soldier is instead shown to have 
entered for his own safety.  Not only does this affect the logic behind Hyder’s pre-
emptive act of violence, but draws parallels with his own original intentions.   While 
brief, this humanising moment is important for the reader’s reaction to Hyder, who is 
now shown to understand the gravity of his actions.  Similarly to Turner (6.7), the 
narrator draws a comparison between the image of the soldier he kills and the friend he 
avenged by killing him.  Likewise, the inclusion of the assumed mental activity of the 
young children killed by the drone strike in Predator (5.7) attempts to provide the 
perspective of the victim.  As R5 noted in this study, however, the German soldier killed 
by Hyder is ‘never present as an individual’.  In other words, while these impressions 
present an attempt to model the minds of the victimised participants within the 
narrative, the first person perspectivisation retains focal prominence, and the reader 
remains aware that this construal is presented by a homodiagetic narrator with an 
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ideologically-driven outlook.  This is evidenced in the text itself by the repeated use of 
‘perhaps’ to emphasise Hyder’s own uncertainty regarding his evaluation, negatively 
shading the description of the German soldier’s possible thoughts and character.  In 
each case, the effort to represent the victim of their act of violence as an intentional 
actor with independent, personal agency is hampered by the narrator’s inability to 
achieve more than speculation.  
As well as attempting to present a description of the soldier as an actor, this 
passage of ‘A Nightmare’ has a second stylistic function.  For Monroe et al. (2012), blame 
is evaluated in relation to what the agent could have done differently (182), and the 
earlier passage of disnarration (‘if so – goodnight!’) construes the perceived risk to 
Hyder’s life which justifies the killing of the soldier.  In this passage, however, the 
revelation that the soldier posed no threat in the first instance undercuts such an 
interpretation.  Instead, however, the new disnarration of the hypothesised intentions of 
the soldier in entering the bunker, ‘perhaps to die’, coupled with the detailed 
description of his wounds, present an alternative series of future events, identified by 
readers in their own redescriptions of the soldier as ‘close to death’ (R2) and ‘already 
dying’ (R6).  With this second construal of alternative outcomes, Hyder’s moral position 
is accounted for whether or not the soldier posed a threat to him by anticipating a 
possible rejection of the construal thus far: if the reader does not believe that the soldier 
posed a threat to Hyder, then the moral seriousness of killing the enemy soldier is 
instead reduced by suggesting that his death was inevitable regardless.  
 Despite the ways in which these elements of the narrative work to justify Hyder’s 
decision, the closing lines of ‘A Nightmare’ provide an emotional evaluation which 
indicates that the narrator feels guilt or regret for his actions: ‘still at night sometimes 
comes a sweat that wakes my by its deathly chill to hear again that creeping, creeping’ 
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(175).  While the narration itself does not include direct descriptions of the narrator’s 
emotions towards the events which occur, Hyder’s reconstrual of the same events 
(shooting and crawling) after their occurrence indicate their significance, and the final 
line includes a single evaluative adjective (‘deathly’) and repetition (‘creeping, creeping’) 
to mark the lasting effects on the narrator.  As Frith (2013) has noted: 
The other strong experience [aside from causation] associated with agency is 
regret.  Regret has to be distinguished from disappointment.  We feel 
disappointment when the outcome of our action is worse than we expected.  
We feel regret when we learn that we would have achieved a better outcome 
if only we had chosen the other action.  Regret is strongly linked to agency 
because, to feel regret, we have to believe that we could have chosen the other 
action. (138, my emphasis). 
Not all authors produce such apologetic evaluations of their actions and experiences.  
Indeed, as the discussion above suggests, Hyder presents the death of the enemy solider 
as either justified self-defence or an inevitable outcome of his existing wounds, meaning 
that the expression of regret does not straightforwardly include an outcome in which 
the enemy soldier survived.  Moreover, as was discussed earlier (3.2.1), Julian Grenfell 
(1915) notoriously writes home about taking pleasure in the act of killing, and Bourke 
(1999) discusses many further examples of soldiers who enjoy taking an active role in the 
violence of war.  Hyder’s decision to frame the narrative entirely in terms of this 
evaluation, given the title, suggest that Hyder’s own moral evaluation of his actions 
conforms to social expectations that, while killing may be permissible during war, there 
is an expectation that the status quo will return after the fact through self-reflecting 
regret.  Indeed, this self-effacing conclusion may also account for readers in this study 
choosing not to blame Hyder for his actions.  Throughout the narrative, Hyder provides 
a number of explanations for killing the soldier, with readers perceiving the death 
ultimately as either justified, inevitable, or both.  Even when the act of killing itself was 
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not described as the most important event of the story, readers nonetheless gave 
prominence to the context in which the act of violence took place. 
7.7: Further Thoughts on Intentionality 
 According to Ricoeur, ‘the decisive step in the direction of a narrative conception 
of personal identity is taken when one passes from the action to the character’ (1992: 
143), and these last two chapters have sought to examine what the process of passing 
from individual actions to overarching conceptualisations of character might entail from 
a cognitive perspective.   Having worked through the means by which the capacity for 
volitional action can be represented within Cognitive Grammar’s model of events, the 
present study has demonstrated how the process of understanding meaning requires the 
consideration of the social dimensions of language and interpretation.  Ahearn (2001) 
defines agency as the ‘socioculturally mediated capacity to act […] both in its production 
and interpretation’ (112), and the role of societal norms and cultural knowledge have 
been demonstrated in the sheer variety of responses to the same text presented to all 
participants in this study.  In terms of understanding agency, the primary result of this 
chapter is the conclusion that readers’ perceptions of responsibility can be meaningfully 
distinguished from their perceptions of intentionality.  In the case of violent acts during 
wartime in particular, readers regularly referred to the mitigating circumstances of war 
as diminishing the violent actor’s responsibility, while simultaneously maintaining that 
the act of killing was intentional.   
Additionally, the variety in readers’ responses to both the sentence and narrative 
level studies reaffirms the conclusion of Chapter 3 that considering the perspectives of 
non-specialist readers in interpretation is an essential component of effective critical 
analysis which aims to reflect actual reading practices.  In the case of intentionality, 
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responsibility, and blame, the intersection between cognitive and social elements of 
interpretation result in numerous different perspectives according to the reader’s 
background knowledge, event models, and personal ideology.  Not only does this 
provide the researcher with additional evidence regarding the most common 
interpretation of a text’s meaning and the inferences frequently associated with an 
action, but it can also provide evidence for readings which run counter to the 
researcher’s own, or at least their expectations for how a text will be read.  By observing 
the similarities and differences between reader responses, the close reading of the text 
in question can account for a number of ideological perspectives through a cognitive 
framework which acknowledges the role of previous usage and frames in forming 
interpretative judgements.  In that sense, the metalinguistic analysis of readers’ 
reconstruals and evaluations of a text provide a vital insight into the stylistic features 
and semantic fields foregrounded in non-specialist reading. 
 Adopting lay-readers’ responses to texts as the premise of critical analysis 
demonstrates the key fact that the act of interpretation relies substantially on a series of 
sociocultural cues which differ from reader to reader.  In correspondence with van Dijk 
and Throop, Duranti (2014) summarises this position in relation to intentionality, 
observing that ‘an intention is embedded in its situation’ (Van Dijk, Duranti and Throop, 
2014: 153).  This chapter has shown that the process of interpreting events relies on 
contexts broader than are construed within a single clause, or even the overall discourse, 
as readers enact background knowledge and personal moral perspectives, which affect 
the perception of concepts such as agency and responsibility.  In narrative, the reading 
of a single clause is not an isolated process.  Instead, readers draw on the context of 
actions to make evaluative judgements based in part on their schematic understanding 
of intentionality.  Hence, the same clause can elicit a distinct interpretation of 
intentionality based on the variation of its narrative context.  The analysis of 
243 
 
intentionality and responsibility as independent variables in this chapter demonstrate 
the significance of considering the variety of ways in which individual readers may 
respond to identical linguistic prompts.  Moreover, while the recognition the social 
dimensions of reading and interpretation complicates the process of producing a critical 
analysis, contemporary cognitive theories of language and communication readily 
account for the role of experiential differences between readers.   
Overall, this chapter and the last have not simply made a case for recognising 
the interpretative differences between perceptions of causality, intentionality, 
responsibility, and praise/blame, but argued that doing so is essential to the production 
of meaningful critical commentary on the perception of violence in these texts.  Each 
stage of evaluation requires socio-cognitive analysis, relying on image schemata, and 
with the possibility of being influenced by subtle shifts in lexicogrammatical and 
narrative stylistic choices.  As Van Leeuwen (1997) has observed of social action, these 
categories cannot be assigned direct linguistic parallels.  Rather, the social and cognitive 
processes of determining whether an action was performed intentionally, and whether 
or not the agent in question is accountable for it, takes into account both information 
associated with the lexicogrammar of its linguistic construal, and broader social 
knowledge and beliefs.  Contemporary cognitive Critical Discourse Analysis (van Dijk, 
2014; Hart, 2014; 2018) recognises the significance of the interrelationship between 
discourse, society, and cognition, as well as the complexity of combining these elements 
for analytical purposes.  By moving to situate the perception of responsibility and moral 
evaluations in relation to a socio-cognitive conceptualisation of agency, this chapter has 
aimed to expand the critical and stylistic discussion of intentionality from the 
cognitively focused account of Chapter 6, towards a model which more actively 
considers the social dynamics in which the clauses evaluated function pragmatically.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1: Overview  
 
 The aim of this thesis has been to examine the ways in which twentieth and 
twenty-first century soldiers have employed language to convey their experiences of war, 
and as perpetrators of violence.  Using Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1991; 2008; 2009) 
to examine soldiers’ linguistic choices – from clause level to narrative structure – has 
provided an insight into the ways in which violence can be construed for a civilian 
readership.  In doing so, however, the thesis has also engaged with the limitations and 
challenges faced in both Cognitive Grammar (Pincombe, 2014) and Critical Discourse 
Analysis (Widdowson, 1998; O’Halloran, 2003; Billig, 2008).  The concluding discussion 
now reviews the primary aims of each chapter, and contextualises their approach and 
findings in relation to the overall research goals.  Following this, specific findings are set 
out with regards to the general stylistic features identified in the primary texts (8.2), the 
thesis’ contributions to methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (8.3), and the advances it 
has made in the application of Cognitive Grammar to the study of actions and actors 
across discourse (8.4).  Finally, the limitations of the present research are discussed (8.5), 
alongside proposed directions for future research. 
 The thesis began with a review of the linguistic frameworks employed in critical 
and stylistic analysis.  Beginning with Systemic Functional Linguistics (2.2), it conducted 
practical analyses to demonstrate the value of transitivity and ergativity in accounting 
for the construal of agency in soldiers’ language choices.  Following a review of the 
literature employing SFL for textual analysis (2.2.2), Cognitive Grammar was introduced 
(2.3) as an alternative framework through which to analyse stylistic features.  Developed 
through the analysis of extracts of war writing, Cognitive Grammar’s models of event 
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construal (2.3.1), and its constituent features (2.3.2; 2.3.3), was presented as the preferred 
means for modelling actions throughout this thesis.  Simultaneously, cognitive 
approaches to metaphor (2.3.4) were examined, and the functions of Common Ground 
(Werth, 1993; Browse, in press 2018) and the conceptual substrate (2.3.5) were 
introduced as an indicator of the ways in which Cognitive Grammar moves from clause-
level to discourse-level analysis.  The chapter concluded (2.5) by affirming the value of 
Cognitive Grammar as a framework for critical analysis within the scope of this research, 
as well as observing preliminary trends in the stylistic features of the extracts, examined 
in terms of causality and the transfer of force. 
Chapter 3 began by examining existing studies of the language employed by 
soldiers to describe acts of violence (Benke and Wodak, 2003; Grassiani, 2011; Robinson, 
2011), and found that the concept of social agency (van Leeuwen, 1997) was often 
conflated with the linguistic application of the term (3.2.1).  Additionally, the chapter 
examined concerns that Critical Discourse Analysis produces specialist readings which 
are not reflective of the interpretations of everyday readers (3.2.2).  After examining the 
cognitive (3.3) and discursive (3.4) ways in which readers might infer causal connections 
unspecified or segmented within a text, a reader response study (3.5) was conducted to 
produce non-specialist interpretations to inform the ensuing critical commentary.  This 
demonstrated ‘a commitment to triangulation’ (Hart, 2018: 400) in CDA, ensuring that 
the textual analysis was not over-reliant on the subjective perspective of the individual 
analyst.  The findings of this study demonstrated that readers were able to directly infer 
a causal relationship between two segmented events within the source narrative (3.5.2), 
limiting critical interpretations of event segmentation as masking agency. 
In addition, readers’ qualitative comments from this study (3.5.3; 3.5.4) showed 
that their interpretations considered context from across the narrative in the assessment 
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of individual clauses.  Chapter 4 therefore introduced narratological research (4.2), in 
order to examine the narrative construction of identity across discourse.  This research 
was contextualised in relation to Cognitive Grammar (4.3.1) and Critical Discourse 
Analysis (4.3.2), introducing the value and challenges of Cognitive Grammar’s 
application to discourse-level analysis.  In addition, the narrative construction of 
identity was discussed in relation to research on war writing (4.4), which typically 
follows the position of Strong Narrativism critiqued in Strawson (2oo4).  In responding 
to Strawson’s objections to the prominence of narrative in discussions of selfhood (4.5), 
the chapter situated the thesis in general in relation to the Narrative Self Shaping 
Hypothesis (Hutto, 2016), acknowledging the primacy of narrative as a sense-making 
tool in the majority of cases, but recognising that episodic perspectives and traumatic 
experiences challenge the view of narrative identity as one which spans a lifetime (4.6).  
As a result, this chapter established a relationship between Cognitive Grammar and 
theories of narrative and identity, allowing later chapters to address the scalability of its 
application beyond individual clauses. 
Chapter 5 followed on from this discussion with a direct and extended analysis of 
two primary texts (Martin and Sasser, 2010; McCurley and Maurer, 2016).  The ability of 
drone pilots to assert the flesh-witness authority typically associated with war-time 
experience (Harari, 2010) was put under question from the outset (Royakkers and van 
Est, 2010; Chamayou, 2015; Daggett, 2015), making the language choices of the authors 
particularly important to the reader’s perception of the pilots’ identity.  This chapter was 
the first analysis of the phenomenology of drone warfare from a linguistic perspective, 
and critically examined the effects of features from deixis (5.3.1; 5.3.2) to action chains 
(5.4; 5.5) and negative shading (5.6).  As discourse around drone warfare itself is in its 
infancy, this chapter identified emerging stylistic trends (5.7) in the available literature.  
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More broadly, it also recognised that a model of Cognitive Grammar analysis confined 
to clause-level discussion is limited in its ability to discuss book-length texts. 
The next chapter responded to this problem directly, by proposing a model of 
intentionality within Cognitive Grammar.  Although the perception of intentionality is 
essential to the processing of meaning (6.3), this model is the first variation of the 
Canonical Event Model (Langacker, 2008: 357) to distinguish between intentional and 
superventional events.  Beginning with simple clauses (6.4.1), the chapter built towards 
the analysis of intentions across complex sentences (6.4.2), as well as multiple sentences 
across a passage of text (6.4.3; 6.5).  Following these examples, the model was 
contextualised within Langacker’s (2008: 480) view of the process of transitioning 
Cognitive Grammar to the analysis of discourse (6.6), before critically analysing a longer 
passage of text (6.7), the findings of which are discussed below (8.2.2).  This 
contribution to the critical and stylistic application of Cognitive Grammar represents 
the first effort in the development of a model which should continue to be applied and 
refined in future research. 
The final chapter examined the discussion of intentionality in relation to the 
concept of agency more generally (7.2), and distinguished between the perception of 
intentionality, responsibility, and praise/blameworthiness as each comprise and affect 
the sense of agency.  Following the findings from Chapter 3 that non-specialist readers 
produced novel interpretations of the primary material which challenged the critical 
interpretations of the individual researcher (3.5.4), the majority of Chapter 7 was 
dedicated to the production of a further reader response study (7.4; 7.5), designed to test 
the perception of intentionality and responsibility in narrative.  The general trends of 
these responses (7.5.1; 7.5.2), demonstrate that while lexicogrammatical features can 
provide indications of intentionality and responsibility, the precise responses of 
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individual readers vary according to differing background knowledge and cultural 
scripts associated with each assessed activity.  Additionally, participants produced 
unexpected responses when prompted to define the ‘most important event’ of the war 
story they read (7.5.2), which formed the basis of a critical analysis of the language of the 
source text (7.6).  Given the range and unexpectedness of its findings, this chapter 
strongly supports the call for a triangulation of methods in all forms of stylistic analysis. 
8.2: Findings for the Stylistics of War Writing 
 
 Although the primary texts examined in this thesis do not constitute an 
exhaustive corpus of soldiers’ war writings, they provide a promising indication of the 
stylistic conventions associated with the construal of acts of killing within the genre (Ch. 
1.4).  This section reviews three key features which occurred throughout these texts as 
indicative of possible points of interest in future studies using larger corpora.  Likewise, 
as the authors took a range of ideological stances towards their own actions, the 
summaries below also reflect how these stylistic features were shown to be used to 
produce a variety of discursive and evaluative positions.   
8.2.1: Construal and Granularity 
 
 Although the term ‘construal’ broadly refers to a range of ways in which 
language encodes perspective (cf. Langacker, 2008: 55), granularity has been shown to 
be particularly significant in the way soldiers describe acts of violence.  From the 
introduction of the term (2.3.2), this thesis has shown that soldiers employ both high 
and low granularity descriptions when reporting killing enemy combatants.  In the case 
of highly granular construals, it was shown (3.5.2) that readers are able to infer the 
causal connections between these segmented descriptions, and therefore that to 
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describe this feature as obscuring the agency of the narrator would misrepresent the 
majority of readers’ engagements with the text.  Instead, the description of simpler 
movements grounds the construal in relation to everyday activities, allowing these 
authors to find an experiential Common Ground with non-combatant readers 
attempting to understand the phenomenology of combat (2.3.5). 
 By contrast, low granularity descriptions do render the details inaccessible to the 
reader.  Instead, these descriptions often rely on metaphor (2.3.4), or meta-irony (5.5) to 
construe an act of killing in relation to a longer-term goal or more abstract concept, 
such as keeping people safe, paying interest, or hunting.  While such construals make it 
impossible to know precisely what acts the narrator refers to in their description, the 
semantic fields they foreground in selecting a lower granularity frame of reference to 
which to map their actions can be used to examine the ideological frameworks which 
govern the perception of violence across the text (2.3.2; 5.3.1).  Of course, as these 
observations in isolation risk criticising soldiers’ language choices for both not being 
descriptive enough, and being too focused on detail, analysing the stylistic effects of 
granularity requires reader-response data.  Comparable with the study in Chapter 3, and 
performed on a case-by-case basis, this additional affective data has revealed more 
precisely the effects of a given construal.  As both high and low granularity construals 
have been shown to produce ideologically wide ranging accounts of violence, coupling 
the modelling of force with granularity represents an invaluable direction for future 
critical analysis of the genre. 
8.2.2: Action Chains 
 
 Many of the passages examined in this thesis have been discussed in relation to 
action chains (Langacker, 2008: 355) as a means of conceptualising a relationship 
between individual events through the perceived transfer of force and causation.  Two 
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key stylistic effects have been associated with action chains as a consequence.  First, the 
extension of the number of links in a chain has been shown to produce a conceptual 
distance between the initial actor of the narrator, and the individual who is eventually 
harmed.  Although readers have been shown to be capable of perceiving a causal 
connection between these segmented events (Ch. 3.5), a construal which divorces the 
narrator from a direct transfer of force to an enemy combatant nonetheless weakens the 
kind of relationship represented between the two participants in causal terms. 
 Secondly, several authors (Ch. 5.5; 6.7) construed action chains in which the 
narrator is not the head of the chain.  In these instances, either an authority figure 
ordered them to act, or the act of killing was situated as a response to an enemy’s action 
which elicited an emotional response in the narrator.  In other words, the metaphorical 
and abstract nature of force allows authors to construe social or emotional pressures as 
the cause of their actions, thereby limiting their own responsibility.  Existing literature 
on the experience of warfare (Keegan, 1976; Leed, 1979, Bourke, 1999) emphasises the 
impersonal nature of conflict as an experience in which the soldier is ‘coerced […] by 
vast, unlocalised forces’ (Keegan, 1976: 324).  With this in mind, construals which 
foreground heads of action chains other than the narrator are a promising indication of 
stylistic feature of war writing more generally. 
8.2.3: Disnarration 
 
 As well as examining the ways in which the individual clauses which construe 
the act of killing are constructed across the primary sources, disnarration (Prince, 1988) 
has been frequently observed (Ch. 4.3.2; 5.1; 6.5; 7.6) across the texts examined in this 
thesis, as narrators foregrounded alternative outcomes, detailing the dangers of deciding 
not to act violently.  By construing hypothetical scenarios, these authors pre-empted 
resistant readings of their representations of events (cf. Browse, in press 2018).  In the 
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case of drone pilots in particular, disnarration allowed the authors to situate their 
experiences within scripted frames of understanding war, which was used to both 
exemplify the differences between their experiences and those of ground troops (5.1), 
and foreground similarities (5.6).   In the same way that the perception of intentionality 
was described as a ‘network of possible explanations’ (Ch. 6.4.2), disnarration restricts 
the number of possible outcomes, encouraging the reader to view the course of events in 
which the narrator kills as the most logical, primarily in terms of self-preservation.  
Describing what could have been affords narrators the possibility of situating events 
which actually occurred within an evaluative frame which serves to justify their actions.  
8.3: Findings for Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 As well as noting stylistic patterns across the primary texts, this research has 
been equally concerned with the development of its analytical methods, and the 
practices associated with its conceptual frameworks.  In particular, it has supported the 
development of reader response methods in Critical Discourse Analysis.  Additionally, in 
breaking down the concept of agency into its constituent concepts (Ch. 7.2), this thesis 
proposes that analyists interested in the discussion of agency in language and society 
take greater care in distinguishing between the two concepts, and recognising the 
distinction between the composite factors which affect their perception, such as 
intentionality, responsibility, and blame. 
8.2.1: Researcher Subjectivity and the Reading Process 
 
Critiques of Critical Discourse Analysis have long been concerned with the ways 
in which CDA selects (Widdowson, 1998), analyses (Stubbs, 1997; O’Halloran, 2003; 
Breeze, 2013), and writes about (Billig, 2008) its source material.  As a result, the reader 
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response studies in this thesis (Ch. 3.5; 7.5) have supported the textual analysis of their 
associated stylistic features, and indicated areas in which the research methodology 
required adaptation.  In particular, the discussion of unexpected findings (Ch. 3.5.4; 7.5.5) 
prompted reflexive consideration of the ideological and intellectual positon from which 
this research has been conducted. 
At first glance, a Critical Discourse Analysis which aims for objectivity may at 
best seem paradoxical, as the ideological position of the researcher has often been 
described as inextricable from the research itself (Fairclough, 2001; O’Halloran, 2003; 
Butt et al., 2004; Sorsoli, 2007).  Given the capacity for readers to extrapolate any 
number of potential interpretations from a source text, supporting critical analysis of 
linguistic features with reader-response data indicates the likelihood of given 
interpretations.  The continued development of a cognitive model of language 
contributes to this aim, and this thesis has shown how one particular dimension of 
meaning can be affected by both linguistic and social factors. 
8.2.2: The Structure of Agency 
 
From the outset, this thesis has been concerned with the function and 
perception of ‘agency’, both as a feature of grammar and a social concept.  In Chapter 2, 
the conceptualisation of agency in language was examined comparatively across 
Systemic Functional (2.2) and Cognitive Grammar (2.3) approaches to transitivity and 
force.  The use of the term ‘agency’ in critical commentary was problematised, however, 
with the observation that the linguistic category of agent has often been conflated with 
the concept of social agency, a term itself used to cover a range of perceptions from 
intentionality to responsibility (3.2.1).  Later studies (7.3), further suggest that readers’ 
assessments of intent and responsibility, which are partially affected by lexicogrammar, 
are also affected by pre-existing scripts of activity developed through previous usage.  
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Understanding more precisely how the perception of agency can be segmented into its 
constituent concepts, as well as how these concepts can be investigated linguistically, 
will be a rich source of continuing research.  For now, this thesis has shown that 
segmenting the concept of agency into its constituent elements of causality, 
intentionality, and responsibility demonstrates the value of Cognitive Grammar’s 
modelling of force in explaining the construal of events, but has also highlighted its 
present limits.  
By breaking the concept of agency into its constituent elements, this research 
has developed a gradual analysis of each aspect independently.  Beginning with causality 
in Chapters 2 and 3, followed by the sense of selfhood (Chapters 4 and 5), and 
intentional action (Chapters 6 and 7), the perception of agency is borne from an 
amalgam of inferential cognitive processes, relying on cultural scripts and mind-
modelling in order to draw probabilistic conclusions about actors and their goals.  In 
many cases, the precise reasons for an actor’s actions remains unspecified, or 
multivalent, but recognising the capacity for intent, alongside probable associated goals, 
provides an insight into the ways in which readers can reach multiple and even 
competing interpretations of actions and actors.  A probabilistic model of interpretation, 
then, both takes into account the construal of information presented to the reader by 
the text, its discursive context, as well as the capacity for each individual readers’ 
background knowledge to affect their perceptions, from the intentions of an actor to the 
meaning of a story.  As Labov (2013) notes of believability in oral narratives of personal 
experience, ‘a credible narrative is one in which the sequence of events is plausible in 
accordance with what we know of human behaviour’ (225, my emphasis).  Even beyond 
cognitivist approaches to language, modelling the capacity for particular behaviours is 
inherent to the process of making inferences about actors and events in narrative.  
Likewise, in the individual event clauses which constitute narratives, readers’ 
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evaluations of agency are founded on an interrelated network of lexicogrammatical cues, 
and more diverse social knowledge, whereby previous usage establishes scripts of 
probable activity which allow for the modelling of prototypical intentions. 
8.4: Findings for Cognitive Grammar 
 
 Cognitive Grammar has been employed as a framework for the critical analysis of 
clause and discourse-level language throughout this thesis.  With the increasing 
application of Cognitive Grammar to critical and stylistic analyses in recent years 
(Stockwell, 2009; Hart, 2013; 2014; 2018; Harrison et al., 2014; Harrison, 2017; Browse, in 
press 2018; Giovanelli and Harrison, in press 2018), this thesis has reflected on the 
present applications of Cognitive Grammar to discourse, alongside its limitations 
(Pincombe, 2014).  In addressing these challenges, this thesis has contributed both to 
the application of the framework to the analysis of a new genre, and to adapting its 
conceptualisation of actions and events, with a view to overcoming its present 
boundaries. 
8.4.1: Event Models in Critical Analysis 
 
 In the introduction to the clausal analysis of Chapter 2, Cognitive Grammar was 
presented as the preferred linguistic framework through which to discuss acts of killing 
in war writing.  Cognitive approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis have largely been 
concerned with the role of metaphor in ideology (Goatly, 2007; Hart, 2008; 2011a 
Underhill, 2011; Musolff, 2012; Ana et al., 2017).  By contrast, this thesis has primarily 
examined the construal of force and causality in events in language.  Given the close 
attention of this research to event clauses concerned with physical motion and acts of 
violence, the billiard-ball model (Langacker, 2008: 355) allowed for straightforward 
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representations of the various ways in which force was construed in soldiers’ language.  
In close association with the concepts of granularity and prominence (2.3.2), modelling 
events in these terms provides an effective means of critically discussing the causal 
relationships between participants.  Findings regarding the language of soldiers’ war 
writings (8.2.1; 8.2.2), for example, are readily explicable in these terms, and Cognitive 
Grammar is well equipped to assess the conceptualisation of force in individual clauses.  
8.4.2: Scaling Cognitive Grammar to the Analysis of Discourse 
 
With the introduction of reader response studies to the investigation, the role of 
context in the readers’ interpretations of individual clauses became apparent (3.5).  
Subsequently, the role of narrative structure and identity (Chaper 4), cultural familiarity 
(Chapter 5), and socio-cultural assessments (Chapters 6 and 7) have each been 
examined as factors in the process of interpretation.  While convenient for the 
modelling of motion and force in Cognitive Grammar, the isolation of individual clauses 
from their discursive context fails to reflect the interpretative practices of ordinary 
readers.  While Langacker (2008) has emphasised the importance of discursive context 
in the interpretation of grammatical structure and meaning, he also acknowledges that 
the modelling of discourse in CG is in its infancy (vii), with the complexity of the model 
drawing concern with regard to its practical applicability to larger units of discourse.  
This thesis has suggested that a model of analysis based on the perception of 
intentionality provides a solution to this issue when producing a cognitively-oriented 
analysis of similar scope to the transitivity profiling of Systemic Functional approaches 
(Simpson, 2003; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014).  In grouping activities according to the 
capacity for action, activity across a discourse can be analysed selectively without 
recourse to mapping each aspect of its construals.   
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The adaptation of the Reference Point Model (Langacker, 2008: 83-88) to the 
analysis of discourse has recently been explored in cognitive poetic research (Stockwell, 
2009; van Vliet, 2009; Harrison, 2017).  This thesis has contributed to this development 
by suggesting that inferred intentions can operate as reference points (6.6), affecting 
readers’ perceptions of actors and their actions in relation to narrative context and 
background knowledge.  Moreover, comparisons between the role of intentionality in 
the perception of meaning and conventional applications of the Reference Point Model 
contribute to the analysis of ways in which characters and their intentions or beliefs 
develop across a text.  While this has clear implications for fiction, where the goals and 
beliefs of characters can change and develop over a substantial period of time, it also 
represents significant possibilities for critical analysis.  Being able to trace gradual 
ideological shifts in discourse, for instance, is a direct application of this approach with 
substantial social impact.  Once again, the success of this approach relies on research 
supported by non-specialist readers’ interpretations.  As this research has shown, 
readers have the capacity to assess a wide range of responses to the intentionality of an 
action, let alone infer specific intentions.  With increasing reference to these readers’ 
responses to a text, studies interested in the perceived goals of action – and their 
consequences for judgements of responsibility and blameworthiness – can be further 
grounded in everyday reading practices.  Just as the processing of clause-level meaning 
requires the consideration of the interaction between its lexicogrammatical components, 
so the reading of discourse is grounded in selective attention to the events and 
participants which make up its narrative. 
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8.5: Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 
 In focusing on the construal of a particular kind of action across a range of 
primary sources, this thesis has been deliberately restrained in its discussion of the 
language of war writing more generally.  Although the discussion throughout this 
chapter has indicated directions in which further research could be conducted, two key 
directions are outline explicitly below, in which long-term, large-scale research projects 
could be readily developed: namely, further points of interest in the language of war 
writing (8.5.1), and the development of intentionality as an approach to discourse-level 
analysis (8.5.2).  Each proposes a number of possible directions within each research 
interest, demonstrating the versatility of this research in its analysis of both the primary 
material and its own linguistic framework. 
8.5.1: Further Research on War Writing 
 
As well as examining the representation of violence in additional texts, the close 
reading of drone pilots’ memoirs in Chapter 5 suggests that the technological distance 
between combatants affects the ways in which violence is perceived and reported.  
Moreover, this thesis has remained focused on one small aspect of soldiers’ experiences 
of conflict.  It would be particularly interesting, for example, to compare the ways in 
which soldiers construe the injuring of others to the language they employ to their own 
injuries.  Likewise, Kleeinresink (2014) shows that soldiers from different countries 
choose to publish their memoirs for different reasons, and a cross-cultural stylistic 
analysis could prove to be a fascinating next step in situating the linguistic choices of 
soldiers in socio-cultural settings. 
Expanding the discussion of war writing established in this thesis, in order to 
assert whether the stylistic features noted in the sampled texts represent trends in the 
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style of the genre, requires substantial developments in archival practices.  At present, 
the majority of archived material at the Imperial War Museum has not been digitalised, 
and the limited number of texts available online have been entered as images, meaning 
that individual words cannot be searched for, or readily tagged as tokens in a corpus 
linguistic project.  Additionally, the genre of war writing itself has been considered 
within a limited scope.  Applying the methods advanced in this research to literary war 
memoirs, for example, or fiction produced by veterans, would provide comparative 
frames of reference from which to discuss the effects and significance of linguistic 
construals chosen by veterans themselves.  Similarly, as the discussion of drone 
warfare’s representation in contemporary cinema (5.6) indicates, war is construed as a 
cultural artefact as well as a political one.  Given the frequent references to video games 
noted in drone pilots’ accounts of combat (5.3) contemporary war writing may arise 
from a bi-directional relationship in which culturally constructed, fictionalised 
representations of conflict in form the ways in which actual military experience is 
presented.  A logical next step in the study of soldiers’ war writings, then, could be the 
interaction of these forms, and the consequences for the everyday perception of conflict 
and military experience. 
8.5.2: Advancing the Model of Intentionality 
 
While the model for the discussion of intentionality in discourse advanced in 
Chapter 6 and 7 has been applied to a single style of writing within this thesis, the 
theory itself is designed to model the perception of intentions in language generally, and 
is readily applicable to other genres of narrative.  Indeed, future work concerning the 
role of perceptions of intentionality as reference points across discourse (Ch. 6.6) would 
benefit from extending the study to new kinds of text.  Given that the texts examined in 
this thesis have been concerned with the construal, and sometimes justification, of acts 
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of violence, the reader’s ability to infer the intentionality of actions has been particularly 
important.  In different contexts, such as legal, political, or fictional discourse, the 
significance of intentionality as a prominent feature of character identity may vary.  
Nonetheless, understanding that agents’ minds are modelled through a comparison with 
our own thoughts and experiences (Zunshine, 2006; Stockwell, 2009) is central to the 
cognitive approach to stylistics.  Examining the ways in which readers are able to infer 
such intentions, therefore, is part of a logical development in the tool-kit of stylistically-
focused analysis for examining larger units of text.   
The reader response studies of Chapters 3 and 7 produced valuable responses 
served to demonstrate the subjective biases of the individual researcher in selecting 
stylistic for analysis and discussion.  However, their sample sizes limit the ability to 
extrapolate their findings to reading practices more generally.  Producing similar studies 
with larger cohorts, then, is an immediate direction for ongoing research into the 
perception of events and intentions in language.  In addition to replicating the questions 
asked in the present studies, future research could probe readers for more specific 
responses with regards to actors’ intentions.  This in turns moves from an observation 
that intentionality is perceived, to more specific evidence of exactly what kinds of 
intentions are commonly associated with particular lexicogrammatical structures.  With 
a more qualitative assessment of intentionality, a study into the goals associated with 
particular acts – both in isolation and broader discursive context – would shed further 
light on the ways in which pre-existing background knowledge affects readers’ 
assessments of actors’ minds.  Such research would be well-suited to the present 
directions of cognitive poetics, and would benefit an understanding of readers’ 
engagement with fictional characters, as well as their evaluation of real-world actors 
represented in language. 
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Recently, Nakamura (2018) has suggested that probability, not morality, explains 
the disparity between readers’ assessments of intentionality in identical actions with 
socially positive or negative outcomes, while Kukkonen (2014) has posited the 
applicability of a Bayesian model of probability to the understanding of readers’ 
engagement with fictional narratives.  As was noted, the model of intentionality in this 
thesis views the inference of intentions as probabilistic (6.3; 6.4.2).  Extrapolating the 
role of probability in mind-modelling and cognition to consider the ideological 
dimensions of other forms of discourse, such as the perception of causality and the 
assignation of responsibility, an approach to CDA grounded in models of probability will 
be well equipped to explore meaning in both narrow (what the reader is likely to infer) 
and broader (what the reader could infer) senses. 
8.6: Conclusion 
 
 Language always encodes a perspective upon the events it describes, regardless 
of the purpose of the discourse in question.  From the perspective of traditional Critical 
Discourse Analysis, which takes as the subject of its analysis ‘the power elites that enact, 
sustain, legitimate, condone, or ignore social inequality and injustice’ (van Dijk, 1993: 
252), soldiers’ own writings are an overlooked genre in which the construction and 
perception of agency in language, and its association with ideology, is crucial.  As has 
been stated from the beginning of this thesis, these texts represent a challenging 
environment (1.3) in which to examine these concepts critically, as the moral and 
ideological analysis of killing in war is multi-faceted.  By looking beyond newspaper 
reports and political discourse, to instead examine the construals of the actors 
themselves, this thesis proposes that not only can CDA be applied to unconventional 
genres of discourse, but that the analysis of morally ambiguous texts requires an 
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introspective assessment of the ways in which ideological positions are inferred.  To 
write about perpetrating acts of violence is a careful negotiation of social and moral 
boundaries through language, and the stylistic analysis of these texts’ language refines 
the ways in which critical analysis is conducted across discourse. 
 Modelling the relationship between lexicogrammar, socio-cultural knowledge, 
and the beliefs and opinions of the reader requires a linguistic framework which situates 
language directly within everyday perceptual processes and cognitive activity.  With its 
capacity to model knowledge beyond that presented in the immediate text, Cognitive 
Grammar showcases a complex but powerful approach to meaning structure, in the 
infancy of its application to discourse analysis.  In this thesis, its capacity to represent 
the transfer of force from actors to patients in language provided a logical 
conceptualisation of the construals inherent to the discussion of military violence, 
although this represents only one dimension of its model of linguistic meaning.  In 
negotiating the relationship between language, cognition, and context, the findings of 
this thesis contribute to the ongoing development of a model of linguistic analysis 
which seeks not only to understand how language and communication work, but how 
our perceptions of the world and the minds of others are continually shaped by 
discourse and society. 
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A.2: Source Text and Participant Responses  
Section 1 - Text: 
 Re-aligning ourselves to our officer’s liking we started off on our attack, heading 
for the line of shell-bursts.  It was heavy going over the torn-up earth but all else was 
easy, and our artillery had done a great job in preparing the path for us; no bullets came 
our way and we gradually lost the crouch which a soldier instinctively adopts when in 
danger.  As we drew near to our goal the barrage lifted and we simply walked on 
through a shattered landscape where no one could possibly have survived unless 
sheltered in deep, well-made bunkers. 
Section 2 – Text: 
 We carried on to our ‘stop line’, just short of a small and scattered hamlet of 
sorts.  Due to the shortened winter day and the miserable weather it was darkening 
rapidly and we couldn’t see too well.  We dug ourselves in, fully on the alert as Jerry was 
a master of the sudden counter-attack.  Nothing happened and we were just 
congratulating ourselves, thinking the Germans had more or less given up, when, 
without warning, a persistant ‘stonk’ began (‘stonk’ was the Army’s slang term for a bout 
of enemy shelling).  Every few minutes a couple of heavy mortar bombs would fall 
among us.  As we were well dug-in, proof against all except a direct hit or a very near 
miss, no one was hurt… The mortaring was far too accurate for it to be the result of a 
random map-shoot by the enemy and our officer realised we must be under observation 
– and pretty close observation at that – as every time a group left their cover for any 
reason, over came another pair of bombs. 
 He reckoned the observer just had to be in one or other of the houses near to us.  
It was now too dark, despite the artificial moonlight, for anyone to observe us from a 
greater distance.  He called upon our tank group; they rattled up and took stock of the 
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situation, then blew the houses to but with their guns, following up by going to each in 
turn and setting fire to it was a liberal dose of tracer.  The mortaring stopped soon after 
this so it was assumed the observer had been killed. 
Section 3 – Text:  
 Again Tom had read the situation correctly.  He had realised that the attack on 
our right wasn’t being pressed home so was in all likelihood a feint.  The mortaring was 
also part of the ploy, all designed to keep our attention elsewhere while the main attack 
came from our front.  The enemy had worked through the young, dense trees in order to 
assault the crossroads from our side. 
 Everyone opened fire, dropping a number of the Germans in their tracks.  Some 
of them immediately went to ground, firing back at us while still others began the usual 
‘fire and movement’ tactics, alternately sprinting and dropping behind new cover, there 
to open fire themselves while others repeated the manoeuvre. 
 Shouting to us to cover him, Tom jumped from his trench and ran over to the 
tanks, the crews of which had fallen for the feint attack and had swung their turrets 
towards it.  Reaching the sheltered side of the first one he beat upon it with the butt of 
his Sten-gun; the officer peeped out through a hatch and Tom told him of the attack 
that was developing.  They swung their guns around as Tom dashed back to us. 
 
Section 4 – Text: 
 We had maintained a non-stop fire all this while, keeping the attackers from 
forming any cohesive pattern and a number of them lay in the open where they had 
been cut down.  One of them, obviously wounded, attempted to bring his Spandau to 
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bear on us but he was seen by Les on the Bren gun who gave him a burst.  The man’s 
head literally exploded as the bullets smashed into it.  Seeing this, our men began to put 
bullets into the other bodies lying about whenever they hadn’t a live target to fire at.  
The tanks joined in, adding their machine-gun fire to the mass of metal which was being 
poured at the Germans, now perhaps fifty or more strong, but forced to spread out with 
little chance of advancing.  The trees to our front were mature and well spaced-out so 
there was little cover for the attackers. 
Section 5 – Text: 
 I saw one of the enemy soldiers slip from behind one tree to another, nearer one.  
As the two were almost in line with us he hadn’t been seen by anyone else.  Realising 
that he must be standing upright and sideways on so as to be hidden, I reckoned that, 
though the centre of the trunk was thick enough to stop a bullet, the edges would 
certainly let one through and, as the tree was not too broad, I would stand a chance of 
getting the man behind it.  My Sten, with its low-powered pistol ammunition, stood 
little chance of this so I grabbed Frank’s rifle, aimed at a point about a third in from the 
edge of the trunk and fired: the man pitched forward to lie on his face.  All this took far 
less time than it takes to tell. 
Section 5 – Reader Reconstruals: 
 R1: One of our soldiers sees an enemy soldier move from being behind one tree 
to another. The soldier works out that he must be standing up right so that no other 
soldiers can see him. The soldier who has seen him shoots him with another soldier's 
rifle. 
 R2: The soldier was now fully alert and looking for the enemy. He spotted on 
behind a tree and realised his own weapon would be ineffective against this position. So, 
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using a mate's more powerful weapon, he calculates how to 'drop' the enemy, which he 
succeeds doing. 
 R3: The narrator kills a man behind a tree. 
 R4: The narrator borrows Frank's rifle to kill an enemy soldier hidden behind a 
tree. He needed the rifle because his pistol wasn't powerful enough to fire through the 
trunk. 
 R5: One enemy soldier was moving from one tree t another, The narrator killed 
him with a carefully aimed rifle shot penetrating the edge of the tree the enemy soldier 
was sheltering behind, 
 R6: One soldier spotted a German soldier hiding who may have been the man 
behind the attack, and so took someone else's gun which was better and shot the hiding 
soldier all in an short space of time. 
 R7: This soldier noticed that there was a man hiding behind a tree and that only 
he could kill him. To do this, he figured he'd need a more powerful gun and to shoot 
through the edge of the tree. He used someone else's gun and shot accurately where he 
needed to, killing the soldier behind the tree. 
 R8: Seeing an enemy soldier hide behind a tree he sees an opportunity for a kill, 
the tree wouldn't be cover enough. Realising his machine gun wouldn't be powerful 
enough to penetrate the tree he borrowed a friends rifle and shot, he was successful and 
the enemy fell. 
 R9: The writer recounts his ingenuity in finding a way to kill one of the enemy 
who he realises is hiding behind a tree. 
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 R10: I saw a man hiding behind the tree, so I shot him with my friend's better 
gun. 
Section 5 –Evaluation: 
 R1: This text has not evoked as much feeling in me as the others, I'm not sure 
why! 
 R3: It's very rational in the sense that is a presentation of a sequence of events 
and the thought processes he has about them. Again, there seems very little emotion. 
 R4: Again, action packed. Part of me felt triumphant that the narrator got one 
up on 'jerry', another part of me feels I shouldn't approve of killing and glorifying war. 
 R5: Nathan Bedford Forrest "d unto them as they would do unto you, But do it 
fur'stest 
 R8: The soldier is putting thought into how to kill the enemy in a sort of 
scientific way and is successful. 
 R10: I bet the other man thought he was so sneaky and cunning sneaking around 
behind the trees. And then he died. 
Section 6 – Text: 
 Beckoning to our stretcher-bearers to come and deal with the casualties, I told 
Dave about “my” victim.  Finding him, we looked at the tree trunk.  Sure enough, the 
bullet had ripped clean through it.  Looking at the man, it was obvious that the bullet 
had flattened on its path through the wood and had then caught the poor devil across 
the shoulders, tearing out both shoulder blades and making a terrible, messy wound 
from the blood which was still oozing despite the fact that a great deal of bleeding had 
already taken place, forming a thick red pool in the pine needles.  Turning him over, we 
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saw a young man of my age – a teenager in fact.  To my surprise and horror he was still 
alive – but only just.  Somehow or other his body had survived the awful would inflicted 
upon it. I stood, transfixed for what seemed like an eternity, looking down at the lad.  
Visions of his possibly being saved raced through my mind and I called to Jimmy, one of 
our first-aiders.  ‘Come over and look at this guy, Jim.’ 
 He came over and gave the young German a casual glance.  ‘He’s nearly dead, 
won’t be long.’ 
 ‘Can you do anything for him?’ 
 ‘No, he’s as good as gone.’ 
 As we spoke the German lad simply died… no rattle, no movement, nothing at all; 
his life simply left his mutilated body; the only visible sign was that his eyes glazed over.  
Jim checked his pulse.  ‘He’s gone,’ said he. 
Section 6 – Evaluation: 
 R1: I said that the last passage didn't evoke much emotion, but now that I have 
seen the other side of the story, it has made me reflect more on the last passage and 
brings home the reality of war. The people you shoot from far away are real people, with 
real lives, not just 'the enemy'. 
 R2: Although taken aback by the sight of the dying soldier's wounds and age, is 
the soldier who'd fired the shot nevertheless offering some kind of 'fair play' when 
wanting to help? It's just a game, I shoot you, you shoot me. 
 R3: This extract has more emotion with words like 'terrible', 'awful', 'poor devil', 
'mutilated'. The emotion seems a little perfunctory perhaps? 
 R4: I warmed to the narrator as the harsh reality of war hits him. I'm wondering 
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if the stretcher bearers are there to deal with German casualties as well as allied? The 
fact that the German soldier is so young is truly sad. I don't think soldiers on either side 
had much choice in whether to go to war or not. 
 R6: The soldier who had shot the other soldier felt sorry for him and wanted to 
help him as he related to him as they were the same age and he had seen what he had 
done to him. 
 R8: After shooting the enemy he goes to help him with a stretcher bearer, sees 
the injuries to the man and seeks first aid help, all to no avail, as the man dies. These are 
humane actions to help, that follow cleverly thought out actions to injure / kill the man 
initially. A massive contradiction of actions in a short period of time 
 R9: The writer expresses a degree of empathy when face to face with one of the 
enemy, as distinct from the enemy being at a distance. 
 R10: Did the narrator feel remorse? He wanted to save him? Was it just because 
the victim was young or because he felt the guilt himself at having done that to someone? 
Section 7 – Text: 
 I felt devastated.  This was strange since he and his comrades but a short while 
ago were out to kill me and my mates.  It was a totally irrational feeling.   I tried to tell 
myself that if I hadn’t shot him he would have taken the greatest pleasure in shooting 
me, but it had little effect.  Had he been dead or more normally wounded when I found 
him it wouldn’t have bothered me.  It was the sight of that ghastly wound combined 
with his being alive that got to me.  Looking back, I’m glad he died.  If he had been 
taken back and by a miracle restored to some degree of life, then he would surely have 
been a wreck of a man and I would probably never have lost the feeling of guilt that 
possessed me for a while on that day. 
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Section 7 – Evaluation: 
 R1: This has confused me because maybe I have got the last passage wrong and it 
was not his comrade who found him dead but his enemy... It is important to hear how 
doing something like killing the enemy can be difficult for the soldiers, as they think 
about the life that that person had and that they have taken away. 
 R3: The claim that his feelings of devastation are 'totally irrational' is strange, as 
I think they are quite normal. I mean, it's a human being that he's dealing with here - 
someone his own age roughly and quite young. Of course that would be devastating, 
even if it is an enemy. It's also strange he says he is glad the enemy solider died for the 
reason that he would feel guilty about it if he had lived on in suffering. He could 
conceivably feel guilty simply for him dying too. I wouldn't want to judge the narrator 
too harshly because feelings are feelings and I wouldn't want to second guess him, but I 
think the reaction here are a little strange. I mean, he ascribes a viciousness to the 
enemy soldier which he does not apply to himself - saying that the enemy soldier would 
'take pleasure' in killing him. How does he not know the enemy soldier would have the 
same guilty feeling about killing an Allied soldier? It is also strange that a 'devastating' 
feeling of guilt only 'possessed him for a while on that day'. This seems like a very short 
time to feel devastated. 
 R4: Its a hard thing to come to terms with, shooting someone and seeing the 
results. As the daughter of a soldier (who has certainly killed people) this has made me 
think about my dad and the horrendous affect of military service on his mental health. 
In war there are no victors. 
 R5: Having spent a year as a casualty officer,a year doing neurosurgery and more 
than 25 years as a coroner, I'm afraid that the the nature of fatal injuries, and survivors' 
reactions to them doesn't upset me as much as perhaps it should. When you see a 25 
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year old woman who has, quite literally, blown her head off with a shotgun, it gives you 
a certain perspective. 
 R8: Conflicting emotions again, the injuries caused to the man caused problems, 
he finds himself wishing a less serious injury was caused to the man, that the man could 
have been killed straight away, then glad he died as he would have been forever guilty if 
the man had survived and lived with the wounds. 
 R9: It might be that the wounded enemy soldier would have agreed that early 
death was preferable to continued but severely maimed life, but the writer imposes his 
own view of that choice and thus comforts himself. 
 R10: Total rationalisation. Makes sense, I suppose, because how else do you live 
with yourself knowing that you killed someone and they died slowly and painfully, and 
it was because of you? Better to believe that really had he lived, the soldier would have 
had an awful painful life. Killing him was a favour. 
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Appendix B: Signed consent forms and email correspondence 
with Charles Sasser (B.1) and Kevin Maurer (B.2), regarding the 
citation of personal correspondence (Ch. 5.2) 
 B.1.1: Charles Sasser – Consent Form 
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B.1.2: Email Correspondence with Charles Sasse r 
 
17/5/2017 
Dear Mr Sasser, 
My name is Matthew Voice, and I am a PhD researcher at the University of Sheffield, in 
the UK.  In the course of my research on the language of violence in military memoir, I 
came across 'Predator: The Remote-Control Air War over Iraq and Afghanistan: A Pilot's 
Story', co-authored by Matthew Martin and yourself. 
Because my research interest is in the language used by soldiers to describe their 
experiences, I wanted to contact you directly to ask a few questions about the writing of 
the book.  How did you come to collaborate with Matthew Martin on the book?  At what 
stage did you become involved in the book's development, and did you act as a writer, 
advisor, or in some other role?  I hope you can find the time to shed some light on the 
process, and I look forward to hearing from you soon.  If you have any questions for me, 
I would be more than happy to answer them. 
Yours sincerely, 
Matthew Voice 
 
 
18/5/2017 
Dear Mr. Voice. Matt is a friend; I’m a professional writer with over 60 books published, 
thousand of magazine articles. I’m also a veteran of 29 years in the U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Army, 13 of those years in Army Special Forces (Green Berets). I’ve published a number 
of books about the military. The most recent fiction are, just published: SIX; BLOOD 
BROTHERS; and SIX:END GAME—the novelization of the History channel drama  mini-
series, SIX., based on U.S. Navy SEALs.  The most recent non-fiction published this year, 
also military, are NIGHT FIGHTER, and BLOOD IN THE HILLS. 
I’d be happy to help if I can. 
Chuck sasser 
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19/05/2017 
Dear Mr Sasser, 
Thank you so much for your swift response.  It's really useful for me knowing a bit more 
about your relationship with Matt.  I'd like to know a little bit more about the process of 
writing the book, and your involvement.  Your name appears next to Matt's on the cover, 
and I'd like to establish which parts of the book you were involved with, and in what 
way. 
 
22/05/2017 
Mr. Voice— 
The process of writing PREDATOR, is I interviewed Matt and from those interviews and 
my research wrote the book. Hope your project goes well. 
 
22/05/2017 
Dear Mr Sasser, 
Thank you again for your reply. As a linguist interested in language use, it's important 
for me to know who produced the text in the first place. This is incredibly valuable 
information for me and my work, and I appreciate your response immensely.  Would 
you be happy for me to include this conversation within the appendix of my PhD? Being 
able to refer to it directly will make my discussion of the book a great deal better. 
As my research is particularly focused around scenes of combat, I would be keenly 
interested in knowing exactly which details of the book came from Matthew Martin 
through your interviews. Do you still have records of those interviews, and is there any 
way you would be willing to share them with me for research purposes? 
Finally, I would be interested to know whether you believe your own combat experience 
influenced your writing. I appreciate these are a lot of questions, but I'm very keen to 
accurately represent your role in writing the book. 
 
03/06/2017 
Sorry I couldn’t get back with you right away—but I’m often on deadlines that demand 
foreign travel. Anyhow, the truth is that Matt and I were both career military men. As 
such, military people speak a particular language that you see in my military books. It 
has to do with nomenclature, environment of fighting men, understanding of so many 
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various missions scattered across the various military branches the details of which we 
often share, and the face [sic] that so many of us depend on each other for that 
understanding. For example, I was in Army Special Forces (Green Berets) for 13 years. 
During that time, on missions, we depended upon Air Force people like Matt for 
support, and on Air Force for our transportation and insertions, upon Navy at times for 
insertions and air support, as well as upon Marines for various tasks. You see, all 
branches of the U.S. military are in many ways interlocked and made stronger by the 
fact that we all speak the same military language. I don’t know how to explain it any 
better than that. 
Same goes for the books I write about military people. I do take extensive notes, but not 
always on the minor details other than the subject’s interaction with whatever his 
mission might be. The individual is most important in these stories, not the overall 
nomenclature. If you can get a copy of THE SNIPER HANDBOOK, published by Sword 
& Pen in Britain, you will find one of my pieces I did on WWII Russian female sniper 
Ludymila Pavlichenko, “the most dangerous woman in the world.” Writing about the 
military from ancient times to foreign militaries is essentially a military understanding 
in common. 
 
14/12/2017 
Dear Charles, 
I am writing again to thank you for answering my questions about Predator.  
Understanding your involvement in the process of writing the book has been very 
helpful for me in my own work.  As a result, I would like to quote passages from our 
correspondance in my PhD thesis.  In order to do this, however, I need your explicit 
consent.  I have attached to this email a participant information sheet, which explains a 
bit more about the nature of my work, and exactly how I would like to quote your 
correspondance.  If you are happy with this, please attach a digital signature to the 
document, or print and sign it then send me a scan, so that I can provide evidence of 
your consent.  If you have any questions about this, please don't hesitate to email me. 
 
15/12/2017 
Morning, Matt. No problem. I’ll sign and return the form to you. I’d love to read your 
paper itself when you’ve finished and published. Only, I have no idea how to use a 
digital signature—and I don’t scan. Send me a mailing address, please, and I’ll mail it to 
you promptly. (I like to keep life simple without so many machines controlling our lives, 
which, I believe, is ultimately a great danger to mankind and civilization.) Anyhow, 
good luck. 
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B.2: Kevin Maurer –  Consent Form 
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B.2.2: Email correspondence with Kevin Maurer 
24/5/2017 
Dear Mr Maurer, 
My name is Matthew Voice, and I am a PhD researcher at the University of Sheffield, in 
the UK.  In the course of my research on the language of violence in military memoir, I 
came across 'Hunter Killer: Inside the Lethal World of Drone Warfare', which you co-
authored with Lt. Col. T. Mark McCurley. 
Because my research interest is in the language used by soldiers to describe their 
experiences, I wanted to get a bit more detail with regards to the process of writing the 
book.  From my experience in contacting other authors, my understanding has been 
that the second author has interviewed the soldier, before writing up the book.  Was 
this the case with 'Hunter Killer'?  If so, I'd be really interested to know how the writing 
relates to the source material.  If not, then further clarification of the writing process 
would be most welcome. 
I hope you can find the time to shed some light on the process, and I look forward to 
hearing from you soon.  If you have any questions for me, I would be more than happy 
to answer them. 
Yours sincerely, 
Matthew Voice 
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23/5/2017 
Hey Matthew, 
Thanks for reaching out. McCurley wrote the first draft of Hunter Killer and I revised it 
from there. Unlike other books I've done, this one had more of my co-writer's work than 
usual. I'd be happy to talk about other projects, but for this one I usually took 
McCurley's chapters and rewrote from there. 
Kevin 
 
25/5/2017 
Hi Kevin, 
Thanks so much for your swift response.  As a linguist, I'd love to know a bit more about 
what the process of rewriting means, exactly.  My research interest is in the way 
language represents experience, particularly in the context of conflict, and the idea of a 
third party being involved in the editing of someone's autobiographical writing really 
intrigues me.  How do you go about rewriting that kind of work, and how does the 
process differ from representing the events and experiences in a book like No Easy Day? 
 
14/12/2017 
Hi Kevin, 
I am writing again to thank you for answering my questions about Hunter Killer.  
Understanding your involvement in the process of writing the book has been very 
helpful for me in my own work.  As a result, I would like to quote passages from our 
correspondance in my PhD thesis.  In order to do this, however, I need your explicit 
consent.  I have attached to this email a participant information sheet, which explains a 
bit more about the nature of my work, and exactly how I would like to quote your 
correspondance.  If you are happy with this, please attach a digital signature to the 
document, or print and sign it then send me a scan, so that I can provide evidence of 
your consent.  If you have any questions about this, please don't hesitate to email me. 
 
14/12/2017 
Hey Matthew, 
 
Happy to help. Don't hesitate to contact me if you need anything else. 
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Appendix C: Participant responses for the study of perceptions of 
intentionality and responsibility (Chapter 7) 
 
C.1: Question Structure 
1) In your own words, please describe the most important event of this story. 
2) Is the person/thing who performs the most important event acting 
intentionally? (1 = not acting intentionally, 10 = Acting intentionally) 
3) To what extent is the person/thing that performs the most important 
event responsible for it? (1 = not at all responsible, 10 = highly responsible) 
4) Please complete this sentence: the person/thing responsible for the most 
important event should be _______ for it. 
a) Praised 
b) Blamed 
c) Neither  
5) If you have any further thoughts on ‘A Nightmare’ or the questions you 
were asked about the story, please record them here. 
 
C.2: Participant Responses 
 
R1: ‘The german raid and artillery strike, as this led to the german soldier 
entering the bunker.’ 
  Intentionality: 8 
  Responsibility: 9 
  Praise/blame: Neither 
 R2: ‘The discovery that the man he shot was not a threat to him but was close to 
death and trying to find safety.’ 
  Intentionality: 10 
  Responsibility: 8 
  Praise/blame: Neither 
 R3: ‘The shooting of the German in terror for his life, not realising he was injured’ 
  Intentionality: 10 
  Responsibility: 8 
  Praise/blame: Neither 
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 ‘The fact that it happens in a war zone makes a difference. It was reasonable to 
believe his own life was in danger.’ 
 R4: ‘The most important part of the story is the protagonist waiting in the 
pillbox, hearing the sound of someone approaching and feeling afraid and not knowing 
what to do.’ 
  Intentionality: 10 
  Responsibility: 7 
  Praise/blame: Neither 
 R5: Sparrer came back with the chisel, and some rum and hot tea. From the 
point of view of the other man, who went on to survive the war, that was important. He 
had never been so glad to see anyone in his life 
  Intentionality: 8 
  Responsibility: 10 
  Praise/blame: Praise 
 ‘You’re probably shocked I didn’t pick on the German who got shot, but the poor 
man/boy was never present as an individual.’ 
 R6: ‘The narrator's moments alone in the pillbox, waiting for his friend to return, 
hearing the raid of enemy fire on his camp, and realizing his hideout is about to be 
discovered. The most important event is his distinguishing friend from foe and 
defensively shooting the German soldier, even though he was already dying.’ 
  Intentionality: 10 
  Responsibility: 7 
  Praise/blame: Neither 
 ‘I don't think the narrator should be praised for killing his enemy, nor would he 
be blamed for accidentally killing his friend. Defending oneself in a time of war does 
carry responsibility, but not as much as it does in peace time. The soldiers are 
responsible for protecting their country and neutralizing the enemy; if under attack, 
they cannot be blamed nor praised for killing preemptively or in return.’ 
 R7: ‘When the narrator kills the German soldier who came into the pill box.’ 
  Intentionality: 10 
  Responsibility: 10 
  Praise/blame: Praise 
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 R8: ‘The shooting of the German soldier appears the most important, for if the 
narrator hadn't shot the German there would be no drama to the narrative other than a 
potential bond between the wounded soldier and said narrator.’ 
  Intentionality: 10 
  Responsibility: 1 
  Praise/blame: Neither 
 ‘Great story. The blame is on the related governments in that particular story, for 
if it weren't for the greeds of government war might be a scarcity, and good people 
wouldn't find themselves in such situations.’ 
 R9: ‘The shooting of the German soldier’ 
  Intentionality: 6 
  Responsibility: 8 
  Praise/blame: Neither 
 
 
